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INTRODUCTION 
Time and product variety are the central dimensions that promote the emergence of 
flexibility in the apparel production sector of the United States. As a critical source of 
comparative advantage, the dimension of product cycle time is driving the apparel industry's 
initiative for change (Bailey, 1993). Production flexibility, with faster response to apparel 
market preferences, is now the strategic aim of the industry (Miller & Blais, 1993; Schoer & 
Ziemke, 1994; Tucker & D'Andrea, 1992). Extending from product development to retail 
sales, U.S. apparel firms are adopting technologies and systems that meet requirements for 
reduced cycle times and increased product variety (Lin, Kincade, & Warfield, 1994). These 
efforts to become more sensitive to the influential needs of consumers are being coordinated 
among suppliers, producers, and retailers (Hunter, King, Nuttle, & Wilson, 1993). Within 
and across firms, the apparel production sector is undergoing a structural and dynamic 
transition (Bailey, 1993; Sieling & Curtain, 1988). 
Transitions in the Structure and Dynamics of the Domestic Apparei Industry 
Four major developments are influencing the U.S. apparel industry's transition toward 
flexibility. Each of these developments were addressed in a variety of presentations by 
industry experts at the 1994 International Apparel Research Conference (International 
Apparel Research Committee Proceedings, 1994). Further support for their salience is 
apparent in the apparel trade press, business periodicals, and academic literature. 
The first development involves the recent consolidation of the retail sector and the 
emergence of alternative methods of retailing. Second, there are changes in consumer 
demand and the structiu-e of markets. The third development is the intense competition from 
lower-wage foreign producers. Last, is the availability of computerized technologies for 
most aspects of apparel production. All four developments are interrelated, and share the 
common premise that the apparel supply system is changing to one where goods are being 
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pulled out of the system by consumers, rather than being pushed out of the system by 
manufacturers and retailers (International Apparel Research Committee ftoceedings, 1994). 
Retail changes 
Consolidation of the traditional American retailing sector during the past several years 
continues to intensify. Concentrated power among fewer retail firms has resulted from 
mergers and closings of many large department stores (Agins, 1994; Friedman, 1988). 
Discount retailers, such as manufacttirer's outlet stores, category specialists, and discount 
store chains, have increased their market shares in apparel at the expense of department and 
specialty stores (Germeroth-Hodges, 1993). These newer retail formats have lower cost 
operating structures, due in part, to less expensive real estate and lack of commitment to full 
assortments (Kauftnan, Smith, & Ortmeyer, 1994; Morganowsky, 1993). Retailers with 
distinctive marketing competencies are seeking fresh images using exclusive apparel 
products that serve to differentiate themselves from other retailers in the minds of consumers 
(Conant, Smart, & Solano-Mendez, 1993). Establishment of private label apparel lines by 
retailers has been an effective technique that provides growth opportunities for producers 
who are willing to work directiy with the retailers (Germeroth-Hodges, 1993). Specialized 
tasks of product conceptualization and development formerly done by apparel manufacturers 
is now also in the domain of retailers who want greater merchandise control and better 
margins (Gaskill, 1992). 
The balance of power to determine merchandise, timing, and pricing is shifting away from 
manufacturers and toward retailers (Agins, 1994). In a study that examined the exchange 
relationships between apparel manufacturers and retailers, ZuHone and Morganosky (1995) 
found imbalances in various dimensions of power dependencies between the two. Retailers 
perceived that they were losing control over the determination of markdown prices, 
markdown timing, and merchandise placement in their stores. Manufacturers perceived that 
they were gaining power in these areas as well as that related to advertising content and 
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media selection. Both retailers and manufacturers believed that retailers will have greater 
overall power in the future. 
Relationships between retailers and their vendors have both behavioral and economic 
implications (Skinner, Gassenheimer, & Scon, 1992) requiring dramatic adjustments in how 
apparel goods are supplied to retailers (Agins, 1994). Verticalization in the industry has both 
textile and apparel firms integrating forward into production, sourcing and retailing. At the 
same time, store and catalog retailers are integrating backward into production and supply 
sourcing (Bernard, 1987; Jacobs, 1994). Even though single brand and single product 
apparel companies have performed well financially in the past, fashion trends, such as those 
toward casual clothing in the workplace, are encouraging producers to assure their retail 
customers a varied product mix with expanded distribution channels (Jacobs, 1994). 
Brand-named marketers, such as Liz Claiborne and The Gap, have established 
decentralized production networks throughout many newly industrialized countries. For 
example, in 1990, Levi Strauss, a sportswear manufacturer with $4.2 billion in sales, was 
producing, in part, through a network of 600 worldwide contractors (Bonacich & Waller, 
1994). Through buyer-driven commodity chains, marketers, retailers, and trading companies 
are able to merge research, design, sales, and marketing with the low-cost production 
capabilities of a dense overseas contracting network. Such contracting relieves the buyers 
fixjm owning factories and from carrying the financial obligations of production labor 
(Appelbaum & Gereffi, 1994). 
Contractual flexibility within buyer-driven commodity chains brings a source of value to 
the consumer because worldwide apparel production capacity is utilized more efficientiy to 
meet the needs of ull markets (Appelbaum & Gereffi, 1994). Production is continuously 
shifted to countries and firms offering the most appropriate skills, equipment, capacities, and 
costs (Bonacich, Cheng, Chinchilla, Hamilton, & Ong, 1994). Increasingly liberal import 
restrictions, where combined with advances in telecommunications and transportation, have 
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reduced the need for producer proximity to the market (Alcorta, 1994). 
The widespread and increasing use of computers in the apparel industry is a major 
technological change that has supported contracting activities. With bar coded merchandise, 
data obtained at the point-of-sale provides useful information for the merchandising and 
operational aspects of retailing (Friedman, 1988). Partnerships among suppliers, producers, 
and retailers supported by electronic data interchange (EDI) are becoming more common. 
By creating a technological form of vertically integrated structure, partnerships are an 
innovative method for apparel firms to meet consumer needs (Blackburn 1991). 
At the core of Quick Response (QR) is an electronic infrastructure linking retailers, 
manufacturers, and their suppliers. Information that originates from the consumer's purchase 
behavior is expanded with supplier data, and flows up through the supply chain, allowing 
preferred merchandise to be produced and delivered rapidly (Black, 1994). Historically, 
apparel producers have offered goods to the marketplace through a process where designers 
and product developers tried to create what consumers would want. The traditional retail 
pattern of preordering most apparel merchandise resulted in season-end residual inventories 
as well as stockouts of popular merchandise within the season. Quick Response was 
conceptualized as a method to decrease apparel production time allowing for in-season 
readjustment of merchandise orders according to what consumers were buying (Hunter, 
King, Nuttle, & Wilson, 1993). The dynamic difference with QR networks is that consumers 
now pull apparel goods through the production chain with their buying behavior (Hunter, 
1990). Effective for basic apparel goods, QR replenishment systems are not well established 
for fashion goods, but are being used more frequently by fashion oriented apparel companies 
(Tucker & Corey, 1993). Also, this innovative technology has not been widely adopted by 
small and medium sized producers due, in part, to the large capital expenditures required 
(Agins, 1994; Tucker & D'Andrea, 1992). 
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Consumer demand 
Consumers are demanding a wider range of apparel products within narrower time frames 
(Lin, et al., 1994). Regional and seasonal variations in consumer apparel preferences are 
requiring a wider variety of apparel products to be delivered continuously (Bernard, 1987; 
Jacobs, 1994). Quality and pricing in apparel products are becoming more important to 
American consumers (Jacobs, 1994; Scheller, 1993; Tucker & D'Andrea, 1992). Imbalances 
in supply and demand became an issue in the last decade. During the 1980s, soft goods 
shipments to retailers grew at an annual rate of 13%, while consumer purchase growth of 
these goods remained at 7%. Excess retail inventories in the stagnating apparel market 
forced retailers to leverage producers into reducing margins for price-conscious consumers 
(Jacobs, 1994). 
Tmnort nenetration 
Survey data on manufacturing indu'itries collected by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
offer an overview of the size and scope of the apparel production sector. In 1992, there were 
23,048 establishments in the U.S. producing apparel and other textile products (SIC 23). 
Those firms employed 985,600 people with an annual payroll of over $15.3 billion. 
Production workers alone accounted for 824,000 of the sector's employees, with average 
earnings of $13,809 per production worker (U. S. Department of Commerce, in press). 
Wages for apparel productioii workers in many offshore firms are dramatically lower, 
however, other costs associated with offshore sourcing are not reflected in the offshore labor 
cost data. 
Because countries have varying wage and benefit requirements as well as different data 
collection techniques, simple comparisons of worldwide wage differentials are not always 
meaningful. Nevertheless, hourly wages in the Caribbean region for apparel production 
workers in 1992 ranged from a low of $.41 in Haiti, to a high of $5.50 in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. These offshore figures are in U.S. dollars and reflect fringe benefits and required 
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so charges. Such dramatic differences in wages have encouraged offshore sourcing. For 
exanipie, Mexican operator wages and benefits averaged between $1.01 and $1.15 per hour 
(Cedrone, 1993, November). With a 44 hour week and 50 weeks of work, $1.15 per hour 
would produce an annual wage cost of $2,530 per worker. 
Despite decades of protectionist legislation, the penetration of foreign apparel products 
into the U.S. continues to expand (Yang, 1994). Retailers and manufacturers are increasing 
their global sourcing in both amounts and locations, resulting in higher import penetration of 
apparel goods into the U.S. market (Handfield, 1994; Yang, 1994). In 1992, China became 
the largest foreign apparel supplier to the U.S. market, with imports also growing rapidly 
from other areas in Asia and Canada (Tucker & D'Andrea, 1992). An increasing portion of 
apparel imports enters the United States under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States (HTSUS), provision 9802 program (formerly 807). Garments assembled abroad from 
U.S. components under the 9802 program accounted for nearly 14% of apparel imports in 
1992. Mexican and Caribbean producers have assembled the most HTSUS 9802 imports. 
Garment production has become an important part of the growth in the Mexican maquila 
sector (Chinchilla & Hamilton, 1994). 
Pressures from quotas on Asian goods along with the tariff advantages of the HTSUS 
9802 program are strong incentives for U.S. rnanufacturers and retailers to source products 
fipom Caribbean and Central American countries (Cedrone, 1994, March). It is expected that 
apparel trade will be affected by the provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) among the United States, Canada, and Mexico (Glasmeier, Campbell, & Henton, 
1993; Tucker & D'Andrea, 1992). 
In an environment of competition from imports, apparel retailers and producers have 
adopted a variety of techniques to maintain profitability. Sub-contracting and joint ventures 
of apparel assembly operations in low-wage countries, such as those of the Caribbean, have 
allowed for reduced shipping costs and lower prices for consumers while maintaining the 
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viability of many support jobs in the U.S. (Balkwell & Dickerson, 1994). In a dramatic 
position shift, a recent agreement between the Amalgamated Clothing and Textiles Worker's 
Union (ACTWU) and the Clothing Manufacturer's Association of the United States (CMA) 
allows CMA producers to make 10% of their garments in non-union shops. It is expected 
that these producers will source offshore for their non-union production. Represented by the 
ACrWU are about 36,000 workers in several hundred CMA member firms. This agreement 
also requires producers to abide by International Labor Organization standards that provide 
for decent working conditions in the production of non-union garments (Abend, 1994). 
Technological chanyes in apparel production 
Apparel producers are also responding to these environmental transitions through changes 
in the dynamics of their internal operations. Technology is increasing both the capital 
intensity and the efficiency of the industry (Bailey, 1993; Lin, et al., 1994). Since World 
War n, the strategic intention of the American apparel producers has been to increase 
productivity through incremental improvements in the traditional progressive bundle system. 
This was accomplished by maximizing the output of individual sewing operators (Bailey, 
1993; Hill, 1992a; Hoffman &. Rush, 1988). Domestic apparel manufacturing has its histoiic 
anchor in the progressive bundle system, which is characterized by mass production of high 
volume styles with long lead times. In this system, finished garments emerge from a process 
that coordinates skilled sewers who perform single operations on each garment. Large 
bundles of garment parts move sequentially through production plants as operators are paid a 
productivity incentive through a piece-rate plan. Because this process depends on specialized 
operations, labor-based product costing, and fewer retail selling seasons, it was and continues 
to be perceived as a profitable system for the markets and industrial structure of the 20th 
century (Bailey, 1993). 
However, recent developments in maintaining profitability through the systematic 
reduction of production cycle time are qualitatively different than the incremental 
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improvements in productivity that have predominated in the apparel industry during this 
century (Hoffinan & Rush, 1988). With the progressive bundle system, profits and market 
share were earned by economies of scale through large volume orders and low style variation 
(Cokins, 1994; Lin, et al., 1994). Now that materials and overhead exceed labor in the cost 
content of garments, high inventories of work in process with long production schedules have 
become too expensive for manufacturers to financially tolerate and inconsistent with the 
needs of the market (Awasthi, 1994; Brimson, 1991). Because smaller production volumes 
and increased style variation can reduce productivity and increase costs, producers are 
making more dramatic changes in alternative sewing systems and technology adoption (Lin, 
et al., 1994; Sieling & Curtain, 1988). 
Cost reductions through changes in the organization of apparel production are being 
approached from a variety of strategic options (Bailey, 1993). In order to serve niche 
markets and more frequent retail selling seasons, producers are establishing modular 
manufacturing systems and unit production systems. Although descriptions of these systems 
are covered in the Review of Literature, a brief introduction to them is offered here. In 
modular production, focused teams of operators (ranging from 5-17 members) sew and finish 
smaller runs in less time than is required in the progressive bundle system (Cairere & Litde, 
1989). Unit production systems provide a computer-integrated overhead transport 
technology to move apparel parts among sewing operators. Finished garments are produced 
faster with dramatically less inventory, while current production data are continuously 
available. In addition, cross-training of operators for more than one skilled job allows both 
of these systems to accommodate shorter runs of a wider variety of products. Combinations 
of these systems with sub-assembly of small parts in progressive bundle lines provide another 
means to faster, lower cost production (Hill, 1992a; Schoer & Ziemke, 1994). 
Diffusion of organizational innovation with flexible apparel production systems is thought 
to be low, with about 90% of manufacturers still using the progressive bundle system (Hill, 
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1992a). A recent study of Alabama apparel producers found 77% using bundle systems, and 
a few using a combination of systems (Lin, et al., 1994). Technical innovation, however, is 
diffusing throughout the industry, with specialized equipment for operations such as collar 
attachment or pocket setting (Schroer & ZiennJce, 1994). Many firms have invested in 
computerized design, cutting, embroidery, sewing, information, labeling, packaging, and 
tracking equipment (Cedrone, 1994, June; Tucker & D'Andrea, 1992). Electronic data 
interchange (EDI) is becoming a requirement for producers that are supplying large retailers 
(Agins, 1994). Because new technology is costiy, larger manufacturers with greater capital 
resources have led the industry in its adoption (Tucker & D'Andrea, 1992). In some firms, 
organizational innovation is being coupled with technical innovation. 
Mass production in U.S. manufacturing industries after World War II thrived in 
environments of low uncertainty by adopting mechanistic, bureaucratic structures (Nemetz & 
Frye, 1988). Underlying the foundations of industrialism has been the view of a factory as a 
mere collection of individual machines and operations. Emerging now is the world view of 
manufacturing as a pan of an integrated system that converts materials into economic 
satisfactions (Drucker, 1990; Slaughter, 1994). In the systems view, the factory is not a 
place, but a stage in a process that integrates people, materials, machines, and time (Drucker, 
1990). New organizational forms have evolved to become more responsive and flexible to 
accelerating changes in customer preferences, technology, and competitive forces (Webster, 
1992). 
The focus of this study was on the structural and dynamic cransitions that apparel 
producers were undergoing as they accommodated their customers' demands. Changes in 
retailing, consumer demand, global production, and technology were requiring 
responsiveness from producers that depended on fundamental reform. Reform that was 
behavioral, technological, and structural required an understanding of the dynamics of 
transition to sustainability (Slaughter, 1994). 
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Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to inductively describe strategic apparel production 
behaviors, values, and ideologies that intended to reduce cycle time, increase the range of 
apparel products in the marketplace, and respond to environmental uncenainties. Because 
domination of the productivity paradigm that has supported the progressive bundle system 
and its concomitant piece-rate incentive scheme has been challenged, the fundamental 
assumptions and * r alues within the cultural sphere of the apparel industry were examined. 
Furthermore, the study described the premises of the apparel production culture through the 
perceptions of managers and consultants. By analyzing the ways that managers and 
consultants thought about flexibility, the study focused on how the referent firms were 
becoming flexible. 
Flexibility in apparel production is a salient concept in the apparel trade press; however, 
flexibility as a multidimensional construct has neither been fully defined, described, nor 
developed in the apparel research literature. The review of manufacturing literature more 
broadly indicates that flexibility is a latent variable representing suites of many other 
variables. Attempts have been made to isolate and measure amounts of flexibility within 
other types of manufacturing firms. Apparel is a complex, continuously changing set of soft 
goods products manufactured in a wide range of firms. Consequently, within specific apparel 
firms, quantitative measurements of flexibility may not be as valuable to the audience of this 
research, namely, other apparel firms and the academic community, as would qualitative 
descriptions of flexibility dimensions and techniques. deGroote (1994) asserts that it is 
unnecessary to obtain specific measures of flexibility in order to gain insight into its nature. 
Application of deGroote's theoretical framework of technologies, diversity, and performance 
criteria in a study such as this one demonstrates that flexibility can be defined and analyzed 
on the basis of ordinal properties only. 
In order to address the issues of how apparel managers can create useful flexibilities that 
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will improve the performance of their firms, this study described and compared the 
dimensions of flexibility within and among a variety of apparel production systems. The 
study was conceptually grounded in previous research. Various dimensions of flexibility 
reported in the management literature served as points of depanure for issues and 
relationships of flexibility that were unique to apparel production systems. Through in-
depth, exploratory interviews with apparel production managers and consultants who advise 
the apparel industry, major and minor themes related to flexibility were described. Results 
are useful to guide further flexibility research, to assist in the development of instruments that 
can assess flexibility, and to guide apparel production managers in flexibility related 
decisions. Knowledge gained from this study may also help apparel managers and 
researchers to document the value of production flexibility, to discover elements of flexibility 
in reorientation of production processes, and to develop manufacturing strategies that are 
essentially flexible. 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this study is grounded in three major constructs. Support 
for the salience of these constructs is found throughout the academic literature on 
manufacturing flexibility, the apparel trade press, and written materials from major apparel 
trade organizations. Interpretations of flexibility identified within the broad range of 
manufacturing literature served as points of departure for the framework. As conceptual 
categories, these constructs inductively emerged through preliminary interviews of apparel 
production managers and consultants. Coupled with visits to apparel production plants and 
two nationally recognized apparel production research and demonstration sites, attendance at 
industry seminars on flexible apparel manufacturing provided further clarification for the 
validity of these constructs. 
The following five research questions guided the study and were developed from the three 
constructs that include the ideology of flexibility, the behavioral and technological forms of 
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flexibility, and the barriers to flexibility. Issues related to these constructs affect producers as 
they strategically adopt flexible techniques and philosophies. The relational framework 
among these constructs had not been identified a priori, leaving open the possibility of other 
emergent themes. Final interview instruments were developed from the research questions 
with the goal of allowing relationships between and among constructs to emerge in the data. 
Research questions 
Construct Research Question 
Ideology How do apparel producers perceive the concept of flexibility 
in production? 
How does the concept of flexibility relate to the dominant apparel 
production ideologies of quality, productivity, and profit? 
Forms What are appiirel producers doing (behaviorally, technologically, and 
structurally) to suppon their perceptions of flexibility? 
Barriers What are the barriers to the implementation of flexible production 
philosophies and techniques? 
What knowledge do apparel producers need to overcome their 
resistance to change? 
Objectives 
1. Inductively describe dimensions of apparel production flexibility, including, but not 
limited to market and industry forces that are contributing to the need for increased 
production flexibility, and issues related to labor, management, materials, quality, 
productivity, profit, and growth within a variety of apparel production systems. 
2. Define the concept of flexibility in apparel production by characterizing the meaning and 
significance of flexibility to apparel managers and consultants. 
3. Develop constructs and model(s) that will support a grounded theory of flexibility 
transition within apparel production firms. 
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Deflnitions of Terms 
The following terms are operationally defined for the purpose of this study. All of the 
terms are found in the literature, and most of them are used in the everyday language of 
apparel producers. 
Apparel producer: Organization or individual that plans and executes the conversion of 
resources into garments. Apparel producers may include manufacturers and contractors who 
make clothing. Due to the increase in vertical integration, definitional ambiguity about 
apparel manufacturing has developed. For example, some apparel manufacturers produce 
their own goods, contract for goods from other producers, sell their goods to other retailers, 
and operate their own retail stores. Throughout the Review of Literature, the use of the terms 
contractor, producer, or manufacturer depended on the author's reference. 
Benchmarking: A term used to describe organizational goal setting that is based on the best 
practices in a particular industry. Companies that use benchmarking strategy search for the 
knowledge and techniques of successful competitors so that they can implement exceptional 
practices to improve their own performance. 
Bottleneck: A resource within an apparel production system with a capacity that js less than 
the demand being placed on it (Vonderembse & White, 1991). In a manufacturing process, a 
bottieneck is the station with the highest mean operation time. Utilizations of other stations 
are calculated based on the 100% utilization of the bottleneck (Aly & Subramaniam, 1993). 
In an apparel production system, a particular operation or machine is a bottieneck when its 
capacity is too low to keep up with the flow of products that have to pass through it. 
Generally, it is the capacity of a bottieneck that determines the capacity of an entire plant. 
For example, a finishing department that has a maximum daily capacity of 5,000 garments 
determines the total daily capacity of the plant. Despite the plant's ability to sew 6,000 
garments per day, the finishing department acts as a capacity constraint on the plant. Sewn 
products will pile up behind such a bottieneck, until more finishing capacity is added to 
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reduce it, or the flow of garments to the finishing department is controlled elsewhere in the 
process. 
Cycle time: The relative amount of time required to design, develop, produce, transport, and 
sell a garment at retail. Practicably, the cycle time is equal to or more than the sum of all the 
task times (Vonderembse & White, 1991). 
Electronic data interchange (EDI): An information system shared by retailers and their 
vendors for conducting business transactions electronically (Lewison, 1994). 
Forms of flexibility: Behavioral activities, equipment, and techniques that are supported by 
an ideological strategy of responding to the needs of the market. 
Ideology: A specific form of practical social consciousness that is materially anchored and 
sustained. Ideological forms of social consciousness manifest themselves as sets of values 
and strategies that influence social control. The productive and distributive practices of a 
society lie within an ideological framework of social stracture (Meszaros, 1989). 
Kanban: A manufacturing system that uses cards to indicate when more materials are 
needed in the production system, in order to keep a controlled level of inventory in 
production. Kanban is a Japanese word meaning "visible record" (Vonderembse & White, 
1991). 
Lead time: The amount of time that producers or suppliers (sellers) have from notification of 
an order to the actual production of the order or reception of the order by the buyer. 
Production flexibility: The capacity of a production system to adapt to changes in the 
environment and changes in process requirements (Swamidass, 1988). As a global measure 
of the opportunity within a manufacturing system to add value to its products, flexibility 
permits a firm to cope with environmental uncertainty by allowing it to switch products, 
volumes, and parts quickly, thereby maximizing its responsiveness to market demands 
(Gupta & Somers, 1992). The definition of production flexibility is further developed in the 
Review of Literature. 
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Quick Response (QR): A program initiated among apparel industry members to coordinate 
suppliers, producers, and retailers to reduce the amount of time apparel products require from 
inception to final consumer sale. At the core of the apparel industry's "Quick Response" 
(QR) initiative is an electronic infrastructure linking retailers, manufacturers, and their 
suppliers with information that originates from the consumer's purchase behavior, is 
expanded with supplier data, and flows through the supply complex allowing preferred 
merchandise to be produced and delivered rapidly (Blackburn, 1991; Hunter, 1990). 
Garments carry bar coded tags that are scanned at the point of sale. These data are gathered 
and used analytically to determine the rates and amounts of products being sold. Information 
from the point of sale is transmitted electronically back to producers and suppliers in order to 
expedite replacement inventory. 
Stock keeping unit (SKU): One garment of a particular combination of style, size, and 
color. A category of merchandise for which separate records for stock and sales are 
maintained (Lewison, 1994). 
Technology; "...practical implementations of intelligence" (Ferre, 1988, pp. 26). The term 
"implementations" implies that technologies are concretely embodied in artifacts, 
implements, or social organization. Technologies are practical in that they are not ends in 
themselves. The technology of a society reflects the knowledge of what the society's 
members know how to do (Ferre, 1988). 
Throughput: A steady-state average output of a production system (Hopp & Simon, 1993). 
Some authors refer to throughput as the revenue gained from the output of a production 
system (Seidmann & Tenenbaum, 1994). In this study, throughput refers to the value or 
quantity of physical goods produced, while throughput rate refers to the time it takes to 
produce the goods. 
Work in process: The amount of inventory that the producer has partially completed. Work 
in process refers to materials that are committed to production, such as cut goods or partially 
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sewn goods (Vonderembse & White, 1991). 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is arranged as follows. Chapter two covers the review of literature 
according to the three constructs of the study, including a summary of the literature's 
contribution to the study. The third chapter describes research methods, including sampling 
procedure, data collection, and data analysis. It also introduces support for the qualitative 
methods and emergent design. Results are developed in the fourth chapter as analysis of the 
original data. An examination of the issues surrounding the research questions and their 
foundational const-"ucts is made. Further conceptual analysis based on emergent themes 
provides a relational model grounded in the data. The fifth chapter summarizes the study as 
it traces the implications of the work. Limitations of the investigation evolve into 
recommendations for further research. References are listed in alphabetical order at the end, 
while the appendices contain data collection instruments and coding guides. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Despite the recent development of a substantial body of academic literature on flexibility 
in manufacturing industries, academic studies of flexibility specific to apparel and related 
soft goods production are still limited. Organizational and technological innovations in 
apparel production have been dominant issues in the apparel trade press. Through anecdotal 
accounts of successful firms, as well as advice from industry consultants, the trade press has 
attempted to educate industiy managers about production flexibility. Apparel research 
facilities that are funded by educational institutions, government, and private industry are 
progressive in their technical smdies of flexible improvements in production processes. 
Consequently, their research offers some quantitative evidence of the benefits of flexibility. 
All of these sources contribute to the growing body of knowledge on flexibility in apparel 
production. 
Three bodies of literature are examined here. They can be categorized as: 1) generic 
manufacturing smdies on strategic flexibility; 2) apparel trade press articles; and 3) technical 
research papers on apparel production. These categories of literature are cross-reviewed 
according to the three constructs of this study: the ideology of flexibility, the behavioral and 
technological forms of flexibility, and the barriers to flexibility. Constructs are reviewed as 
they relate to flexibility in manufacturing in general, and apparel production firms 
specifically. 
Within and across these bodies of literature, there are subtle but comprehensive issues of 
corporate culture, shifting strategic paradigms, and conflicting related ideologies. The three 
principal bodies of literature outlined above are founded theoretically in a range of scholarly 
literature that addresses these issues. In order to gather and interpret the range of flexibility 
literature into a meaningful synthesis for this study, contemporary management literature on 
these comprehensive issues is reviewed within specific sections where its theoretical support 
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is most influential. 
Because a large body of highly technical literature on hard goods flexible manufacturing 
systems, robotics, and microprocessor controlled production operations exists in a variety of 
engineering and production journals, their contribution to this study and to this review of 
literature was considered but omitted. These works address what is specifically known as 
flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), characterized by a group of flexible machine tools 
connected to a material handling system (Gunasekaran, Martikainen, & Yli-Olli, 1993). 
FMS production systems differ from labor intensive manufacturing systems, such as those of 
apparel, in that there are not operators for every machine, and set-up and operations are 
performed by robots or by the machines themselves. The key differences are in automated 
material handling and multi-skilled labor that supervises equipment rather than performs 
individual operations (Gunasekaran, et al., 1993; Kaighobadi & Venkatesh, 1994; Mair, 
1994). With the exception of a few FMS works that have direct implications for this study, 
that body of literature is not reviewed here. Its technical concentration and hard goods 
orientation are not related to the essential human themes and the soft goods focus of this 
study. 
The review of literature is divided into sections according to the three research constructs. 
Because definitional ambiguity about apparel manufacturing has developed, the use of the 
terms contractor, producer, or ir.anufacturer depends on the author's reference throughout the 
review. The literature is then summarized for its contribution to the study. 
Ideology of Flexibility 
Literature encompassing the construct of flexibility as an ideology focuses on a recent 
range of work in operations management, strategic management, economics, and 
organizational theory. The research agenda on the ideology of flexibility covers three broad 
categories in the business literature: quantitative measurements and predictive models of 
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flexibility, taxonomies of flexibility forms, and financial valuation of flexibility (Sethi & 
Sethi, 1990). In addition to its definitions and dimensions, the ideology of flexibility 
includes its role in the firm and industry culture, its theoretical perspectives, and its 
competition with other dominant ideologies, such as productivity, quality, and profit 
Strategic management literature offers theoretical support for flexibility from several 
perspectives: organizational theories, options theories, and economic theories. These 
avenues of literature are traced from the practical to the theoretical, and begin with a variety 
of definitions and dimensions of flexibility. 
Definitions of flexibility 
Flexibility as strategy The concept of flexibility is captured within a larger construct of 
strategy. Strategy is defined as "...actions or patterns of actions intended for the attainment of 
goals." (Swamidass & Newell, 1987, pp. 509). The hierarchical viev/ of strategy refers to 
three levels: 1) corporate strategy addresses the selected industries, product markets, and 
resource allocation; 2) business strategy lies within a multi-business corporation and is 
designed to maximize each firm's ability to compete with its distinctive competencies; and 3) 
manufacturing strategy involves a functional area of the firm that maximizes its competencies 
while capturing corporate and business level missions (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Swamidass 
& Newell, 1987). Effectively using manufacturing strengths to achieve business goals and to 
contribute to long-term growth is the expected outcome of manufacturing strategy 
(Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). Flexibility is now being recognized as one of the most 
significant dimensions of manufacturing strategy (de Groote, 1994). 
In their review of empirical manufacturing strategy studies. Minor, Hensley, and Wood 
(1994) found that manufacturing strategy is most effective when it is coordinated with and 
supported by business level strategy. A longitudinal study of three firms' manufacturing 
strategies found two significant reasons for strategically adopting a flexible manufacturing 
system. The first reason was that the distinction of the firm's image in the eyes of its 
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customers was important. The second reason was the need to increase manufacturing 
capacity (Meredith & Vineyard, 1993). 
The scope of flexibility is very broad. Total flexibility has been defined as "... a global 
measure of the opportunity of a manufacturing system to add value to its products." (Gupta & 
Somers, 1992, p. 168). Faced with growing imports, American industries are creating more 
flexible production processes as competitive strategy. Increased adaptability allows them to 
offer a wide range of products to meet the needs of specific market niches while being 
geographically closer to their markets than foreign producers (Gerwin, 1993). Flexible 
production capacity may be held in reserve, as in the case of military apparel contractors or 
seasonal market demands. Surge capacity, for example, is maintained for national 
emergencies when contractors must dramatically increase production (Defense Logistics 
Agency, 1992; Gerwin, 1993). 
Most research on flexibility in manufacturing has applied to operational decisions related 
to production planning, scheduling, control, and investment in advanced manufacturing 
technology. Ownership of strategic options is a recurring concept in flexibility research. 
Rexibility permits a firm to cope with environmental uncertainty by allowing it to switch 
products, volumes, and parts quickly, thereby maximizing its responsiveness to market 
demands (deGroote, 1994). 
Gerwin (1993) proposed a strategic model that holds environmental uncertainty as one of 
five variables (see Figure 1.). The other variables include manufacturing strategy, methods 
for delivering flexibility, required manufacturing flexibility, and performance measurement. 
Paths of the Gerwin model reveal the generic strategy of adaptation as the firm's behavior 
moves defensively from uncertainty into strategy, on to flexibility and beyond. Implicit in 
the framework is an expanded definition of flexibility as an investment that creates options 
for a manufacturing firm to use either defensively or offensively. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Adaptation (Gerwin, 1993) 
Flexibility as adaptive response Because definitions are dependent on context and 
purpose (Ferre, 1988), researchers have conceptualized production flexibility as an adaptive 
response to environmental uncertainty (Gerwin, 1993; Gupta & Goyal, 1989). 
Manufacturing flexibility refers to the capacity of a production system to adapt to changes in 
the environment and changes in process requirements (Swamidass, 1988). Flexibility has 
also been defined"... as a hedge against the diversity of the environment." (de Groote, 1994, 
p. 933). 
Environmental uncertainty is itself a complex construct comprised of the firm's internal 
disturbances and external forces. Internal variations include problems such as equipment 
breakdowns, supply shortages, variable task times, and queuing delays. External forces are 
the current and potential probabilities that variations may exist in levels of demand, prices, 
product mix, and availability of materials. External uncertainty can arise from the actions of 
competitors, government regulations, consumer preferences, and technological innovations 
(Sethi & Sethi, 1990). 
A recent paper by Nayyar and Bantel (1994) extends the importance of decision speed and 
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develops it with the concept of competitive variety. This distinctive competence is referred 
to as competitive agility. Firms that face multiple environmental conditions find competitive 
value in rapid decision-making as well as implementation speeds, thereby making them more 
"agile". Because uncertainties may be current or potential, they exist for levels of product 
demand, prices, product variety, or availability of resources. Technological advances and 
actions of competitors are also uncertainties that carry unknown probabilities (Sethi & Sethi, 
1990). The time required to decide what to do is as essential an element of flexibility as is 
the time required to do it (Nayyar & Bantel, 1994). Issues of organizational structure, 
communications, and functional specialization also arise from the speed/variety imperatives. 
Dimensions of flexibility 
Dimensions of flexibility in manufacturing have been identified through literature reviews 
as well as through empirical studies. As a way of conceptualizing different types of 
flexibility, dimensions can be very specific, or very general. This section covers literature on 
the specific dimensions of flexibility, such as product mix flexibility. Globally, other ways to 
think about dimensions of flexibility include static and dynamic flexibilities, flexibility as 
dynamic efficiency, and the complexity of flexibility. These general conceptualizations 
follow the specific dimensions of flexibility. 
Specific dimensions of flexibility Flexibility dimensions add definitional clarification 
and are especially relevant to apparel production. These behavioral dimensions are responses 
to specific strategic objectives that are in turn based on types of uncertainty. The puipose of 
Table 1 is to show the wide variety of flexibility dimensions that have been developed in the 
literature. The chronological order of their appearances in publications is indicated. Some 
authors have gathered dimensions from across other studies. Redundancy of dimensions is 
evident For example, the concept of volume flexibility is present in four of the models, but 
it is definitionally the same as the output flexibility concept studied by Fiegenbaum and 
Kamani (1991). As the dimensions of flexibility were refined over time, Gerwin (1993) 
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Table 1. Dimensions of flexibility identified in the literature 
Swamidass (1988) Fiegenbaum & Karnani (1991) 
Action flexibility Output flexibility 
Adulation flexibility 
Application flexibility Gupta & Somers (1992) 
A^mbly system flexibility Expansion/market flexibility 
Demand flexibility Material handling flexibility 
Design flexibility Routing flexibility 
Dispatch flexibility Machine flexibility 
Job flexibility Market flexibility 
Machine flexibility Product/production flexibility 
Machining flexibility Process flexibility 
Material flexibility Programming flexibility 
Mix flexibility Volume flexibility 
Modiflcation flexibility 
Process flexibility Gerwin (1993) 
Program flexibility Mix (product variety) flexibility 
Product flexibility Changeover flexibility 
Production flexibility Modification flexibility 
Routing flexibility Volume flexibility 
State flexibility Rerouting flexibility 
Volume flexibility Material flexibility 
Sethi & Sethi (1990) 
Machine flexibility 
Material handling flexibility 
Operation flexibility 
Process flexibUity 
Product flexibility 
Routing flexibility 
Volume flexibility 
Expansion flexibUity 
Program flexibility 
Production flexibility 
grouped them into more abstract and inclusive concepts. Within Gerwin's concept of mix 
flexibility are captured many of Swamidass' (1988) terms that had appeared in operations 
management literature. Gerwin's (1993) model of the dimensions of flexibility offers the 
most concise and holistic framework. 
Sethi and Sethi's (1990) flexibility constructs were built from literature that had 
accumulated over twenty years and were developed to encompass most of the definitional 
and conceptual ambiguity in the literature. Examples of these constructs include machine 
flexibility that describes the variety of operations machines can perform within cost and 
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setup constraints, expansion flexibility as the effort needed to increase capacity, and market 
flexibility that depends on the ease with which a production system can adapt to a changing 
environment. 
Gupta and Somers' (1992) dimensions are empirically derived and accommodate the 
redundancy among studies. The value of their work lies in the development of the instrument 
itself. A comprehensive instrument was constructed from the accumulated literature on 
manufacturing flexibility, tested, and analyzed with multivariate methods. The reliability of 
this 21-item instrument is high enough to indicate that the items perform well in capturing the 
constructs of flexibility. 
The conceptual model of flexibility proposed by Gerwin (1993) includes six dimensions 
of manufacturing flexibility: mix, changeover, modification, volume, rerouting, and material. 
These dimensions apply at levels within the activity process, such as at the machine level, the 
cellular level, the plant level, and the multi-plant level (Swamidass, 1988). Furthermore, 
each dimension of flexibility possesses a scope of range and time (Slack, 1988). Production 
systems are more flexible if they can manufacture a wider range of goods or a greater range 
of volumes. The amount of time it takes a firm to produce goods or to change production 
within its range is also critical to flexibility (Gerwin, 1993). 
Mix flexibility refers to the strategic objective of product diversity, as it encompasses thp 
range of product line and variations within those product lines. The temporal aspect of mix 
flexibility involves speed of setups to produce the increased range of products and their 
variants. Changeover flexibility is essentially product innovation through the firm's ability to 
change products as the markets detemiine product life cycles. The range aspect of 
changeover involves the number of major design changes, while the temporal aspect refc? to 
the period of time from design to production startup. Modification flexibility refers to 
responsiveness to customer requirements through accommodation of minor design changes in 
products, by number and by rate. Volume flexibility involves increases or decreases in 
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production volume levels throughout the range of products and time obligations. Rerouting 
flexibility focuses on process flow and machine downtime with consideration of the number 
of options for rerouting and amount of time rerouting requires. Last, material flexibility is 
the ability of a manufacturer to accommodate variations in materials in terms of number of 
variations and how much time is required to deal with them (Gerwin, 1993). 
Static and dynamic flexibility The United States is experiencing a fundamental change 
in its industrial sector. Reorganization of traditional production with a focus on 
manufacturing skills will determine the transition (Cohen & Zysman, 1987). Cohen and 
Zysman (1987, pp. 88) define a transition as "... a period of uncertain and unstable 
parameters linking two phases with stable parameters..." Manufacturing flexibility is the 
"slogan of that transition" (Cohen & Zysman, 1987, pp. 130). Within that transition is a 
distinction between static and dynamic flexibility. The distinction between the two forms of 
flexibility is critical, not the differences in techniques used to achieve the flexibilities (Cohen 
& Zysman, 1987). 
Static flexibility is the ability of a producer to adjust its operations to changing conditions 
in the market, such as rising or falling demand or the mix of products (Cohen & Zysman, 
1987). This adjustment occurs within fixed product types and production structure. Static 
flexibility implies the firm's ability to change its strategic direction, level of production, 
product line composition, labor variables, wages, work organization, or many other things 
(Cohen & Zysman, 1987). Static flexibility forms include many of the dimensions of 
flexibility identified by previously reviewed authors within specific contexts. Techniques to 
achieve static flexibility may be technological, political, or organizational. Examples include 
adopting new machinery, renegotiating with unions to reduce job categories, or develop a 
network of subcontractors (Cohen & Zysman, 1987). 
In contrast, dynamic flexibility goes beyond static flexibility in that it becomes the long 
term capacity to develop production innovation that steadily improves productivity. Many 
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strategic decisions that seem flexible do not fall into the definition of dynamic flexibility. 
For example, offshore sourcing is very common in the apparel industry, as manufacturers 
seek lower wage production (Mytelka, 1991). However, moving production offshore rather 
than developing the skills of domestic workers to steadily improve the production process 
would not be considered a dynamic flexible strategy according to the definitions of Cohen 
and Zysman (1987). Their persuasive rhetoric cautions U.S. manufacturers: 
A strategy of trying to hold onto the high value-added activities while 
subcontracting production to foreign producers who have a manufacturing 
edge defines Ae fast track to disaster. Over time, American firms will not be 
able to control what they cannot produce. The only viable strategy for 
American firms is to combine advanced technology with high-skilled labor 
and innovative management to create high-wage, high-productivity, flexible 
production capabilities. (Cohen & Zysman, 1987, pp. 261) 
Let us summarize our position as a simple proposition. Lose control of the 
manufacturing or production process of your product and you risk losing 
control of both the technology and the final markets. (Cohen & Zysman, 
1987, pp. 129) 
The basis of competitive advantage in apparel and footwear in the past depended heavily 
on inexpensive labor (Cohen & Zysman, 1987). When U.S. companies have been tlireatened 
by competitors producing low cost goods with inexpensive foreign labor, they have 
sometimes been able to transform a labor-intensive process into one that is more technology 
and capital intensive (Cohen & Zysman, 1987). Competition under mass production systems 
focused on price. However, competition under "flexibilism" focuses on customization, 
quality, and price (Goss & Knudsen, 1994). 
Dynamic flexibility requires changing production capacities and technologies over the 
long-term. However, innovative transitions must also be efficient, in order to improve 
performance. What internal capacities firms have that allow them to efficiently change is 
considered in the next section. 
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Flexibility as dynamic efficiency The dramatic changes in technology and markets that 
have occurred in manufacturing industries can cause abrupt and irreversible shifts in the 
market positions of individual firms. Established positions in traditional markets do not 
ensure for a firm the capacity to change. Skills required for success in one set of 
technologies may not be useful in a new set of technologies. Because static efficiency is the 
ability to profit from stable conditions, the apparel production sector in the U.S. benefited for 
years firom static efficiency. On the other hand, dynamic efficiency is the capacity to adapt to 
changing circumstances (Cohen & Zysman, 1987). A number of research centers 
representing the apparel industry are focusing their work on the development of adaptable 
capacity in order to achieve dynamic efficiency. 
A research program sponsored by the Defense Logistics Agency to improve apparel 
production technology is addressing the industry's need for dynamic efficiency. Technology 
is being developed to advance the industry from the production of ready-to-wear garments 
sized according to standard anthropometric data, to the production of made-to-measure 
garments that use body scanning technology for individual consumers. This program also 
seeks to advance production from traditional methods to computer integrated manufacturing 
that use product representation standards in communicating requirements. Ultimately, the 
program's goal is to move the industiy toward integrated enterprises where all aspects of 
apparel product life cycle are coordinated through a framework of standards, practices, and 
supporting technology (Defense Logistics Agency, 1992; Moncarz & Lee, 1993). 
Complexity of flexibility Operationalizing flexibility has been difficult because the 
domain of flexibility has not been established. Some measures based on the characteristics of 
manufacturing processes have not captured the complexity of flexibility (Slack, 1988). 
Gerwin (1993) asserts that applied investigations of flexibility wUl be hampered without 
valid and reliable measures, and that operationalizing flexibility is the most important 
research priority. Quantitative investigations have suffered from industry specificity. 
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restrictive assumptions, and significant limitations. 
Dixon (1991) addressed the multidimensional concept of flexibility in the textile 
industry. By developing a measure that supported the inclusion of firm size, structure, and 
technology, he proposed a general model of flexibility. Another instrument for measuring 
and analyzing manufacturing flexibility was developed by Gupta and Somers (1992). In a 
survey of senior executives of manufacturing firms, 21 items representing nine principal 
components were identified as valid and reliable measures of flexibility. As a framework for 
development and testing of hypothetical flexibility relationships, this model is the most 
comprehensive. 
In another review of literature on flexible manufacturing systems, the complexity of 
interrelationships between flexibility dimensions and various characteristics of production 
systems is salient (Gunasekaran, et al., 1993). Swamidass & Newell (1987) concluded from 
an empirical study of 35 manufacturers that regardless of the production process used, the 
greater the flexibility of that process, the better the firm's growth performance. Furthermore, 
the study concluded that the role of manufacturing managers in strategic decision making 
was a function of environmental uncertainty. Firms whose manufacturing managers were 
highly involved strategically, performed better. 
A proposed path analytic model that emphasized the sequential, non-linear relationships 
among four constructs was deduced from manufacturing literature and tested. These 
constructs included: 1) manufacturing flexibility; 2) perceived environmental uncertainty; 3) 
economic performance; and 4) the role of managers in strategic decision making. The 
authors recognized that these four constructs represented an underlying structure of many 
other variables such as industry type, process, size, structure, and technology (Swamidass & 
Newell, 1987, pp. 513). 
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Management systems 
Strategy and environmental adaptation are major themes in the ideology of flexibility. In 
order to better understand the ideology of flexibility within the context of manufacturing 
firms, it is useful to address the ways that people think about manufacturing firms, and how 
these firms have developed over time. The next section covers literature related to 
metaphorical perceptions of manufacturing firms. They include mechanistic management 
systems, organic management systems, and organizations as cultural systems. This literature 
serves as a frame of reference for the ideological development of the apparel industry. 
Additionally, the metaphorical descriptions of organizations lend some understanding to the 
subsequent theories of production flexibility. 
Mechanistic management systems As organizations are forced to adapt to technical 
and commercial changes, the mechanistic management systems that were appropriate for the 
stable conditions of the past evolve toward an "organic" forai of organization (Bums & 
Stalker, 1961). Mechanistic systems are characterized by the following: 1) hierarchical 
structure of authority, communication, and control, with exclusive knowledge anchored at the 
top of the hierarchy for centralized decision making; 2) differentiation of specialized tasks 
into functional roles with precise definitions of the rights, obligations, and technical methods 
that are attached to those functional roles; 3) working behavior governed by decisions that are 
communicated vertically from superiors to subordinates, with required loyalty and obedience; 
and 4) a greater respect for the prestige and importance of local, internal knowledge, skills, 
and experience than for general knowledge and education (Bums & Stalker, 1961). 
The mechanistic form is essentially a framework of two principles: definition and 
dependence. All behavior is conceived and carried out according to the structure of the 
organization. Individuals work for the organization and struggle to carry out their assigned 
tasks within and across the functional barriers. Tasks and jobs are neatly defined so that 
individuals know what they do not have to know or do, as much as they know what their 
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precise duties are. The more job definition is developed by management, the more 
omniscient managers seem. No one is overburdened with undelegated responsibility, so that 
all separate functions are connected to defined roles that extend through the hierarchy of 
superiors and subordinates (Bums & Stalker, 1961). Mass production manufacturers have 
thrived in environments of low uncertainty by assuming bureaucratic, mechanistic structures 
(Nemetz & Frye, 1988). 
A recent case study of an American tailored apparel producer detailed these mechanistic 
characteristics and the internal conflicts that environmental changes were inducing. Major 
retail customers insisted on production quality. Despite a newly professed managerial 
commitment to both product and production quality, retained beliefs of maximizing output at 
individual operations remained the dominant imperative. Bureaucratic structures could not 
be overcome by operators and supervisors who were struggling to contiol variation both 
within the process and within the materials. Consequently, high quality failure characterized 
the outcome of a new quality commitment (Scheller, 1993). 
After studying the construction industry, Stinchcombe (1959) asserted that under 
conditions of economic uncertainty and technological variability, craft administration is a 
more rational form of production than a bureaucratic form because it requires less capital, 
thereby reducing overhead. Craft production is the type of administration that dominates 
industries producing individual products through specialized knowledge. On the other hand, 
bureaucratic administrative forms in manufacturing are characterized by mass production, 
with a routinization of both the work and the product. In traditional trades, individual 
craftsmen were guided in their production decisions by a collective cultural knowledge-a 
combination of ideology and behavioral techniques. However, in mass production, jobs have 
been fragmented and specialized so that individual workers do not have a wide enough 
knowledge base to make decisions. Instead, many decisions are made bureaucratically 
through collective knowledge in the form of procedures or regulations. Kusterer (1978) 
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found in his studies of factory workers that limited craft production forms existed within 
bureaucratic factories. Management directives may have specified production goals and 
deadlines, but the procedures for accomplishing the production were left up the workers. In 
another example, new employees were trained by existing employees, but management did 
not specify how that training had to be done. It is evident in these cases that 
micromanagement of tasks by bureaucratic directives is not functionally practical, and that 
craft forms within bureaucracies may be valuable. 
Cognitive structures of managers Manufacturing firms in the U.S. are still dominated by 
a scientific management tradition that influences the design of production activities. This 
notion holds people within the organization as being unpredictable creators of mistakes. The 
workforce was considered a source of problems, not as a source for problem solving. Given 
the inherent instability in factory production, the traditional managerial response has been to 
integrate people out of the production process by breaking down the system into the smallest 
possible parts and creating a bureaucracy to manage the parts (Alic, 1993). 
Larger firms in the apparel industry have been characterized by hierarchical leadership 
structures. Leaders in such stmctures acquire dominating positions that can suppress the flow 
of ideas. One of the reasons that teamwork stmctures are replacing hierarchical structures in 
manufacturing industries is that managers see the need for an increase in the involvement of 
more people within the organization (Mueller, 1994). Senior managers play an integrative 
role in the management team. In a study that linked dimensions of the scope of firms with 
the cognitive complexity of their senior managers, Calori, Johnson, and Samin (1994), 
showed the importance of a two-fold analysis. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of 
multinational firms were found to have complex understandings of the structures of their 
industries. Different from the dimension of the geographic scope of their industries, was the 
understanding of the dynamics of their industries, especially through links with foreign 
parent companies. The study demonstrated that senior managers have cognitive complexity 
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that parallels the complexity of the business environments their firms operate within. 
Ganz (1981) asserts that the processes of creation, diffusion, and utilization of knowledge 
within an organization depend upon the extent to which the organization's structure is subject 
to reform. Social change and technical change are integrated in complex ways within 
organizations (Ganz, 1981). With higher levels of automation, fewer people who are more 
skilled are required in the workforce, in order to solve complex problems in the factory (Alic, 
1993). Manufacturing firms that have adopted teamwork structures to better utilize 
knowledge have been forced to accommodate their new objectives through their existing 
structural and historical constraints (Mueller, 1994). 
Organic management systems In contrast to the mechanistic form, organic forms are 
working organizations where individuals work with the organization to serve the general 
aim of the firm. As polar opposites of mechanistic structures, organic forms of organizations 
are able to adapt to changing conditions because of their inherent characteristics: 1) a 
network structure of control, authority, and lateral communication wiili pockets of 
specialized knowledge and expertise that contribute to the common goals and team 
commitments; 2) continuous adjustment and redefinition of individual tasks through 
consultations with other people and communication that consists of information and advice 
rather than directives and decisions; 3) technical or commercial knowledge located anywhere 
in the network; and 4) creation of value through affiliations and technical expertise that are 
external to the organization (Bums & Stalker, 1961). 
Even though organic systems are not hierarchical, they remain stratified. Authority is 
owned by those who demonstrate expertise and capability, while the location of authority is 
settled by consensus. Individuals within organic organizational structures have heavier 
demands placed on them because their jobs are not self-contained and precisely defined. 
They have to continuously participate with others through appropriate language and activities 
that are meaningful to everyone. Furthermore, there is less definition in status roles and 
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modes of communication. The greater the extent and rate of change the organization is 
experiencing, the more the activities of members become determined by the real tasks and 
needs of the firm, rather than by routines and instructional policies (Bums & Stalker, 1961). 
Studies done by Woodward (1965) showed that mass production firms manufactured large 
volumes of standardized products in highly mechanistic, organizational structures, and that 
organizational structure was more organic for firms that produced a wider range of goods. 
Shepaid (1956) addressed the radical differences between "Scientific Management" and 
the emerging forms of industrial organizations that made more optimal use of human 
resources: 
The central emphases in this development are as follows: 
1. Wide participation in decision-making, rather than centralized decision­
making. 
2. The face-to-face group, rather than the individual, as the basic unit of 
organization. 
3. Mutual confidence, rather than authority, the integrative force in 
organization. 
4. The supervisor as the agent for maintaining intragroup and intergroup 
communication, rather than as the agent of higher authority. 
5. Growth of members of the organization to greater responsibility, rather than 
external control of the member's performance or their tasks. 
(Shepard, 1956, pp. 125) 
Nearly forty years later, these are the essential changes that have been taking place in 
American manufacturing organizations. Because these two forms of organizational systems 
represent a polarity, many intermediate stages between them are represented in organizations. 
The relationship between the mechanistic form and the organic form is elastic so that firms 
can operate with management systems that have elements of both forms for varying 
environmental conditions (Bums & Stalker, 1961). 
Organizations as cultures Smircich (1983a) shows how current themes in organization 
and management research were derived from anthropological concepts of culture, as well as 
from concepts in organizational theory. Smircich examined five viable modes of 
organizational research that portray culture. Culture is represented as either a dependent 
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variable, an independent variable, or as a root metaphor for conceptualizing the organization. 
The latter promotes a view of organizations as "...expressive forms, manifestations of human 
consciousness" (Smircich, 1983a, pp. 347). Culture as a root metaphor extends the 
instrumental view of organizations as mechanistic entities comprised of functional 
specializations. The root metaphor view also extends beyond the adaptive view that 
represents organizations as organisms with adaptive capabilities. The research agenda 
supported by culture as a root metaphor conceives organizations in terms of their expressive, 
ideational, and symbolic aspects, not in solely economic or material terms (Smircich, 1983b). 
Viewing apparel production organizations as knowledge systems necessitates the 
assumption that thought is related to behavior. If organizations rest in a system of meaning, 
then they do not depend on bureaucratic rules and structures (Morgan, 1986). Many 
organizational problems are embedded in the thinking of their members. A close relationship 
between thoughts and actions allows for the creation of new ways of organizing (Morgan, 
1986). Although the focus in the culture metaphor is on language, symbols, rituals, and so 
forth, these are not perceived as cultural artifacts. Instead, they are perceived as 
"...generative processes that yield and shape meanings and that are fundamental to the very 
existence of organization" (Smircich, 1983a, pp. 353). 
Schein (1985) outlined common meanings of organizational culture found in the literature. 
These meanings that guide organizations focus on observed behaviors, norms, dominant 
values, philosophies, rules, and the organizations' interpersonal climate. As reflections of 
organizational culture, tiiese meanings do not define culture. Instead, Schein defines 
organizational culture as: 
...a pattern of basic assumptions-invented, discovered, or developed by a given 
group as it leams to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration-that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, 
to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems. (Schein, 1985, pp. 8) 
One of the strengths of viewing the organization as a cultural or multicultural system is 
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that it reveals the shared interpretive schemes that create and recreate meanings. This ability 
supports the creation of organized action and change by influencing the language, norms, 
ceremonies, and other social practices that transmit ideology. Ideologies, beliefs, and values 
guide action. In the past, managers have seen themselves performing rational duties of 
designing organizational structures and job descriptions. Through the coordination of 
business activities in functional departments and development of schemes to motivate 
employees, managers have operated through patterns of authority in established hierarchies. 
The advent of corporate cultural control as a managerial duty allows managers to see 
themselves as symbolic actors who have the roles of fostering desirable patterns of meaning 
in their organizations. That culture can be manipulated in an instrumental way reflects a 
mechanistic pattern of thinking about organizations (Morgan, 1986). 
In an analysis of organizational culture, Baligh (1994) proposed a theory on the goodness 
and badness of "fit" between structural components and cultural components. Organizational 
cultures that value groups over individuals, and believe that cooperation is more efficient in 
achieving organizational goals, have different structures for effective performance than 
competitive, individualistic cultures. Cultures that promote teamwork and cooperative 
harmony have a high level of participation by members in making comprehensive decision 
rules. Furthermore, these cultures reward individuals based on group performance. 
In a broad review of coiporate culture literature, Willmott (1993) asserts that the 
phenomenon of corporate "culturism" (the perception of managerial cultural control in an 
organization) relates historically to the adoption of more flexible forms of business. Popular 
philosophies such as Total Quality Management (TQM) have been addressed in management 
literatiue for many years. Common to these programs is the expansion of the autonomy of 
workers that forces them to commit to"... a monolithic structure of feeling and thought" 
(Willmott, 1993, pp. 517). Employees within strong corporate cultures are encouraged to 
devote themselves to the values and ideologies of the firm, and to assess their worth to the 
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firm accordingly. Willmott asserts that the crafting of corporate culture extends the self-
direction and self-control of Theory Y (McGregor, 1960) to produce a distinctive philosophy 
and form of management control. By seeking to construct consensus within the firm, 
corporations manage the process through which employees acquire values. 
Implications of corporate culture control Willmott (1993) argues that the implications 
of corporate cultural control are profound. Employees are selected through specific hiring 
practices and promoted through the perceived acceptance of the firm's core values. Mere 
compliance is insufficient, because corporations expect more than operant conditioning of 
behavior. The homogenization of values and norms within the organization denies the 
development of conditions in which critical reflection is fostered. By eliminating pluralism 
and the associated conflict of values its diversity brings, a monocultural environment is 
created. Suppressing the indeterminacy and ambivalence of individuals robs them of the 
ability to question or think critically about the organization. Therefore, the normative 
framework of the organization creates a firm ±at is lacking in the capacity for internal 
change. Even when employees avoid deep identification with corporate values by behaving 
with calculated compliance, they remain unable to alter the managerial control that extends 
into the affective domain of workers (Willmott, 1993). The cultural metaphor of 
organizations thus exposes a reinterpretation of traditional managerial processes and 
behavioral concepts (Morgan, 1986). 
Ideological development of the aooarel industry 
As the mass production system of apparel manufacturing developed, a conventional 
wisdom about how the system best functioned, using machines and labor, developed along 
with it. Studying the relationships between the conventional wisdom of apparel managers 
and operators and the paradigm shift toward more flexible forms of production raises some 
theoretical issues. The following section describes literature related to the ideological 
development of the apparel industry through the cognitive structures of managers. 
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Ideology and manufacturing Ideology is described by Meszaros (1989) as a specific 
form of practical social consciousness that is materially anchored and sustained. Various 
ideological forms of social consciousness manifest themselves as rival sets of strategies and 
values that may result in social control. Any society's productive and distributive practices 
lie within a regulatory firework of social stnicture. Because of the antagonistic nature of 
social structure, ideologies are conflictual. The radical questions that social conflicts invite 
challenge the continual imposition of formerly viable modes of production and distribution. 
Therefore, the changing character of society's productive and distributive practices follows 
the course of historical development (Mesz^os, 1989). The development of a specific type 
of mentality over time is an inherent part of any social system (Auerbach, 1988). 
North Americans value probabilistic thinking with trial and error learning. Analysis is 
oriented toward problem solving, with a tendency to discover simple causes, preferably those 
that are economic or technical. Technical decision makers use information as an abstract 
commodity that parallels money. The group decision maker sacrifices the powerful influence 
of information to the demanding social network of the group. These problem solving 
approaches are contained within the concepts of time and future states, so that action is 
designed to affect the future (Stewart, 1983). Innovations arise from the interaction of three 
factors: market demands, needs of buyers and sellers in the market, and technical advances 
(Q)hen & Zysman, 1987). 
Apparel production can be viewed as a transformation process-raw materials are 
transformed into finished garments in economical periods of time. In cultures where material 
goods are highly valued, people will seek transformation processes that produce the greatest 
output in the least amount of time. These cultures perceive of time as "monochronic" 
(Baligh, 1994, pp. 22), or one-dimensional. This perception of time encourages them to 
maintain high levels of control over transformation processes. Baligh believes that there is a 
cultural tendency to protect processes, even when they are inefficient. In his words..."If the 
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transformation process itself is also highly valued in a culture, then people in the culture may 
not seek to change the process even if they also value more output to less" (Baligh, 1994, pp. 
22). 
Over the past century, American apparel producers have primarily used one type of 
transformation process-the bundle system. Despite changing environmental conditions and 
strong industry initiatives toward more flexible systems over the past decade, approximately 
90% of American apparel firms continue to produce with a bundle system and piece-rate 
compensation (Hill, 1992a). Because adoption of flexible technologies among apparel 
producers has been so limited in comparison to other manufacturing industries, the value that 
apparel producers place on the transformation process itself may be an important issue. 
Value in the traditional progressive bundle system has been supported by a product 
costing technique that allocated overhead costs to each garment according to the amount of 
labor time in the garmenL Time efficiencies within the transformation process operations 
were thought to reflect lower product costs and consequently, greater profit margins. Costs 
were believed to be "managed" by reducing the amount of labor time. These costing beliefs 
have been valued by managers and incorporated into the training and rewards that operators 
received. However, newer cost accounting techniques that assess resource management 
instead of cost management reveal that the allocation of overhead to labor time offers a 
distorted view of actual product costs. Even so, in the traditional assembly line method, 
performance measures were and continue to be part of the belief system about how garments 
are best manufactured (Gardiner, Blackstone, & Gardiner, 1994; Scheller, 1993). 
Taylorism and production ideologies The historical development of the U.S. apparel 
industry through the twentieth century has its ideological roots in the influences of Taylorism 
and practices of early assembly line manufacturers. In the early twentieth century, Frederick 
Taylor (1992) believed that the elements of scientific management had evolved through 
industrial practices of deliberate increases in output per worker. To Taylor, scientific 
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management was a complete mental revolution that required a long period of time to develop 
in a manufacturing organization. 
Taylor's four principles of scientific management are as follows. The first principle 
involved the gathering of all the knowledge that was in the heads of the workers, recording 
and tabulating it, and reducing it to rules, laws and mathematical formulas. This mass of 
traditional knowledge that the workers had was reflected in their behavior on the job, and it 
was believed that it could be captured by motion and time studies, which were thought to be 
truly scientific. The second principle involved the careful and "scientific" selection of 
workers by studying them, profiling them, and choosing those with the most productive 
characteristics. The third principle focused on training workers to understand the science of 
production and offer them intangibles such as better treatment or opportunities to express 
their needs freely, as well as higher pay, in trade for their work motivation and increased 
output. The fourth principle represented a division of work that divided all tasks into those of 
management and production. Formerly, many managerial duties were performed by workers. 
Taylor thought that teamwork and cooperative democracy among managers and workers 
would create a mutual interdependence that would prevent labor strikes, as long as 
management shared the profits from increased productivity with the workers (Taylor, 1992). 
Critics of Taylor's theory thought the scientific management system would make workers 
into machines and rob them of initiative (Braverman, 1974). In response to criticism, Taylor 
defended his principles with the metaphor of the surgeon. The modem (1916) surgeon was 
compared to a finer mechanic, combining manual dexterity with a great knowledge of 
implements, materials, and techniques. Surgeons in training were taught the current state of 
the art, learned to master it, but were also encouraged to push the field further by showing 
initiative and developing new techniques. This form of training workers by teaching them to 
build on their knowledge was central to Taylor's theory. All workers could propose process 
improvements; those proposals would be tested, and the workers would be rewarded if their 
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ideas were successful. Finally, Taylor believed that progress in manufacturing came through 
workers, and that the four principles of scientific management actually created worker 
initiative (Taylor, 1992). Much of Taylor's philosophy mirrors that of G. Edward Deming. 
Later in the twentieth century, Deming promoted the use of statistical process control and 
ongoing process improvement through worker contributions as the most effective methods 
for reducing variation in manufacturing processes (Evans & Lindsay, 1989). 
Many writers of manufacturing studies refer to the ills of the modem factory as being 
caused by Taylorism. Review of Taylor's speeches and writings reveal that his theories 
promoted productive manufacturing organizations that were positivistic in their use of 
experimental methods and data collection, but more naturalistic in their training, 
communications, and democratic forms. Taylor's principles of organizing work for better 
productivity encouraged the development of new technologies. In other words, Frederick 
Taylor did not promote the mechanistic, bureaucratic structures that many U.S. 
manufacturing organizations have evolved into. Models of bureaucratic behavior feature the 
use of general and impersonal rules, ineffective organizational learning, decreased visibility 
of powerful managers, high levels of interpersonal tension and conflicts, as well as intense 
supervision as a function of authoritarianism (March & Simon, 1992). 
According to Bums and Stalker (1961), there is no optimal type of management system. 
Rather, systems develop appropriately according to their specific sets of conditions. 
Bureaucratic structures have been effective under certain conditions. For example, a 
productivity transformation that perpetuated the viability of a bureaucratic structure occurred 
in the British shoe industry nearly forty years ago. Shoe companies were concerned with 
maximizing return on their invested capital by attempting to make more shoes per employee 
and per square foot of factory space. Although shoes had been made by a craft type of 
production, they were produced faster by dramatically reducing the labor content in each 
pair. For example, in 1957, Clark's factory made women's fashion shoes in Plymouth, 
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England. At tiiat time, the average length of time it took to manufacture a pair of women's 
fashion shoes was 19 days. Within a year, Clark's had reduced the production time to three 
days. Each job was broken down into the smallest possible self-contained operation. 
Specialized tasks proved to be advantageous to efficient production (Hudson, 1978). 
Bureaucratic forms also have disadvantages. Reeves' (1970) descriptive study of a British 
clothing factory found fragmented bureaucratic control that resulted in conflicts between time 
in production and quality objectives. Control mechanisms that governed the rate of 
production conflicted with those governing the sequence of production. The monitoring of 
the production process was found to be much less effective than the monitoring of the 
production output. Production quantity imperatives reigned over quality imperatives because 
of the importance of meeting deliveries on time. 
Patriarchy and production ideologies Batch production firms differ from firms with 
unit production or continuous flow processes in their product standardization, organizational 
structures and behavior (Reeves, 1970; Woodward, 1970). Apparel production is a form of 
batch production and it remains dominated by female operators pushing fabric through 
sewing machines. Apparel firms continue to have mass production characteristics such as 
separation between managers and operators, gender role typing, and patriarchial structures 
(Bailey, 1993; Scheller, 1993). 
Patriarchal theory represented society and organizations within it as an enlargement of the 
family form. The father, or patriarch, was thought to be the authority and protector of the 
family, so that members of the family naturally submitted to his power. Rights and status 
were bestowed within the family, while inheritance and descent passed exclusively through 
men. This perceived structure extended into politics, businesses and other institutions. lis 
principles are being challenged by contemporary theorists (Coward, 1983). 
The apparel industry's success emerged from the production of mass-produced garments 
for a large domestic market using a largely female, low-wage workforce and strong 
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patriarchal structure. Managers in the apparel industry believed that efficiency in production 
came from engineering the process and controlling sewing operators' time by breaking down 
jobs into minute tasks that took only seconds to perform. Styles changed slowly for many 
commodity type articles, such as jeans, underwear, and men's shirts. The design of factories 
reflected the mass production method, with most plants dedicated to producing only one type 
of product (Bailey, 1993; Schoer & Ziemke, 1994). 
Competitive advantages, such as those of economies of scale in manufacturing, that are 
suddenly lost in particular industries can render the accumulated mastery of manufacturing 
techniques obsolete (Cohen & Zysman, 1987). Now that changes in the markets are reducing 
the demand for mass-produced garments in large volumes, apparel producers are faced with 
fundamental changes in their organizations that are essentially ideological. The mechanistic 
bureaucracies do not easily accommodate changing conditions, so innovative apparel 
organizations are transforming their organizational structures, behaviors, and ideologies 
(Bailey, 1993; Bums & Stalker, 1961; Schoer & Ziemke, 1994). 
Because combinations of mechanistic and organic forms can exist within the same 
organization, the perception of manufacturing organizations as either mechanistic, organic, or 
cultural systems may be too simplistic. The cultural system is inherent in both mechanistic 
and organic types of organizations. The literature devotes enough explanation of the 
metaphorical views of organizations that support an understanding of flexibility as an ability 
to change in form, ideology, and behavior. The next section assesses the theoretical models 
of flexibility that approach these types of changes. 
Perspectives of production flexihilitv: Options, economic, and manufacturing theories 
Because flexibility is an emerging phenomenon in research literature, only a few theories 
related to flexibility in manufacturing have been developed. The following section describes 
a useful framework f jr production flexibility constructs, wherein, no particular organizational 
form is assumed. Related works in options theories, economic theories, and manufacturing 
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models lend some theoretical support to flexibility. No theories of transition or of flexibility 
within apparel production firms were found in the literature. 
Theoretical framework offlexibility in production deGroote (1994) proposed a useful 
theoretical framework of flexibility in production processes. Three concepts were derived 
from generic properties shared by the models of flexibility proposed in the literature: 
flexibility as a property of technologies, diversity, and performance criteria. The first 
concept is that of flexibility. As a hedge against uncertainty, flexibility is considered a 
property of technologies. Technology is defined in this framework as "... any aspect of a 
firm's production resources, control procedures, and overall strategy" (deGroote, 1994, pp. 
934). Flexibilities are compared by strategists and by those managing production between 
sets of technologies. 
The second concept is that of diversity. Diversity is a property of environments in which 
technologies are operated. In this sense, diversity refers to general notions of variety, 
complexity, or variability. Diversity may refer to variability in market conditions. This 
could include variation from seasonal or fashionable apparel production or variable raw 
material prices. Rexibility and diversity are two complementary properties. Therefore, the 
more diverse the environment, the more flexibility is required to cope with that environment. 
The third concept is a performance criterion for evaluation of differing technologies in 
different environments. A given technology would be considered more flexible than another 
if an increase in environmental diversity produced a more desirable change in performance 
than would have been produced with a different technology under the same conditions 
(deGroote, 1994). For example, in apparel manufacturing, unit production is considered 
more flexible than a progressive bundle system, because it reduces cycle time and the amount 
of capital tied up in materials inventory. Cycle times are so much shorter that the 
performance criteria of cash flow and profitability are more desirable. 
In review, the essential elements of deGroote's (1994) framework are flexibilities as 
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technologies, diversity as a property of environments, and performance criteria for the 
evaluation of technologies in a variety of environments. The distinction between the two 
complementary properties of flexibility and diversity is the inherent principle of the 
framework. 
By characterizing flexibility in this way, deGroote developed three strategic properties 
related to distinct optimization problems. The first problem is that of allocation of 
environments to technologies, as illustrated by a multi-product apparel producer that allocates 
different parts of its product line to different plants or different sub-contractors. Apparel 
products are variable components of demand, and they have to be allocated to appropriate 
technologies (i.e.; plants with necessary capacities, certain types of equipment, sub­
contractors, operators with specific skills, etc.). Given this problem of allocating two 
different environments to two different technologies, the overall performance of the system is 
better if the more diverse environment (e.g., apparel product line) is allocated to the more 
flexible technology. 
The second problem reflects the design of optimal technology for a given environment. 
As an operations strategy, the theory proposes that an increase in the diversity of the 
environment (e.g.; increased variation in demands made by retail customers on apparel 
producers) makes it more desirable to choose a more flexible technology. An example may 
be that of a large discount retailer requiring an apparel producer to install an EDI system for 
communications and inventory control. The producer is concomitantiy facing demands by 
other retail customers to install similar systems. Therefore, it is in the producer's best interest 
to select an EDI system that is flexible and capable enough to accommodate all of its retail 
customers, rather than separate systems that are dedicated to single customers. 
The third strategic property of this framework is related to the influential force that the 
firm exerts on the environments in which its technologies operate. As a problem in 
managing the interface between the firm's strategy and its operations, options are created. 
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For example, a change in the delivery strategy of an apparel producer that guarantees 24 hour 
turn around on an order to its retail customers would have a major impact on the performance 
capabilities of various technological choices in production. In this scenario, the firm may 
have to dramatically change its information, production, and delivery stmctures (i.e.; its 
technologies) to more flexible forms. Thus, an increase in the flexibility of these 
technologies makes them more attractive to operate in more diverse environments. 
Consequently, the firm can seek more diversity in its environment (e.g., more variability in 
its product line or more customers) because it has established more flexible technologies 
(deGroote, 1994). Some firms have failed in this regard. Studies have demonstrated that 
flexible manufacturing systems within U.S. firms are underutilized because the subsequent 
strategic opportunities flexibility offers are not realized. 
Performance criteria of particular flexible technologies depend on the relevant notions of 
environmental diversity and appropriate evaluation techniques (deGroote, 1994), Traditional 
cost accounting and capital budgeting methods have failed to capture many of the benefits of 
flexibility. Such intangible benefits include increased employee morale, better quality, 
reduced woric-in-process inventories, reduced floor space, faster response to market demand 
shifts, and longer use of equipment over generations of product changes (Laengle, Griffen, & 
Griffen, 1994). 
Options theories These theories are categorized as options theories because they 
involve choices between a variety of options. Options theories presented here include the 
decisions between exploration and exploitation, decisions among sets of flexibilities, 
decisions that are economically based, decisions within queuing networks, and decisions that 
are behaviorally based. 
Exploration vs. exploitation The attention and resources of organizations are divided 
between two kinds of activities: exploration and exploitation. Exploration is the search for 
and pursuit of new knowledge, while exploitation is the use and development of knowledge 
46 
the organization akeady has (March, 1991). The basic challenge of a firm is to maintain a 
balance between exploration and exploitation. Sufficient exploitation is necessary to insure 
the firm current viability; on the other hand, sufficient exploration is needed to insure future 
viability (Levinthal & March, 1993). 
Flexibility as decisions Jones and Ostroy (1984) have developed a sequential decision 
model that suggests the following: The more variable a decision maker's beliefs about the 
future, the more flexible position the decision maker will choose. Decisions between short-
term investments that leave future options open and long-term investments that hinder those 
options are dependent on the amount of variability the decision maker's beliefs about the 
future have. The less confident decision maker is faced with more uncertainty, and greater 
risk in future commitment. Investment in capital resources, such as plant capacity, is a 
decision that could deliver more flexibility for future production. However, if the investment 
in plant capacity is made under the conditions of uncertainty (more variability of beliefs 
about the future), then the decision toward such an illiquid capital investment may be one 
that surrenders cash to inflexibility. 
A strategic options "bundle" framework has been proposed as a set of feasible choices a 
firm can make in its response to uncertainties (Sanchez, 1993). Consisting of product 
options, timing options, and implementation options, this set of choices can define any type 
of flexibility a firm could select. The framework captures choices the firm makes about 
which products it should develop, produce and market. Also, when the firm should develop, 
produce and market its product is integrated with how the firm chooses to organize or 
implement its development, production, distribution, and marketing of those selected 
products. For example, firms choose between assets and technologies that impact their 
operational flexibilities (Sanchez, 1993). 
Economic theories Most models intended to assess the economic benefits of flexibility 
are limited by their simplified assumptions. Laengle, et al. (1994), however, have proposed a 
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theoretical model to determine the optimal capacity level for a combination of dedicated and 
flexible manufacturing systems using varied and realistic assumptions. Because large apparel 
manufacturers today have both dedicated and flexible plants, this model is worth exploring. 
Assuming combinations of product demand over a fixed time horizon, their model 
demonstrates the economic value of expansion and product flexibility. The net present value 
and profits for some combinations of production systems, or for a totally flexible production 
system, are higher than for a dedicated, single product system (despite the higher cost of 
flexibility). 
The historical development of flexibility is presented by Sethi and Sethi (1990) through 
economic, organizational, and manufacturing contexts that span about 70 years. Economic 
works based on decision theories and the costs of flexibility have evolved into the 
measurement and value of flexibility. Organizational flexibility was defined early as the 
ability of an organization to change without becoming severely disorganized. Related works 
on the changing structural forms of business organizations have evolved into studies on labor 
flexibility and teamwork. Manufacturing contexts have evolved from grouping machines to 
matching human flexibility with microprocessor technology (Sethi & Sethi, 1990). 
General model of a manufacturing svstem Variations in the manufacturing process can 
be exacerbated by random orders for finished products and random arrivals of raw materials. 
Given the variability of demand, production capacity, and production flexibility, 
Courcoubetis and Weber (1994) proposed a general model of a manufacturing system as 
merely a number of distinct queues. Queues include orders for products, inventories of raw 
materials, machine parts, and subassemblies of products. Work-in-process inventories are 
also queues that wait for further processing. Deterministic changes in queues are made by 
reducing items from some queues and increasing items to other queues. Reducing items 
refers to the consumption of raw materials or subassemblies in the completion of finished 
products. Completion of finished products depends upon a stock of working knowledge 
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(Kusterer, 1978). 
Any stock of working knowledge in a manufacturing environment can be divided into five 
areas: fundamental working knowledge of routine procedures, supplemental knowledge about 
the materials or documents that are handled, the use of equipment, the patterns of customer 
behavior, and the expected work-role behavior of others in the firm that the worker interacts 
with during the performance of the job. The degree of either routinization or specialization 
involved in a job is what determines the amount of working knowledge needed. 
Routinization refers to the degree of variation in the performance of job functions. 
Specialization involves the number of work functions assigned to a job. Extreme 
routinization of jobs occurs in mass production of identical products from materials with little 
variation. Specialization requires supplementary working knowledge, and thus is more 
creative and necessary to solve difficult problems (Kusterer, 1978). 
Local efficiency measures, such as standard rates, are based on the assumption that the 
output of an entire production system is maximized (or its costs minimized) if the output of 
each resource in the process is maximized. In a progressive bundle system, production 
operators are usually evaluated and paid by the number of units or operations they process in 
a given amount of time. After a training period, operators are expected to perform to a 
standard, and are given a financial incentive to perform beyond that. This encourages them 
to maximize the output at each resource (operation) in the production process, keeping work-
in-process inventories high, rather than moving to do an operation that is needed to maximize 
the output of the entire system (Gardiner, et al., 1994). However, some studies show that a 
system's productivity is not supported completely by local productivity measures (Lambrecht 
& Segaert, 1990). 
Behavioral theory of the apparel firm A behavioral theory of the apparel firm has been 
proposed by Kunz (in press). This theory recognizes internal constituencies related to 
functional specialization in merchandising, marketing, operations, finance, and executive 
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management The mcxiel interprets the roles of executive management as being that of 
relating to the needs of the other four constituencies in the establishment of company mission 
and goals, decision making, and development of business plans. Therefore, the production 
constituency is restricted by constraints imposed on it by the executive constituency in 
carrying out its functions of producing goods according to specifications and production 
schedules. The model accommodates the issue of organizational power by recognizing that 
the most powerful internal constituencies control acquisition of the most critical resources. 
The film's most powerful external coalitions can control the most critical activities by 
influencing allocation of the firm's resources (Kunz, in press). Findings from a descriptive 
case study of a tailored clothing producer supported the behavioral theory of the apparel firm 
(Scheller, 1993). 
Other theoretical constructs related to flexibility 
The literature is not well developed on theoretical aspects of production flexibility; 
however, there are some other issues related to flexibility that have been described from a 
reasoned perspective. These include the philosophies underlying push vs. pull production 
systems, the role of buffers, and the costs of flexibility. 
Production systems: Push vs. pull Control of production in a factory can be classified 
as either a push system or as a pull system. Push systems depend on information flowing 
from the beginning of the production process. Demand for production originates at the raw 
material stage, when the materials are ready to enter the process. Each operation or stage in 
the production process is activated by the completion of the operation that precedes it, so that 
work is essentially pushed through the process (Takahashi, Hiraki, & Soshirodas, 1994). 
Push type production systems are dependent on product demand forecasts and have 
dominated the apparel industry. 
Many manufacturers adopted medium level production control systems that monitored 
and scheduled the raw material resources. Known as material requirements planning (MRP), 
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current research is demonstrating that MRP leads to high inventory and poor lead time 
performance if forecasting error exists (Chang & Yih, 1994). The flexibility of MRP type 
ordering systems can be quantified. Differences in production ordering systems affect 
qualitative as well as quantitative influences of change in production systems. Under some 
conditions, pull type production ordering systems are more flexible than are push type 
systems. However, a simulation study demonstrated that the influences of downtime 
fluctuation makes a push-type production ordering system more flexible than a pull-type 
system (Takahashi, et al., 1994). 
Pull-type production systems calculate production order on the basis of feedback 
information and the actual production quantity of the succeeding operation or stage in the 
production process (Takahashi, et al, 1994). Demand originates at the end of the production 
process, so that information flows from the end to the beginning. Kanban and just-in-time 
(JTT) are types of production information and control techniques that provide discipline to 
pull-type production systems. A kanban is a card that indicates job type and quantities of 
parts. The information helps materials to flow through the production process while keeping 
inventory as low as possible. These systems have worked well in repetitive processes that 
function with stable demand, but dynamic environments reveal their limitations. 
With variations in product demand and processing times, it is difficult to design a master 
schedule that can manage the flow of materials in a dynamic environment like that of apparel 
production. Even though the kanban is a simple and effective method for implementation of 
a JIT plan, it is designed for environments with stable demand, low changeover, reliable 
production processes, and sufficient excess capacity (Mitwashi & Askin, 1994). Chang and 
Yih (1994) have proposed modifications to a generic kanban system that can be adapted for 
use in dynamic manufacturing environments. 
The role of buffers Buffers exist primarily to protect the manufacturing core from 
uncertainty (Gardiner, et al., 1994). Buffers may include inventories, quoted lead times, and 
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excess capacity cushions (Newman, Hanna, & Maffei, 1993). Inventory buffers serve to 
protect a production system from delays. Larger inventory buffers provide more protection, 
but also cause long lead times and high work-in-process (Gardiner, et al., 1994). By 
insulating the production process from the implications of external uncertainties with buffers, 
manufacturers have been able to respond to increasing uncertainty without assuming the costs 
of increasing flexibility (Newman, et al., 1993) 
Production systems such as kanban and drum-buffer-rope (DBR) are "pull" production 
processes that keep a fixed level of inventory in the system. In a DBR system, the system's 
constraint determines the pace of production. In terms of a popular "theory of constraints" 
(Gardiner, et al., 1994, p. 13), a constraint may be a machine, a department, a raw material 
resource, or even the market. The constraint has two protective buffers: one is the material 
buffer in front of it to protect it from upstream disruptions, and the other is the space beyond 
the constraint to protect it from downstream disruptions. Materials for another product are 
released into the system only when a completed product is shipped. In the kanban system, 
each operator has a small buffer of inventory. Kanban work stations are blocked from 
receiving more inventory until its buffer is depleted and it is ready for reorder. Lambrecht & 
Segaert (1990) showed that an assembly line generated more output using a DBR process 
than one using a kanban process. Other industries have reported dramatic increases in 
production by moving from kanban to DBR (Gardiner, et al., 1994). 
Costs of flexibility in production Manufacturing firms are investing in technologies 
that are flexible in order to enlarge the scope of their capabilities. Flexible factories are more 
costly than dedicated factories, because meeting market demand for a varied product mix 
with shorter lead times requires different resources than traditional mass production plants 
require-d. Capital intensive technologies involve substantial investment. Even though firms 
are shifting away from economies of scale in production and toward economies of scope, 
technology choices and capacity expansion decisions continue to be determined by 
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economies of scale criteria. Li and Tirupati (1994) have proposed a model to help managers 
make decisions on appropriate mixes of flexible and dedicated capacity that takes into 
account variables appropriate to flexibility. 
Training costs for flexible production are a recurrent issue. Cross training operators for 
production modules leads to inevitable inefficiencies in some operations. Labor flexibility is 
the ability of workers to transfer from one work center to another. Because workers are not 
equally efficient at every work center, Bobrowski and Park (1993) developed a mle model of 
how to assign labor to work centers when differences in worker skill exist However, the 
premise of this type of model is consistent with a basic assumption of traditional apparel 
production: that speed of production is the goal and that efficiency of an entire system is 
earned through optimizing the performance of each task in isolation (Alic, 1993). 
Speed in production is not always beneficial. There may be significant costs associated 
with completing an order before the customer is ready to take delivery. Costs of finishing an 
order early include time value of materials inventory as well as storage and related costs. 
Ideally, materials are released into the production system in time for finished orders to be 
shipped when the customer expects them (Gardiner, et al., 1994). 
Summary of ideology 
This section has covered literature related to the understanding of flexibility as an 
ideological construct. Ideology has been defined, while its role in the development of 
manufacturing organizations has been considered through metaphorical management 
systems. The contrasts between inflexible organizational structures and the mental models of 
managers that support those structures are salient. Descriptions and definitions of 
manufacturing flexibility are nunierous, but few specific theories relating to flexibility as an 
ideology in production have been developed. Theoretical and anecdotal support for the 
activities related to flexible behaviors in manufacturing firms exist. The following section 
describes the flexible activities of manufacturers and apparel producers. 
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Behavioral and Technological Forms of Flexibility 
Behavioral and technological forms of flexibility involve activities and technologies that 
apparel producers select as they seek to decrease production cycle time and increase the 
range of products. A variety of approaches to flexibility have emerged in recent years as a 
response to changes in the environment. This section will focus on behavioral and 
technological innovations in the organization of apparel production and techniques related to 
flexible fomis. 
Innovations in the coordination of anoarel production 
Innovations in the organization of production is one of the primary flexible strategies of 
the apparel industry (Bailey, 1993; Mytelka, 1991). Apparel production activities consist of 
pre-assembly processes, assembly processes, and post-assembly activities related to 
warehousing and distribution. A useful framework for analysis of production activities 
related to flexibility is offered by Taplin (1994). Changes that producers have made in 
response to competitive pressures are of three types: changes in pre-assembly, changes in 
assembly, and changes in the structural organization of the work process. 
Changes in pre-assembly stages Within the past ten years, the pre-assembly stage of 
production has seen advances in computerized technology for product design, pattern 
grading, pattern marking, and fabric cutting (Mytelka, 1991). These tools have helped 
producers respond more quickly to shifting market conditions while reducing costs and 
improving quality (Alic, 1993). Integration of the four processes of design, grading, 
marking, and cutting has resulted in dramatic reductions in both the labor and the time 
needed to perform them. Improved fabric utilization has reduced materials costs (Mytelka, 
1991). 
Considerable time reductions have been gained through the adoption of computer-aided 
design and maiking systems (CAD/CAM) (Hoffman & Rush, 1988). These systems allow 
for the development of larger collections and more frequent seasonal selections. Designers 
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use G\D/CAM systems for drawing new designs on video screens, as well as recalling 
former designs that have been stored electronically. Alterations in designs are easily made. 
Fabric swatches or existing hard copy patterns can be scanned into the system, so designs can 
be viewed in full scale and color. The grading and marking of patterns that used to take 
several days now takes only minutes or hours. Design software allows communication of 
pattern marking to computerized cutters (Schoer & Ziemke, 1994). In larger firms, high­
speed, computerized cutting has outpaced the capacity of the slower assembly process in 
materials handling (Taplin, 1994). 
The knowledge embedded in this electronic equipment and in the software that is required 
to operate it has altered the level of international apparel competition from one based mostly 
on price to one based on both innovation and price. These technologies also create higher 
entry barriers, primarily in the forms of more capital and skill, especially for producers in 
newly industrialized countries (Mytelka, 1991). The skill requirements for running and 
integrating this equipment are changing from low to high skill. What used to require 
knowledge in mechanical and electrical engineering fields is now requiring technical 
knowledge related to electronics, programming, and systems design. Because these skills are 
not widely available, there may be a "technological capabilities" barrier to entry in newly 
industrialized countries (Alcorta, 1994, pp. 765). U.S. apparel companies face this difficulty 
in Latin America and the Caribbean where they are taking aggressive approaches to adopt 
sophisticated production equipment for their "807" operations (Black & Cedrone, 1994). 
Changes in the assembly process Because fabric handling has been difficult to 
mechanize, advancements in the assembly process have focused on incremental 
improvements in sewing machines (Taplin, 1994). Sewing machine efficiencies have been 
improved by mechanically activated thread trimming attachments, needle positioners, 
stackers, and air lifts. During the 1980s, sewing equipment was developed that manipulated 
garment pieces while they were being sewn. These machines can handle a wide variety of 
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fabrics, styles, and sizes (Seiling & Curtin, 1988). 
Common sewing machines have been upgraded with digital attachments such as stitch 
counters and stitch type variation capabilities (Schoer & Ziemke, 1994). Belt loop attachers, 
seamers, pocket setters, and buttonhole and button sewers have contributed to increasing the 
productivity of the assembly process. Innovations in fusing, pressing, and finishing 
equipment with microprocessor controls and automatic unloading have also introduced 
technical changes to the assembly process. However, highly specialized equipment that 
requires large volume production for investment justification can be inflexible in its limited 
task range and product specificity (Hoffrnan & Rush, 1988; Seiling & Curtin, 1988). 
Computerized tracking systems, known as electronic point-of-entry systems (EPOS), track 
garments throughout the assembly and shipping process (Taplin, 1994). Retailers involved in 
Quick Response partnerships with producers are expecting product bar coding and advance 
ship notices to extend further with sophisticated identification technology. For example, an 
emerging technology to track inventory is radio frequency (RF) units that are laser scanners. 
Through the capability of reading bar codes anywhere in a plant, paperwork, data entry, and 
downloading batches of information is eliminated (Cedrone, 1994, June). Taplin (1994) 
notes that tracking systems also have the capability of monitoring assembly operators. 
Changes in the organization of the production process As the industry begins to move 
away from the progressive bundle system for mass production, it is adopting two general 
types of production technologies: unit production and modular manufacturing. 
Unit production Although theoretically similar to progressive bundle systems, computer 
controlled unit production systems (UPS) offer a variety of advantages. Cut garment parts 
are attached to hangers on an overhead conveyor that routes garments in "bundles" of one to 
individual sewing operators. In many cases, the garment parts to be sewed for a particular 
operation do not have to be removed from the carrier when the operator receives it. The task 
is performed, and the operator touches a switch that sends the hanger away. Another hanger 
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is then routed to that operator. The reduction in handling and bundling time allows 
dramatically faster throughput time. 
The throughput of a particular style may be completed in several hours or less than one 
day, depending on the number of workstations, the complexity of the garment, and the 
volume of the order. Shorter throughput time allows the system to handle rapid style 
changes. More than one style can be in production at a given time, because each hanger 
containing garment parts can be routed differently. Managers can track each garment, plan 
the sequence of garment orders, and monitor the work of every operator (Bailey, 1993). 
Through computerized collection of up-to-the minute data on operator performance, the 
system can display payroll information to each operator, who is usually paid on a piece-rate 
incentive basis. 
Hill (1992b) provides extensive detail on UPS in a comparison study with the progressive 
bundle systems. Reduction in direct labor content occurred fi^om the elimination of bundle 
handling and clerical tasks associated with piecework tickets. The increase in the number of 
garments produced per hour rose by an average of 18.4%. Direct labor excesses included 
overtime, operator make-up, and repair costs. These were reduced using UPS by an average 
of 33.8%. Total cycle time was reduced from an average of 14.9 days to 5.9 days. Defects 
were reduced by 11%, and it was thought that the hung garments needed less inspection 
cleaning and pressing than did garments produced in bundles. Although no methodology for 
this study is explicit, a variety of other advantages were reported. Plants using the UPS were 
thought to have fewer claims for back injuries related to bundle handling, increased operator 
earnings, and narrower floor space requirements. 
Besides reduced throughput time, UPS offers a significant reduction in work in process 
inventory and improved cash flow, which helps to justify the high cost of initial investment 
in the system. However, with limited space for inventoiy buffers, balancing the flow of 
garments through unit production systems has been a challenge when variations, such as 
57 
machine failures or slower operators, occur. Bailey (1993) reported that a UPS operation in 
his study was most successful as a fast throughput, mass production technique for 
standardized styles in children's sleepwear. In the same firm, style variations in women's 
sleepwear caused operator dissatisfaction from having to shift stations often due to line 
balancing difficulties on the UPS. In a study of North Carolina apparel producers, Taplin 
(1993) included four firms that had experimented with UPS systems, but abandoned them 
because they were unable to manage the flow efficiently. Bailey (1993) notes that the 
limitations of unit production systems include operator isolation, repetitive tasks, mechanical 
pacing of the assembly line, and piece rate incentive compensation. 
Modular manufacturing The modular manufacturing concept is a form of organizational 
innovation that has been borrowed from techniques used in Japanese automobile 
manufacturing. Modular production systems require the management of material flow so that 
work-in-process inventory is kept to a minimum. Small teams of cross-trained operators are 
organized with a set of dedicated equipment to assemble an entire garment together. Bundles 
of garment parts are brought to the module stations, where each operator moves between 
several machines and hands completed work off to the next operator (Taplin, 1994). Many 
variations of this system have been reported, including the Toyota Sewn Products 
Management System (Schroer, Wang, & Ziemke, 1991), and sit-down modules wdth small 
bundles of inventory. 
Team members usually receive special training to handle communications, conflicts, goal 
setting, and quality control. Pay of individual operators within the group is usually based on 
±e output of the entire group. In a manufacturing sense, teams are defined as a group of 
people (perhaps 8-15) who is responsible for producing a defined output while rotating from 
job to job "under a flexible allocation of tasks" (Mueller, 1994, pp. 383-384). Important to 
the concept of woric teams is the team's fulfillment of tasks that were formerly supervisory in 
nature. Decision making, training, maintenance, scheduling, and personnel tasks are falling 
58 
under the responsibility of teams. 
There are quantifiable disadvantages associated with adopting teamwork, such as the costs 
of training team members, decreased production during the training period, and the 
requirements for new facilities, or greater space and equipment (Mueller, 1994). A study of 
teamwork among clothing producers in The Netherlands found four major disadvantages 
during the process of adopting team manufacturing: initial resistance to change on the part of 
operators and managers, investment in more equipment, investment in time and deliberation 
to adapt the company structure, and a lack of an adaptable wage system (Peeters, 1993). 
Compensation of team members has been another difficult hurdle for apparel producers. 
Former bundle operators were paid on a piece-rate basis, with superior operators enjoying 
relatively high earnings. Conflicts arise when operators who earned high wages in a bundle 
system are transferred to a modular system and essentially take a reduction in pay because 
the team is usually rewarded as a group, and the group is comprised of some less-skilled 
operators (Hill, 1992a). Production quotas may be established by management, or by the 
experienced teams themselves. Workers in the team are usually paid a base rate for 
completing the quota production, with an incentive bonus for exceeding the quota on quality 
production (Taplin, 1994). Variations of team-based compensation systems are being 
developed (Hill, 1992a). 
Literature on teamwork and group development strategies is growing; however, not much 
research has been done on the internal dynamics of team member behavior. The two major 
obstacles to the effectiveness of teams are in the provision of expertise to teams when they 
need it, and the requirement for a common language among team members who have an 
inconsistent and specialized knowledge base (Meyer, 1994). In one survey, teams reponed 
that the three main advantages to teamwork were improved team involvement and 
performance, positive morale, and a sense of ownership and commitment to the organization 
(Kulisch & Banner, 1993). Hill's (1992a) study of modular apparel production found similar 
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reports of increased operator job satisfaction as well as improvement in production quality. 
Also, throughput time, space utilization, and employee turnover were reduced, while morale, 
attendance, and productivity were improved. 
Discrepancies between the qualitative and quantitative results on the advantages of teams 
was the main finding in Bursic's (1992) study of various types of manufacturing firms. This 
study sought to identify which factors contributed to the successful use of teams in 
manufacturing as well as what value the teams provided. Interview data indicated that 
employees involved in teams perceived improvements in organizational performance, 
especially productivity and production quality. However, the quantitative data analysis did 
not indicate strong relationships nor potential causality between time and productivity or 
quality. Contingency tests failed to show a relationship between employee motivation, 
decision making, and job satisfaction, and the employees' participation in teams. Although 
job satisfaction and motivation among team members was high, statistical evidence from 
standard measuring instruments did not support that teams had a direct effect on these 
variables. The researcher pointed out that the literature offers many accounts of the 
advantages of teams in manufacturing, but little empirical evidence over the long term 
(Bursic, 1992). Spender (1993) has found that one of the most important advantages of 
teams is that they develop a body of hidden knowledge that cannot be easily detected nor can 
it be imitated. Because operators have knowledge that managers do not, that knowledge may 
be out of reach to those outside the team, and the value of it not quantifiable. 
The literature does not offer survey data on the adoption and diffusion of team 
technologies in manufacturing industries. Business trade publications have focused on 
teamwork in the automobile industry, including the extension of teamwork into product 
development. It is not known how widespread the use of teams in manufacturing is. For 
example. Tunc and Gupta (1993) found in a large survey of manufacturers in Indiana that 
product quality was the most important competitive priority, not time or flexibility. Rexible 
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manufacturing system adoption was low among respondents in that study. 
In practice, group technologies in manufacturing have a great deal of variation, such as in 
labor and machine selection for each group. This makes the systematic comparative 
evaluation of group technology impossible. Many researchers have selected simulated 
modeling techniques that are able to manipulate variables for predicting production system 
behavior (Aurrecoechea, Busby, Nimmons, & Williams, 1994). In one such model, plants 
that have both traditional production systems and cellular manufacturing systems (hybrid 
factories) did not always perform better. These authors concluded that group technology was 
not necessarily the best method to cope with bottlenecks or improve productivity. They 
pointed to the value of assessment that considers product selection, capacity allocations, 
demand conditions, and the impact of the non-group production system in the same plant. Of 
greatest importance was the conclusion that measuring the effectiveness of single cells 
(groups) in themselves does not account for the impact on the entire plant (Burgess, Morgan, 
& Vollman, 1993). 
In a simulation experiment that compared machine arrangement strategies for a cellular 
(group technology) layout and a process layout, batch size emerged as an important factor in 
determining total run times, fixed move times, average waiting times, and the number of 
required setups. Process layout did not prove itself to be superior to cellular layout in some 
parameters. Use of group technology provided shorter setup times, smaller batches, and 
shorter queues, but serious flow problems resulted from unavailability of dedicated machines. 
The significance of this study was that producers face a trade off between the cellular 
technology's lower setup, move, and mn times against higher waiting times (Flynn & Jacobs, 
1987). 
Other techniques related to flexibility in production Other techniques of flexibility 
that are evident in the literature relate to specific tasks, such as production scheduling, just-
in-time techniques, training, machine layout in production plants, and global sourcing. 
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Because manufacturing facilities are often in a transient state, there is a growing use of 
simulated modeling. Rapid analysis of many scenarios with predictions of outcomes is 
possible by manipulating the program variables. Queuing network model software is being 
used in manufacturing industries to provide reliable statistical analysis of work-in-process, 
machine utilization, and flow time for scheduling (Jackman & Johnson, 1993). 
Neural networks for scheduling Demand for apparel products cannot always be met 
immediately. Problems in the production process, such as equipment failures, material 
shortages, and abrupt demand changes prevent a balanced flow throughout a plant (Han & 
McGinnis, 1989). Production planning determines the ways that production resources are 
used. To allow for flexibility and responsiveness to problems as they arise, production 
scheduling must be essentially dynamic in nature (Levin, Fielding, & Ackhurst, 1993). 
Development of production scheduling methods that can maximize throughput and reduce 
product lead time have focused on constraints and variables such as due dates of orders, 
machine requirements, and workload distribution. These considerations are the result of 
expert strategic decisions relating to production, demands in the market, or inventory 
management Expert knowledge about production scheduling is accumulated during work 
experience. However, questions have been raised about the ability of human schedulers to 
consistently synthesize the complexities of interactions among variables in a dynamic 
manufacturing environment (Sim, Yeo, & Lee, 1994). 
An emerging technique that combines expert knowledge of the production process with an 
artificial intelligence system of variables that influence scheduling in dynamic production 
systems is known as a neural network. The learning capability of the neural network has 
puiential for adaptive and reactive scheduling to meet variations in demand (Sim, Yeo, & 
Lee, 1994). Artificial intelligence systems designed to capture human expertise and solve 
problems in defined domains are expected to play an increasing role in the future 
improvement of manufacturing productivity (Wong, Chong, & Park, 1994). 
62 
Just-in-time Numerous suppliers and manufacturing firms have implemented a pull-
type control system known as just-in-time (JIT). The objective of JIT is to create a balanced 
flow of material through a manufacturing process by avoiding queues and intermediate 
buffers. The principles behind JIT are to eliminate waste and to fully utilize the capabilities 
of people, equipment, materials, and parts (Davy, White, Merritt, & Gritzmacher, 1992). 
Because the suppliers in a JIT system are located outside the assembly plants, close 
relationships between suppliers and manufacturers are critical to the success of the system. 
The suppliers must be able to provide the buyers (manufacturers) with frequent deliveries of 
small quantities of quality products that have delivery schedules directly tied to the 
production schedule of the buyer. JIT systems are designed to eliminate waste in all forms, 
so manufacturers have reduced inventory costs, reduced need for storage, and shorter lead 
times on supply orders (Karlsson & Norr, 1994). Suppliers are responsible for allocating 
their resources so they can service the demand. Ideally, manufacturers will provide their 
suppliers with a container supply schedule, so that suppliers can optimize their resources and 
the manufacturer will not suffer supply disruptions (Pleschberger & Hitomi, 1993). 
Theoretical support for JIT can be found in an empirically derived model proposed by 
Davy, et al. (1992). Inputs include holistic aspects of work culture, design, supply, and 
customer demand. Implementation constructs involve operating structure and control, 
product scheduling, and quality implementation. Two output constructs are quality products 
and timeliness matched to demand. Unique to this model is the significance of decentralized 
control in decision making and the required philosophy within the organization to support 
employee involvement. The model also incorporates a systems perspective on management 
of the input and output dimensions, requiring JIT to be managed as an open system in which 
all of the input constructs are integrated (Davy, et al, 1992). 
Acrivitv-based product costing Determining the actual cost of producing an apparel 
product has been based on traditional cost accounting methods. Some apparel firms are 
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changing their costing systems to more accurately reflect product costs. The activity-based 
product cost approach identifies all significant activities involved in producing a product, 
including support activities. Costs are traced through the activities, and include those of 
research and development and manufacturing engineering. A product cost then becomes a 
sum of all of its traceable activity costs involved in designing, procuring materials, 
manufacturing, and distributing the product (Brimson, 1991). Apparel firms are adopting this 
costing technique because it more accurately measures the performance value of flexible 
production than does the traditional costing method that allocates overhead as a percentage of 
labor. 
Training The importance of training the apparel workforce for flexibility in production 
has received some attention in the trade press. Many anecdotal accounts of apparel firms that 
have innovated their processes reflect the emphasis on employee training (International 
Apparel Research Conference Proceedings, 1994). However, structure and content of these 
training programs has not been emphasized. In some firms, the highly repetitive manual 
tasks of a progressive bundle system are being replaced with broader jobs. Modular 
manufacturing, especially, requires more worker responsibility. 
Cognitive-oriented task components such as production scheduling, machine maintenance, 
process control decisions, and task assignments are the elements of new jobs that apparel 
workers are being trained to perform. Because knowledge structures determine cognitive 
performance, training directed toward knowledge structure development impacts the 
performance of cognitive oriented tasks (Koubeck, Clarkston, & Calvez, 1994). Snell & 
Dean (1992) studied the relationships between integrated manufacturing techniques similar to 
those being used in the apparel industry and human resource management practices. 
Findings suggest that human and technical systems are being managed not as separate 
entities, but in concert. Their study raises many issues relating to employee training, 
upskilling, and measuring performance improvement in flexible systems. 
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Uncertainty about how to improve productivity and flexibility by capitalizing on the 
knowledge structures that existing industrial workers already have is apparent. In an 
experimental study to examine the effects of training on the development of manufacturing 
workers' knowledge structures, Koubek, et al. (1994) found interesting relationships among 
training materials, their order of presentation, and cognitive performance. The group of 
workers that had initial presentation of highly abstract training material followed by detailed 
material showed significant improvement along two dimensions of knowledge structure: 
hierarchical levels and conceptual relations. 
Other issues related to training have been addressed. Labor productivity growth increased 
significantly in manufacturing industries when businesses that were operating below their 
expected labor productivity levels implemented training programs (Bartel, 1994). Production 
feedback as a form of training was provided to experimental groups of operators performing 
industrial tasks. No simple relationship existed between productivity and worker satisfaction. 
Workers were found to have different degrees of interest in performing tasks, but interest was 
not correlated with production quantity or the quality of output. It was proposed that the 
relationship between satisfaction and performance was affected by individual differences in 
values (Das & Mital, 1994). Similar conclusions about satisfaction and productivity in 
repetitive manufacturing were reached by Ruch and Hershauer (1974). 
Machine lavout flexibility Machine layout in a production facility is an important 
variable that impacts the costs and time of material handling, throughput, and productivity. 
Some of the flexibilities within a production process may be diluted with an ineffective 
machine layout. Layout flexibility is the capability of the machine arrangement to be adapted 
to changes in product mix, demand, volume, and routing, with the objective of maximizing 
the production rate. In designing machine layouts, factors that should be considered include 
the number and locations of input/output work stations, the impact of bypassed equipment, as 
well as machine utilization and capabilities (Hassan, 1994). 
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Global sourcing and mulrinational networks Manufacturers in the U.S. have become 
increasingly dependent on global sourcing. By providing immediate cost reductions and 
gains in competitive advantage, outsourcing is substituting for the expensive cost structures 
of vertical integration (Davis, 1992). Retailers and apparel manufacturers in the U.S. import 
apparel primarily through licensing and contracting agreements. International contracting 
usually assumes one of two forms: the contractor purchases the fabric and assumes full 
responsibility for production, or the contractor merely assembles cut parts that have been 
provided (Bonacich & Waller, 1994). By taking advantage of various tax, quota, and tariff 
arrangements, importing firms have maximized the value of low cost production on a global 
scale without the investment in factories or responsibility for labor (Bonacich & Waller, 
1994). Despite additional costs that are not associated with domestic sourcing, such as travel, 
tariffs, transportation, and brokerage fees, the trend toward global sourcing of manufactured 
parts and products is increasing (Handfield, 1994). European apparel firms, such as 
Benetton, have also grown through an integrated, international production system (Belussi, 
1987). 
Managers justify their dependence on global sourcing as a necessary competitive element. 
Overall cost reduction across all products is the primary reason for outsourcing. However, 
investigations into cost accounting practices and performance systems used by U.S. firms 
reveals that many manufacturers suffer from the inability to determine true product cost 
because of direct labor overhead allocation. Recent studies have shown that traditional cost 
accounting practices value inventory and do not accurately measure the costs of activities 
associated with manufacturing specific products (Davis, 1992). 
Fluctuating exchange rates also have an effect on sourcing decisions, due in part, to 
performance measures. Despite the impact on exchange rates, Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) 
note that the diffusion of new cost evaluation techniques has been slow: "The ownership of 
the option to shift production is of littie value if the managerial information is poor, if the 
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incentives are tied to the wrong benchmarks, and if pricing rules do not capture the value of 
flexibility to manufacture at the lowest cost site" (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994, pp. 135). For 
some goods, better prices are available in reciprocity for timely delivery and prompt 
turnaround, thus negating the need for lower cost foreign production. 
Summary of behavioral and technological forms of flexibility Most of the reforms in 
the organization of production have been due to the adoption of different techniques, such as 
modular and UPS, rather than completely new and comprehensive strategies. The absence of 
fundamental change in most apparel firms can be attributed to managerial traditions. 
Although apparel producers are clearly responding to changes in their environment, much of 
the response has been contained within prevailing managerialist paradigms (Bailey, 1993). 
This paradigm is characterized primarily by control in the forms of mechanistic processes 
and bureaucratic structures defined by task specialization. Until the Industrial Revolution, 
the craft trade was the basic unit of the labor process, where the worker was the master of 
knowledge and the procedures of production were left to his or her discretion. Through the 
evolution of manufacturing, management became the producer by planning and controlling 
the process that brought the product into existence (Braverman, 1974). Manufacturing forms 
subordinated labor to capital (Elger, 1982). 
However, dramatic changes in the environment are threatening the bureaucratic structures 
of production. In the apparel industry, renewed interest in empowering production workers 
to use their knowledge and regain some control over the production process is challenged by 
former managerialist paradigms, including those of patriarchy and paternalism. By changing 
the attitudes toward apparel operators and by expanding their participation into innovative 
technologies, more options for flexible response can be created. 
Barriers to flexibility have emerged throughout the literature on ideology and on 
behavioral forms of flexibility. The next section covers six categories of barriers to 
production flexibility that have been identified in the literature. 
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Barriers to Flexibility 
Baniers that contribute to the slow adoption of flexible manufacturing technologies have 
been categorized as organizational, managerial, financial, technical, labor, and policy related 
(Bidanda, Cleland, & Dharwadkar, 1993). Some barriers to flexibility cannot be categorized 
discreetly because they are comprised of multiple sources of problems that are 
interdependent. Following a discussion of barriers to flexibility is a compendium of trends 
that represent a paradigm shift in apparel production. 
Organizafional and managerial barriers 
Organizational and managerial barriers to flexibility are numerous and may be invisible. 
Included here are barriers of organizational resistance to change and failures to manage the 
innovation process. Also covered are organizational network barriers, attention barriers, 
forecast error, the neglect of informal systems, and the failure of performance measures. 
Resistance to change Resistance to change within apparel companies is cited as a 
major barrier to the implementation of flexible production technologies (Bailey, 1994). 
Change involves going from the known to the unknown, and it involves some form of loss 
(Coghlan, 1993). Five common causes of resistance to change in organizations are; 1) lack 
of belief in the need for change; 2) variation in the reasons for needing change; 3) 
disagreement about goals for change; 4) lack of belief that goals are attainable; and 5) lack of 
confidence in the manager of change. Resistance to change results from differences among 
people or functional groups in their priorities, plans, motives, and ideas. It reveals itself 
through many types of behavior. Behavior that demonstrates resistance to change is as likely 
to be covert and unconscious, as it is to be overt and conscious (O'Connor, 1993). 
An implemertation model for reducing the resistance to technological change in 
manufacturing organizations was proposed by Endsley (1994). From the perspective of those 
managing the implementation process, the model offers five major stage factors that 
influence adjustment. The stages progress from decision and introduction to initialization. 
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early job experiences, and finally to institutionalization. Flexibility of both the decision 
makers and the solution during these stages impacts adjustment because resistance to change 
is diminished when others perceive that the change is open to reconsideration and revision. 
Resistance to change has both cognitive and emotional elements. Coghlan (1993) argues 
that there is a need to understand resistance from the perspective of the defender's position, 
rather than from the perspective of those promoting the change. Resistance provides change 
agents with important information on the content and process of change. By taking a person-
centered approach, change agents can learn from resistors and prevent denial, coercion, and 
ultimately failure of the change implementation (O'Connor, 1993). 
Adoption and diffusion of process innovation in American manufacturing industries has 
been slow. The attitudes of managers in the U.S. have been geared toward short-term 
financial gain and risk aversion, with a tendency to neglect the value of process and product 
technologies as competitive weapons (Herbig & Palumbo. 1994). Difficulties arise when 
there are misunderstandings or lack of agreements about what needs to change (O'Connor, 
1993). For instance, American factory workers have been known to sabotage productivity 
improvements that were made through automation if they feared that unemployment would 
result from the substitution of technology for labor (Herbig & Palumbo, 1994). 
Social systems seek ways to defend themselves against innovations. Defenders are 
individuals and groups who try to protect the inner core of tradition and values. Their 
importance derives from the following conditions: they perceive unanticipated consequences 
of the change, they react to change that poses a threat to the integrity of the system, and they 
are sensitive to indications from those who are seeking change that there is a failure to 
identify with the system's core values (Klein, 1976). In a study of firms who underwent 
restructuring, Young and Post (1994) found that communication processes were critical for 
successful change. Managerial action emerged as an issue because it revealed implicit 
messages to employees that may have been contrary to official messages conveyed by formal 
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communication channels. 
Failure to manage the innovation process Despite technical resources and skilled 
people, some firms fail to manage the innovation process (Webb, 1992). Innovation is 
described by Angle and Van de Ven (1989) as a concentrated, purposive effon to develop 
and implement a substantial idea that entails technical, organizational, and market 
uncertainty. Innovation requires a collective effort, significant resources, and a considerable 
duration of time. The innovation process involves three temporal stages: 1) the initiation 
period of planning the efforts necessary to develop the innovation; 2) the development period 
of concentrated effort for transformation of the idea into reality; and 3) the implementation or 
termination period where the innovation is either adopted and institutionalized or terminated 
and abandoned (Webb, 1992). 
Failure to manage the innovation process is a barrier to flexibility. Four basic concepts 
are central to innovation processes: ideas, people, transactions, and context. Van de Ven 
(1986) identified that in order to manage the innovation process successfully, organizational 
leaders have to create an infrastructure that is conducive to organizational learning. This 
infrastructure defines a set of values and standards within which innovations and operations 
are maintained. An experimental approach helps the people in the organization to develop a 
capacity for learning by detecting and correcting errors. Innovation requires preserving 
diversity and uncertainty, not eliminating it. 
Cultural conditions determine whether organizational innovation will occur. The adoption 
of innovative technology requires social change. In a study of technology adoption in small 
manufacturing firms, Harvey, Lefebvre, and Lefebvre (1992) found that firms who were 
successful process innovators differed from other firms. Innovation success was 
characterized by tighter capacity management, improved process design, better trained 
employees, more flexible manufacturing system, advanced product quality, and more 
harmonious labor relations. 
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Acceptance of innovations and their subsequent diffusion occurs when there is a 
perception of sufficient intensity of need (Herbig & Palumbo, 1994). With rising apparel 
import penetration and other competitive forces, the trade press has aptly written about the 
intensity of need for innovative change in apparel production. Many apparel firms are going 
through an internal examination and radical restructuring process that has been referred to as 
business process reengineering (Teng, Grover, & Fiedler, 1994). 
Cross-functional organizational change is a radical improvement effort that is 
distinguished not by incremental improvements, but by dramatic changes in priorities and the 
methods to achieve them. Recentiy, flexibility has replaced cost reduction as a strategic 
priority of manufacturing (Dixon, Arnold, Heineke, Kim, & Mulligan, 1994). Business 
process reengineering (BPR) requires organizations to move from task specialization in 
functional hierarchical structures to the expanded use of process generalists (Teng, et al., 
1994). The apparel trade press has featured anecdotal accounts of BPR in apparel firms. 
Incremental process improvements can be distinguished from BPR in that they commonly 
involve a true strategic change in direction. Dixon, et al. (1994) refer to this phenomenon as 
an improvement trajectory, where people in an organization have to do things differentiy as 
well as do them in an environment where the old rules do not apply. In their study of fifteen 
firms that had undergone BPR, Dixon, et al. (1994) found that the change process takes time, 
patience, shared vision, constancy of commitment, and effective communication. 
The viability of dramatic organizational innovation depends on the extent to which the 
organizational structure is subject to reform. Stmctures that are not subject to reform remain 
barriers to flexibility and innovation. As organizations reform themselves, the access, 
diffjsion, and utilization of knowledge become critical factors (Ganz, 1981). 
Interorganizational processes and relationships affect the decisions involved in the adoption 
of new systems and technologies (Bobrowski & Bretschneider, 1994). 
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Neglect of informal systems Adoption of innovation requires willingness to face 
uncertainty and take risks, a readiness to accept change, and a dynamic long-term orientation 
(Herbig & Palumbo, 1994). When formal systems in an organization are inadequate, 
informal systems of control develop over time. Because these informal systems support 
relationships, they can confer roles and statuses upon individuals within a firm. For example, 
if sewing specifications are not precise, they must be interpreted for the operators. An 
individual may assume the responsibility for such a task, and gain stams for doing so, without 
any directives from a manager. Changing systems within an organization can threaten 
relationships that exist through informal controls, and result in resistance to change. Neglect 
of the existence and importance of informal systems poses a barrier to flexibility (Westbrook, 
1994). 
Organizational networks as barriers A useful approach to understanding barriers to 
strategic change in business was proposed by Buchko (1994). Firms that operate through 
network relationships, such as those between raw materials suppliers and producers or 
between producers and retailers, develop institutionalized patterns of behavior. These 
patterns of behavior can become barriers to flexibility. Although the value of strategic 
alliances is being developed in the literature, major obstacles have also been identified that 
interfere with the flexibility of member firms. Such barriers involve the development of 
dependencies on major parmers, and managerial focus on the alliance itself, thereby 
preventing firms from keeping in touch with their markets and other customers (Kanter, 
1994; Lorange, Roos, & Br0nn, 1992). The extreme demands that alliance relationships 
make on a firm can also conflict with the firm's investment priorities (Kanter, 1994). 
Attention barriers Restricting the flow of information between subunits in an 
organization results in the construction of attention barriers. Restriction of knowledge limits 
opportunities, activities, and hence salience of what could be critical issues. As niches are 
constructed by organizations through specialized capabilities and bureaucratic political 
72 
structures, mental models of the private worlds within organizations are conceptualized. 
Individuals and groups are then reluctant to abandon those models of organizational power 
and past success in favor of innovative change (Levinthal & March, 1993). Managers display 
mental models in the form of rigid beliefs about causal relationships. As evidence of linear 
thinking, a belief in unilateral causation reduces the ability to experiment. Experiments are 
the fundamental basis of innovation, and lead managers to discover the realities of circular 
causation (Grandori, 1987). 
Forecast error Forecasting is the prediction, estimation, or projection of future events 
or conditions that a firm may experience. These events and conditions are beyond the firm's 
control, yet their prediction provides the basis for managerial planning. Forecast error or 
failure to seriously attend to forecasting can be significant baniers to production flexibility. 
Every major functional area of an organization is affected by forecasting, especially 
marketing, sales, and production (Herbig, Milewicz, & Golden, 1993). 
Forecast accuracy contains two components: a bias component and a variability 
component. Bias in forecasts is revealed through the cumulative sum of errors. For example, 
predicting when a specific order will be finished and shipped to a customer may require 
many elemental and cumulative forecasts. Forecast errors have been found to increase 
manufacturing costs, especially in the form of buffers. Variation in forecasting depends on 
many variables, such as the accuracy of data, assumptions of models, and conditions in the 
environment. In most circumstances, forecast bias is much more critical to success and 
accuracy in planning, than is forecast variability (Ritzman & King, 1993). 
A common belief that more accurate forecasting will lead to superior performance of a 
company has not been confirmed. A production facility with poorly developed lot-size 
parameters, for example, will not necessarily benefit from careful inventory predictions. 
Flexible handling of special orders in manufacturing has emerged as an interesting theme in 
forecasting research. Greater revenues from special orders has been thought to offset the 
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problems these orders create in production. However, while it is common in practice, the 
handling of special orders is not well addressed in the literature (Ritzman & King, 1993). 
Failure of performance measures Process-focused multi-functional teams are 
improving the performance of many companies. Those organizations that have moved from 
control-oriented, functional hierarchies to team-based and network forms have found that 
traditional performance measurements systems are failing to support team effectiveness 
(Meyer, 1994). 
For example. Hill (1992a) shows the need for apparel firms to move away firom piece-rate 
incentive compensation to a group incentive, so that individual operators will support each 
other and behave according to what is best for the success of the team. Nevertheless, 
productivity within teams remains the key performance criterion, just as it was with 
individual operators. Inherent flexibilities of the team, such as skill ranges or operator 
contributions to the development of new products as well as the processes to manufacture 
those products, is not captured in a team productivity performance criterion. As long as 
product cost continues to be based on direct assembly labor hours, performance measurement 
and compensation of operators will continue to be based on the number of units assembled 
within a given amount of time, whether it is a modular process, a unit production process, or 
a progressive bundle process. 
Accurate product cost data is essential to apparel producers. Product costs are required in 
many decisions, especially those related to price determinations, capacity planning, sourcing, 
and analysis of capital expenditures. Traditional accounting practices of determining the cost 
of an apparel product usually depends on the amount of labor in the product (Davis, 1992). 
First, labor and materials costs are assigned to each product. Overhead is then allocated to 
each product through a base rate, t>'pically direct labor hours, materials costs, or machine 
time. The shortcomings of this system are that product costs are distorted because different 
products consume overhead resources in the organization to different degrees. Overhead, or 
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indirect costs, and materials have become a larger percentage of product cost, while labor has 
become a smaller percentage. Many overhead costs are driven by diversity in products, 
volumes, processes, and customers (Brimson, 1991; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987). 
Efficiency addresses a production firm's ratio of inputs to outputs. However, with regard 
to costs, the effectiveness of the production system model is better described by the ratio of 
useful outputs to inputs. Efficiency in manufacturing should incorporate a measure of 
usefulness, such as the price that customers will pay for the output (Busby & William, 1993). 
Financial and technical barriers to 
Cost of flexible technology One of the major criticisms of investment in flexible 
technologies is that they fail to meet an acceptabl'^ s\ort term rate of return. The cost of 
capital is a variable issue, while justification of the investment is difficult using traditional 
cost accounting methods (Bidanda, et al, 1993). Specialized equipment such as automatic 
pocket setters can exceed $50,000 per machine, and can be inflexible in accommodation of 
product changes (Schoer & Ziemke, 1994). The cost of computerized cutting technology that 
is integrated with design and marker making can exceed $1 million. Unit production 
workstations were reported by Schoer and Ziemke (1994) to cost from $4,000 to $6,(X)0. 
Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. offers a unit production system with a cost that varies from 
$3,900 to $6,000 per station, depending on additional capabilities such as payroll processing 
and integration with other data processing systems (C. Newman, personal communication, 
March 8,1995). 
Changing to modular manufacturing in apparel production also requires increased 
investment Production facilities require more equipment which is not in continuous use. 
Extensive training of the workforce is costly and can result in a significant loss of production 
during the training period (Bailey, 1993; Schoer & Ziemke, 1994). Other industries tiiat have 
shifted from mass production with task dedication to multiskilling of the workforce suffered 
similar reorganization costs (Kaplinsky, 1994). 
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Firm size Financial constraints of flexible innovation may be felt by smaller or less 
financially secure firms. Large producers are more capital-intensive than small producers 
because they achieve technical economies of scale by using production methods with greater 
capital requirements (Mills & Shumann, 1985). Larger firms have the resources to hire 
consultants, send staff to seminars, and have contact with other innovative firms, foreign 
producers, and industry organizations that offer expertise and information on new 
technologies (Bailey, 1993). On the other hand, small manufacturers have what Fiegenbaum 
and Kamani (1991) refer to as output flexibility. Small firms have many other structural 
advantages that allow for change. 
Labor and policy harriers to flexihilitv 
Labor and policy barriers to flexibility involve cultural, language, and gender differences 
among workers and managers. Within organizations, other labor and policy barriers include 
those related to labor unions, employee tumover, and absenteeism. 
Cultural, language and gender differences Difficulties with team organization and 
effectiveness have been hampered by cultural, language, and gender differences within 
apparel plants. Bailey's (1993) study described a production plant in the eastern part of the 
U.S. that had both Muslim and Hindu workers who would not speak to each other. The 
manager expressed his dismay at the expectation of them working together in a module. 
Ethnic and gender differences between managers and operators in apparel plants continue 
to be sharply defined. In the vast majority of American apparel plants, managers are white 
males, and most operators are white or minority females (Bailey, 1993). This situation has 
occurred because of gender role typing in the industry. Scheller (1993) found that female 
operators and supervisors were convinced they did not have any advancement opportunities 
within their firm because of prevailing attitudes that white male managers held toward 
women. 
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Labor unions The effects of labor unions on the apparel industry's initiative toward 
flexibility has not been described in the literature. However, management literature reports 
that labor unions and other groups can exert power over firms and may be able to erect 
barriers to flexibility and change (Buchko, 1994). Union membership among apparel 
workers is significant Member firms of the Clothing Manufacturers Association of the 
United States (CMA) account for about 85% of the unionized apparel production in the U.S. 
The Amalgamated Clothing and Textiles Workers Union (ACTWU) represents 
approximately 36,000 workers in CMA plants. About 80% of tailored clothing in the U.S. is 
produced in the unionized sector (Abend, 1994). Differences between union and non-union 
producers are not known. Working conditions were found to be the same at both union and 
non-union plants in Schoer and Ziemke's study (1994). 
Employee turnover and absenteeism Taplin's (1994) study of apparel producers found 
that employee absenteeism and turnover disrupted the functioning of modular sewing teams. 
Annual employee turnover in some of the plants studied by Schoer and Ziemke (1994) had 
rates ranging firom 30% to 1(X)%. The industry continues to have a "sweatshop" image and it 
suffers from comparatively low wage and benefit levels in increasingly competitive labor 
markets. A general shortage of trained employees forces production plants to offer their own 
training programs, but such programs also carry high failure rates. 
Standards relating to error, waste, or allowable levels of defective work can become 
barriers to flexibility. Bockerstene and Shell (1993) note that where policies for allowable 
scrap in a manufacturing process exist, scrap continues to be accepted. Likewise, when 
incentive rates for rework operations exist, rework continues. Because organizations have a 
tendency to emphasize standards, the standards can become institutionalized, thereby 
preventing the improvement of manufacturing processes. 
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Summary of barriers to flexibility 
Overall, the amount of research literature on the barriers to flexibility in manufacturing is 
limited. Barriers are bo± internal and external. Internal barriers may be characteristics of 
the organization, while external barriers may involve environmental conditions, such as 
customer needs or availability of technology. Even though financial barriers are important, 
the major barriers to flexibility and innovation within organizations focus on people, their 
knowledge, and their behavior. 
Organizational change literature is primarily strategic, and converges toward innovation, 
business process reengineering, and paradigm shifts. Issues across the literature of 
organizational change involve competitive forces of time, cost efficiency, and an increased 
focus on the value of human resources. Each of these issues is salient in the apparel trade 
press, as apparel firms are trying to accommodate environmental changes without investing 
large amounts of capital. 
Moving bevond barriers: Paradigm shift in apparel manufacturing 
Change in business strategy does not move linearly, nor through easily identifiable 
sequential phases. Strategic change is more iterative, continuous, and uncertain while it 
offers an organization the ability to compete within its prevailing settings. Critical to change 
is the reliance on two qualities: the ability to identify and understand competitive forces, and 
the competence in mobilizing and managing the resources necessary for the competitive 
response of change (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991). Change is defined as "...an empirical 
observation of differences in time on one or more dimensions of an entity" (Van de Ven & 
Poole, 1989, pp. 32). The process of change infers a pattern of differences over time and is 
contained within a theory of innovation (Van de Ven & Poole, 1989). 
Flexible production as a system is embedded in new forms of production organization, 
technology, and industry relationships (Kawano, 1993). Pattems of production change 
within apparel firms have focused on technology. However, between firms, radical shifts in 
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the organization of apparel production and distribution is focused on the nature of 
relationships. The apparel industry is moving away from a model of power-based 
relationships within and across firms, toward a network model of cooperative relationships. 
While the former model was characteristically hierarchical and dependency contingent, the 
newer model demonstrates a sense of mutual support and development within partnerships. 
Two powerful forces behind these changes are the importance of non-price features, such as 
quality, delivery, and inventory control, as well as the growing complexity of products 
(Bessant, 1991). 
In the former mass-production model, low-cost suppliers were favored where labor was 
the major cost component. Now that materials make up a larger portion of product cost, and 
greater scope in product lines requires a wider range of raw materials, inventory management 
has become a source of cost containment. Focusing on quality and timely deliveries requires 
a different kind of relationship between buyer and seller. Inter-firm relationships also extend 
beyond suppliers to other areas such as design, financial services, consultancies, distribution, 
and marketing. 
Product and product line complexity require materials, skills, production capacities, and 
coordination that extend beyond the abilities of most single firms. Through networking, 
apparel firms are extending themselves by bringing together different elements from 
independent specialists. As an alternative to traditional vertical and horizontal integration, 
networking projects flexibility in apparel production to a grand scale. 
Bessant (1991) notes that the emerging networking relationships in the Italian textile and 
apparel industries do not repeat the historic cycle of the "putting out" system that existed 
before mass production. Although the putting out system was inherently flexible because of 
its responsiveness to fluctuations in demand and fashion, it depended on a hierarchy of 
control integrated into a pyramidal structure of dependency relationships. The new networks 
are both centralized and decentralized. Each member is dependent on the sharing of a 
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common information and resource system, while remaining independent in other activities. 
The facilitator of the network coordinates from a central position to focus resources in the 
system toward particular problems or needs. Rather than being power-based, the network 
model is essentially a set of knowledge and information-based partnerships. 
The movement of apparel firms away from mass production and toward network 
relationships represents a paradigm shift. Paradigm shifts among scholars were first 
described by Kuhn (1970) as a set of beliefs, values, and practices held by a community of 
practitioners. Paradigms represent a perspective that is the basis of the way people view their 
reality (Henderson, 1991). 
Paradigms are thought to function on two levels, the social level of a community, and the 
cognitive level of individual members of a community. Paradigms are thought to be the 
correct and proper way that a discipline solves its problems. Implicit in the actions of the 
community's members is the expectation that the prevailing paradigms will be confirmed 
(Rubinstein, Laughlin, & McManus, 1984). 
Paradigms are believed to pass through three stages. The first stage is a period when the 
paradigm is accepted by the community. In apparel production, this could refer to the mass 
production model of bureaucratic control, task specialization and volume production. The 
second stage is a calm phase when problem solving activities are being carried out. In 
apparel production, this may be the gradual improvements in productivity that were gained 
within the progressive bundle system. Third, a period emerges in which an accepted 
paradigm becomes unstable, and alternate views are examined (Rubinstein, Laughlin, & 
McManus, 1984). Dramatic changes in the environmental conditions that apparel producers 
are confronting are forcing them to question the assumptions that underlie the progressive 
bundle system. Some innovative producers are now viewing their world through a new 
paradigm that reflects a different set of realities. 
Processes underlying the function of paradigms are essentially cognitive. Fundamental 
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assumptions are at the core of a paradigm and influence how the members of the community 
view their world. Among members, logical thought rests on particular premises of a 
paradigm. The core premises or assumptions of paradigms are at times not subject to 
examination (Rubinstein, Laughlin, & McManus, 1984). Kuhn (1970) asserted that science 
does not progress through a gradual building of knowledge, but through periodic revolutions. 
A shift in the paradigm, then, is a shift in the world view and in the logic within the members 
of the community. The adequacy or tmth of assumptions underlying the paradigm have been 
questioned and revealed (Rubinstein, et al., 1984). 
Summary of Literature Review 
The logic of mass production in apparel manufacturing is being challenged by the 
environmental demand for flexibility. Apparel organizations have evolved into bureaucratic 
forms supported by ideologies such as patriarchy, economies of scale, and task specialization. 
Inflexibility is the norm. The current social environment of egalitarianism, consumerism, 
and demand variations are not compatible with the apparel production ideologies of the past. 
As in other manufacturing industries, the apparel production sector is showing a trend away 
fiom mechanistic forms of organization toward organic forms characterized by sourcing and 
resource networks and "flatter" structures. Considering the industry's historical development, 
this is a difficult transition. 
Flexibility literature focused specifically on apparel production is especially limited. As 
an emerging issue, little research has been done beyond description and technique 
experimentation at apparel research facilities. No research is definitive on whether flexibility 
is beneficial to producers according to specific conditions they operate in. Studies on the 
adoption and diffusion of flexible techniques throughout the American apparel industry have 
not been done. Many other related issues, such as the effect of NAFTA and offshore 
sourcing on flexibility requirements for domestic apparel producers have not been 
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investigated. 
The literature relates manufacturing flexibility to strategy-a set of behaviors supported by 
a basis of knowledge and beliefs. Most research on manufacturing flexibility has focused on 
production planning, scheduling, inventory control, and technology. Flexibility is generally 
defined as a capability that a manufacturing firm develops to accommodate environmental 
uncertainty and market demands by changing production parameters. Production parameters, 
such as volume, flow control, task times, and product styles are contained within the many 
dimensions of flexibility that have been identified in the literature. 
Changing parameters, however, involves a great deal more than merely altering tasks. 
Beyond the recognition that difficulties lie in changing to flexible manufacturing techniques, 
research studies on apparel production have not described the depth or range of problems 
related to cognitive issues. The essence of flexibility is its human perspectives: training, 
formal education, and organizational learning that are prerequisites to organizational and 
industrial change. Depth studies about flexibility as a way of thinking that is different from 
that of mass production is a major limitation of the apparel production literature. 
Consequently, this research has focused on the knowledge structures of managers and 
consultants in the apparel production sector. No attempt was made to assess or weigh 
evidence in favor of technologies, nor prescribe an ideal set of flexible strategies. Rather, 
this exploratory study sought to examine the relationships between knowledge and actions as 
they relate to flexibility, using the literature as a basis of understanding die construct 
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METHOD 
The Research Approach 
The purpose of this study was to inductively describe strategic apparel production 
behaviors, values, and ideologies related to flexibility. Through the perceptions of apparel 
managers and consultants, the study sought to explore the premises of current apparel 
production cultures. Influencing the selection of a qualitative research approach was the 
challenge of analyzing the ways that managers and consultants thought about flexibility, and 
how their beliefs and perceptions were affecting apparel production. Therefore, methods 
were selected to gather a wide range of in-depth responses from individuals with expertise in 
and knowledge of the apparel industry and of the inner workings of apparel production firms. 
Firm and participant sampling, instrument development, data collection procedures, and data 
analysis techniques were designed to facilitate the exploration of issues relating to the 
research questions. 
Qualitative approach with emergent design 
Because this smdy was conducted without firm assumptions about the relationships 
among the three constructs, a qualitative approach with emergent design was selected. 
Qualitative research is characterized by an inceptive focus, that may change during the 
inquiry, but that establishes the boundaries of the naturalistic investigation. The design of a 
naturalistic study emerges as the study unfolds because the researcher learns during the study 
and follows important themes as they present themselves (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Descriptive studies using naturalistic approaches contribute to understanding of phenomena 
by revealing fundamental variables and constructs for the generation of grounded theory. 
Recent descriptive studies of apparel production using qualitative methods have opened up 
opportunities for focused studies on specific variables (Bailey, 1993; Schoer & Ziemke, 
1994; Taplin, 1994). Descriptive theory building in business research has extended into the 
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development of refined variables within existing frameworks, exploring relationships among 
variables (Snow & Thomas, 1994), and cultivating elaborate definitions of variables from 
qualitative data (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Scheller, 1993). Studies of stability and change 
vwthin organizations have been done through frameworks of significant variables (Pugh, 
1983). Morgan (1983) describes the dialectic approach to organizational research that 
accepts the diversity of assumptions and knowledge while bringing competing perspectives 
into the construction of new modes of understanding. 
Qualitative research is comprised of three major components: data gathered from various 
sources, with interviews and observation being the most common; interpretive techniques 
used to conceptualize the data; and written or verbal reports of the findings (Glaser, 1992; 
Taylor & Bogdan, 1984), Because of human responsiveness and adaptability, the interview 
is the best tool for naturalistic research. The interviewer's ability to process information 
quickly and emphasize the context of the data is a primary advantage of the interview 
technique. During the interview, probing further into themes as they emerge allows the data 
and the study to evolve with greater depth (Lincoln & Cuba, 1985). 
Trustworthiness in naturalistic research is developed through various techniques. 
Adequate observation of salient elements of the study serve to reinforce the credibility and 
dependability of the data. Prolonged engagement, and the investment of sufficient time and 
experience to leam the culture of the phenomena (and to build trust with the informants), are 
activities that increase the probability of credible findings. The use of several data sources 
and different data collection methods (triangulation) helps to ensure die objectivity, 
confirmability, and dependability of the data (Lincoln & Cuba, 1985). 
Grounded theory 
Language represents native conceptual systems (Gregory, 1983). Grounded theory is an 
analytic procedure whereby the qualitative data of language are conceptualized and built into 
a richly explanatory theory which sensitively integrates and represents reality (Glaser, 1992). 
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In the naturalistic approach, hypotheses and theory are not proposed before the inquiry and 
tested, but rather emerge from the data, as data analysis is inductive and open-ended (Lincoln 
& Cuba, 1985). As qualitative data are tediously and abstractly conceptualized by the 
researcher, patterns reveal themselves, so that at the most abstract and conceptual levels, 
grounded theory emerges (Glaser, 1992). 
However, in planning qualitative studies, it is legitimate for the researcher to work 
initially from a body of existing literature that draws empirically derived conclusions. Insider 
knowledge of the domain, problems of access to informants, and identification of the best 
data sources become guidelines that help shape, but not limit, the analysis (Thomas, 1993). 
Glaser (1992) warns against forcing qualitative data into preconceived conceptual categories, 
unless a researcher is specifically seeking to develop merely conceptual description. 
Grounded theory emerges from data throughout a study by systematic and inductive analysis. 
Well-constructed grounded theories are characterized by four central elements: fit, work, 
relevance, and modifiability. Grounded theory that is carefully induced from properties of 
categories will fit the realties of the informants. When major variations in behavior are 
explained by theory, it is considered to "work". Grounded theory achieves relevance when it 
both fits and woiks. As new data present themselves, variations in emergent properties and 
categories may lead to the modification of the theory so that the integration of new concepts 
is accommodated (Glaser, 1992). 
The growing use of qualitative approaches for theory development in organizational 
behavior lies in the nature of dynamic business organizations and their root assumptions 
(Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Quantitative methods have provided valuable knowledge about 
processes of change, but have not captured the depth of description or culturally relative 
understandings of dynamic organizational behavior (Morgan & Smircich, 1980; De Roche, 
1994). Workplaces, such as factories, are not stable, instrumental systems where inputs are 
rationally transformed into outputs with only occasional disruptions. Rather, they are 
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complex social systems characterized by informal structures, inefficiencies, ambiguous tasks 
and roles, and a variety of meanings to their members (Darrah, 1992). 
All members engage in the process of shared meanings within organizations. Researchers 
who study organizations uncover structures of meaning and synthesize an image of the reality 
for reflection and consideration (Smircich, 1983a). Qualitative approaches have been useful 
in production research studies characterized by extended fieldwork (Darrah, 1992; De Roche, 
1994; Klein, 1994; Kusterer, 1978; Snow & Thomas, 1994; Taplin, 1994), thick description 
of cultural systems (Geertz, 1973), and grounded theory development (Glaser, 1992). 
In this study, naturalistic methods consisting primarily of open-ended interviews and 
observation were selected as the most appropriate means for collecting data and developing 
grounded theory. The personal depth interview is an effective method to capture the 
meanings and significance that people have in their lives through their complex personal 
frameworks (Jones, 1985a). Interviews as data collection techniques were supported by other 
activities to enhance trustworthiness. Triangulation was achieved through several types of 
data collection techniques and different sources of data. Techniques included audio taped 
interviews of a wide range of informants, prolonged presence at places appropriate to the 
apparel industry, recorded field notes of observations, and analyses of documents and visible 
systems, such as an actual apparel production process. Data sources included transcripts of 
interviews, field notes, and documents. Opportunities for the collection of data presented 
themselves as the study unfolded; consequently, all data sources were not anticipated in the 
original research proposal. Approval of procedures and instruments for this study, as well as 
the use of human subjects in research, was obtained from the Iowa State University Human 
Subjects Review Committee (see Appendix D). 
Preliminarv data collection 
The design of this study included a combination of deductive and inductive techniques. A 
preliminaiy interview instrument was developed by deductively drawing concepts from the 
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literature related to flexibility. Visits were made to three apparel production plants in the 
midwestem United States. Plant tours, observations of the production systems, and 
interviews with production managers about flexibility served to pre-test the evolving 
instrument. Themes were identified from these informants, which added focus to the study in 
subsequent instrument development. 
Next, a similar interview instrument was developed based on a combination of concepts in 
the initial instrument, the literature review, and themes identified from the initial interviews. 
This instrument was designed to collect knowledge and insights about flexibility from the 
perspectives of apparel industry consultants, with a particular focus on the problems 
producers encounter when they adopt flexible techniques. Visits were made to two nationally 
recognized apparel research facilities in the southern United States: the Textile/Clothing 
Technology Corporation in Gary, North Carolina, and Clemson Apparel Research in 
Pendelton, South Carolina. 
The Textile/Clothing Technology Corporation (TC^) conducts a wide variety of research 
on innovative apparel production techniques. It serves to educate individuals who are 
involved in the industry, through their roles in government, private apparel firms, or 
educational institutions. As a teaching factory, TC^ manufactures apparel daily using state of 
the art equipment and techniques. Clemson Apparel Research is a similar apparel production 
research facility, affiliated with Clemson University and Th'^ Southeast Manufacturing 
Technology Center. In both facilities, observations of flexible production techniques and 
discussions with experts who staff the facilities contributed further to the evolution of the 
study. 
Attendance at a two-day seminar for apparel producers on the theory of constraints 
provided an in-depth analysis of managing production flow from the perspective of a 
production consultant. The seminar also allowed for introductions to and discussions with 
industry managers. From these preliminary activities and interviews, a set of three salient 
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constructs were identified. In turn, from these constructs, five research questions were 
developed. 
It became very clear from the initial discussions with managers and consultants that 
techniques of flexibility in apparel production had to be supponed by an underlying 
philosophy, or abstract set of reasons. This philosophy, or ideology, was a conceptual system 
within the minds of consultants and managers and was based on their knowledge, 
experiences, and perceptions of flexibility. Other ideologies have dominated the apparel 
production industry for decades, namely productivity, profit, and, more recently, quality. 
Conflicts between flexible techniques and the preservation of these former ideologies were 
causing difficulties among producers. Furthermore, initial discussions revealed that 
producers were demonstrating a wide variety of flexible behaviors, and were encountering 
numerous barriers and conflicts related to change. Thus, the constructs and research 
questions below reflected the focus of the study and served as a basis for the evolution of the 
final instruments. 
Construct Research question 
Ideology How do apparel producers perceive the concept of flexibility 
in production? 
How does the concept of flexibility relate to the dominant apparel 
production ideologies of quality, productivity, and profit? 
Forms What are apparel producers doing (behaviorally, technologically, and 
structurally) to support their perceptions of flexibility? 
Barriers What are the barriers to the implementation of flexible production 
philosophies and techniques? 
What knowledge do apparel producers need to overcome their 
resistance to change? 
A third interview instrument was designed to capture elements within the research 
questions (see Appendix B). The intention of this final instrument was to gather meanings of 
88 
flexibility in production from a range of managers and consultants representing a wide 
variety of apparel firms, product lines, and production processes. 
Professional development of researcher Activities related to the preliminary data 
collection phase also served to prepare the investigator by providing knowledge about the 
industry, language, possible informants, and potential problems and issues that could not be 
learned from literature. A previous naturalistic study of quality issues within a large apparel 
producer completed by this investigator offered a valuable frame of reference for the design 
of the present study (Scheller, 1993). Over the past three years, tours of apparel plants, 
discussions with plant personnel, and attendance at industry meetings and seminars made 
valuable contributions to the development of the researcher's knowledge and relationships 
within the industry, thereby helping to provide trustworthiness in this study. Extensive 
undergraduate coursework related to business, strategic and operations management, as well 
as graduate level coursework related to apparel production served as a basis of knowledge 
from which to conduct this study. 
Sample and locations 
Criteria for sample Overall, the sample of 38 informants was purposively selected to 
represent diversity. Informants represented 29 different apparel and consulting firms. In 
order to reduce response bias, other researchers have found that selecting informants who are 
at higher levels in business organizations assures more reliable data (Miller &. Roth, 1994). 
Therefore, informants were selected who were thought to have a significant level of 
knowledge about apparel production. 
Individuals were invited to participate as production representatives of apparel or related 
soft goods firms of varying size, product line, and type of production system. The sample 
was also selected to achieve geographical dispersion, some gender balance, and varying 
levels of industry experience. Three factors were taken into account during the sample 
selection: 1) informants had to be actively involved with flexible techniques in production; 2) 
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informants had to have some experience with production of apparel or related soft goods that 
had a style range, such as clothing or handbags; and 3) preferably, informants had an 
accessible production plant for a visit by the investigator. Time and financial constraints of 
the study did not allow for travel to all of the firms and plants; therefore nine of the 
informants were interviewed by telephone. Confidentiality and anonymity both verbally and 
in writing were assured to each informant. A letter from the researcher detailing the study 
was received by each informant either in person, by mail, or by facsimile after they had 
agreed to consider participation. 
Access In a qualitative study of Asian apparel production firms. Ram (1994) relied on 
the development of connections and trust to earn access to the workplace culture. Likewise, 
the task of identifying managers and consultants who might be regarded as representative of 
firms involved in flexible production techniques for this study was difficult and time 
consuming. Through snowball sampling techniques, several methods of contacting 
participants were pursued. Identifying most of the potential participants was dependent on 
relationships with academic colleagues and industry acquaintances that had developed over 
the past three years. A list of members belonging to a regional sewn goods organization led 
to five informants. A depth interview with an apparel production quality retail consultant led 
to the identification of four individuals who were actively involved in innovative flexible 
production techniques at a variety of firms in the midwest. 
Finding people who had expertise in flexible production required extensive travel. 
Attendance at a major apparel production trade show led to six informants. Three apparel 
production seminars and one academic apparel research meeting gained introductions to three 
infonnants. Also, attendance at a national apparel research conference sponsored by the 
American Apparel Manufacturer's Association led to five people who were willing to 
participate in the study. One participant was an apparel production consultant in Honduras 
who provided a group of American apparel industry visitors, including the investigator. 
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access to six "807" production plants in two free trade zones in Honduras. From that 
experience, two other informants who had been deeply involved in transforming a large 
American apparel producer toward flexibility were identified. 
Sample characteristics The final sample of interviewed informants consisted of 26 men 
and 12 women (n=38), as consultants or managers representing 29 firms in fourteen states 
and Honduras. Four of the informants were sewing operators at a national apparel research 
facility. Because these operators traveled to perform demonstrations of flexible production 
techniques and had definite teaching roles in the industry, they were categorized for this 
study as consultants. Roles of the informants ranged from plant managers, plant engineers, 
corporate engineers, vice presidents of manufacturing, quality assurance managers and 
consultants, to owners, general managers, and chief executive officers. Sales of the referent 
apparel firms ranged from $2.5 million to over $500 million. All of the informants had 
experiences with flexibility and had high levels of knowledge about apparel and soft goods 
production. Some of the informants had been involved in the apparel industry for less than 
ten years, while others had been in the industry for their entire careers, in some cases, 
exceeding twenty years. 
Instruments 
The final data collection instruments consisted of two parts and were based on the 
research questions. Instruments were designed to reflect knowledge across the three 
constructs of the conceptual framework: ideology, behavioral and technological forms of 
flexibility, and barriers to flexibility (refer to Appendix B). One semi-structured interview 
schedule was developed for apparel production managers. It consisted of fifteen primary 
questions that were intended to reflect the managers' knowledge about production flexibility. 
Additionally, this instrument sought the informants' perceptions of what was happening in 
their firms, the industry, and the markets relating to flexibility. Issues of profitability, 
quality, and productivity were addressed. Depending on their responses to individual 
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questions, probes were developed to stimulate funher response or clarify vague statements. 
A separate semi-structured interview schedule was developed for apparel consultants and 
consisted of ten primary questions with probes. This schedule was designed to compliment 
and verify the managerial contribution to the data. It addressed the broader issues across 
firms, and included questions about conflicts that were related to changes in production and 
the industry. Several questions were the same on both schedules, and contained probes for 
identifying and stimulating further exploration of concepts. For example, all informants were 
asked about the meaning of flexibility in apparel production. Also, informants were asked to 
describe the most important characteristics of successful apparel producers. 
Procedure 
The interviews were conducted in a variety of settings throughout the United States and 
in Honduras. Eighteen apparel production plants were toured. Attendance at two apparel 
research centers, three apparel production seminars, one apparel research conference, and one 
major apparel production trade show contributed to the study in the form of knowledge, 
documents, introductions to informants, and observations of apparel production equipment 
and techniques. Data collection took place over nine months. 
Twenty-nine personal interviews were conducted. They ranged in time from twenty 
minutes to three hours. In some cases, an entire day was spent visiting a production plant, 
and discussing issues related to flexibility with production operators, supervisors, engineers, 
and managers. Four of the interviews were conducted with two individuals representing the 
same firm. For example, two senior managers from a large apparel producer were 
interviewed together. Each offered his views on the question or discussion, and each had a 
unique set of experiences and knowledge to draw from. This small focus group technique 
was very effective for stimulating conversation and achieving depth analysis of flexibility 
issues. 
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Nine of the informants were interviewed by telephone. Telephone interviews ranged from 
twenty minutes to one hour. However, in all but two cases, in-person introductions and 
discussions had taken place before the informant was interviewed by telephone. For 
example, one consultant was introduced at an apparel research conference. That individual 
spent some time discussing the study with the investigator and agreed to be interviewed at a 
later date by telephone. Individuals at seminars and trade shows often did not have the time 
or an appropriate place to be interviewed on-site; therefore, telephone interviews were 
preferred. Getting acquainted with potential informants through social activities, such as 
luncheons and dinners, was an important element of the study. Several informants who 
agreed to participate could not be contacted by telephone within a reasonable period of time 
or were not available for the interview at the scheduled time. Setting up some telephone 
interviews required as many as ten telephone calls for scheduling. Informants varied in their 
travel schedules and telephone availability. 
Prior to beginning formal interviews, two small tape recorders were engaged. In some 
cases, informants offered more information after the tape recorders were turned off and the 
formal interview ended. If the informant indicated that sensitive information given while 
tape recorders were off was not to be used, it was not included in the data. Opportunities for 
observation and in-depth explanations of production processes during plant and research 
facility tours presented themselves. Information from these incidents was recorded from 
memory as field notes soon after the visit was completed. Because of excessive background 
noise, four of the tape recorded interviews were not usable, but notes taken during the 
interviews were included in the data. All transcripts and documents were identified with an 
assigned informant number. 
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Data Analysis 
Data analysis followed the recommendations of Glaser (1992). Inductive analysis 
proceeded within and across the conceptual categories in order to discover the deep structures 
of meanings in the data. In listening to the tapes, care was taken to absorb the non-linguistic 
elements of the data, such as emphasis and emotions (Jones, 1985b). Reading and coding the 
transcripts then did not occur without the memory of the data collection scene and 
informants' intonations. Data analysis was also stimulated by discussions with research 
partners. Through these activities, further conceptualization of the data emerged. 
Coding 
Interviews were transcribed into a word processing program and printed. Six were 
selected for the initial development of an evolving coding guide. These six transcripts were 
purposefully chosen because they contained wide ranges of relevant concepts and substantial 
depth of knowledge from informants who had experience with flexibility. The transcripts 
represented interviews of five managers and three consultants. Initial coding began with the 
identification of discreet first-level abstractions in the data. Each discreet abstraction was 
given a name as a code, and all subsequent abstractions were constantiy compared to 
previous codes, as first-order codes were refined. Codes were listed on a coding guide. 
Comparison and discussion of the six transcripts and their codes with another researcher 
brought a decision to use the coding guide to code the remainder of the data. Throughout the 
remainder of the initial coding process, some codes were combined or renamed to more 
precisely echo the meanings within the data. Further discussion and negotiation with the 
research partner verified such coding decisions. 
Development of emergent themes 
All of the data, including the interview transcripts, documents, and field notes were coded. 
First-order codes were then grouped into ten major emergent themes. For example, all first-
order codes that were related to the informants' perceptions of demand for apparel goods. 
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such as changes in the types of products or changes in the volumes of orders, were clustered. 
These clusters were named product volume, order range, and product range, and they 
represented second-order codes. Across clusters, these codes together constituted a larger 
theme, more abstract than any cluster code, but capturing the meaning in individual codes 
and in groups of codes. The larger theme was named demand variation and represented the 
sources and types of pressure with which apparel producers were coping. 
Appendix C offers the reader a guide to the coding and theme development process for 
one major theme, as well as samples of data representing the other major themes. One full 
example of first and second-order coding is provided for the emergent theme entided 
Environmental Diversity. A sample of data representing this theme is presented. Two 
clusters of codes were selected from all of the codes across all of the data to show the range 
of ideas that compose this theme. One cluster was named market characteristics and the 
other cluster was named competitive forces. They are second-order codes. These two 
clusters were named as such because the first-order codes listed underneath them as a group 
represented more abstract ideas. Some first-order codes, such as time competition, are 
elements in both clusters. The environmental diversity section of the results chapter does not 
address all of the first-order codes because some of them were more salient in other sections 
of the results. Nevertheless, the reader can see how codes are developed from raw data and 
grouped to represent higher meanings. Moving from the concrete data to the abstract ideas 
across data is the distillation process of content analysis. 
The ten emergent themes were distinct, and their first-order codes and second-order 
clusters represented nearly all of the data. Some themes were directly related to others, for 
instance, as causes or consequences. These thematic relationships were composed in an 
outline to reveal the inherent structure in the data. It is notewortiiy that the deep structure 
within the data did not mirror the structure of the interview schedule, but emerged across all 
responses to represent the scope of meaning. The thematic structure within the data became 
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the anatomy for the description of meaning. From the ten emergent themes, a grounded 
theory of flexibility in apparel production emerged, and is reported in the next chapter. 
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RESULTS 
The structure in the data was profiled by ten emergent themes. The emergent themes 
were further structured by five superlative categories: external context, internal context, 
barriers, meanings, and theory: 
EXTERNAL CONTEXT INTERNAL CONTEXT BARRIERS 
• Environmental diversity • Planning variation •Barriers to flexibility 
• Demand variation • Sourcing variation 
• Process variation 
• Product variation 
® Structural/functional variation 
MEANINGS THEORY 
• Perspectives of flexibility • Mechanisms of flexibility 
These inductively developed themes demonstrated why and how producer ideology and 
behavior had changed and continued to change. Most perspectives on each of the ten major 
themes complimented each other and enhanced the depth and credibility of the aggregate 
data. 
As circumstantial phenomena, both environmental diversity and demand variation were 
primary themes that represented the external conditions that had impacted producers and had 
compelled them to respond. Behavioral and ideological responses to environmental diversity 
and demand variation comprised five major themes of continuous change that were internally 
derived. 
The five internal themes included planning variation, sourcing variation, process 
variation, product variation, and structural/functional variation. These themes represented 
changes within a wide range of beliefs and activities from the perspectives of producers and 
consultants. 
With such dramatic internal changes, producers had encountered, and in some cases 
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overcome, three types of barriers to flexibility: structural, functional, and cognitive. Barriers 
emerged throughout the data and were often categorically integrated. Two domains that were 
integrated with barriers and that appeared to affect all ideology and behavior were the 
cognitive domain and the affective, or emotional domain of responses. 
Definitional perspectives of the informants offered a scope of meanings for the concept of 
production flexibility within firms. Meanings of flexibility were represented through five 
perspectives as a set of abilities, as relationships to profit and productivity, as a solution to 
quality failure, and as a conception of the value of time. The concept of time ascended from 
the data as a new basis of competition in apparel production and as the ultimate interpretive 
concept of flexibility. 
From the five themes of continuous change and the perspectives of flexibility emerged a 
higher order definition of producer flexibility as the internal capacity to change the firm itself 
into an entity that was then able to make ceaseless changes. For apparel producers to achieve 
the internal stability to react and adapt to the environment and the types of demand within it, 
transitional capacity depended on an organizational knowledge and information base that was 
extraordinary in the industry. 
By deductively tracing the course of informant reasoning and behavior through the major 
themes, a theory of transitional capacity in apparel production emerged. As the iterative 
process of acquiring the necessary knowledge to create a structural and functional 
organization that was capable of adapting to changing demand and environmental conditions, 
flexibility obligated apparel producers to develop traits of character that extended beyond 
traditional production wisdom. 
External Context: Environmental Diversity 
Producers and consultants were well aware of competitive conditions. A major theme that 
emerged across the data was environmental diversity. This theme represents the new and 
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different circumstances in the external environment over the past ten to twenty years that 
have impacted producers and influenced their strategies. As social, technological, economic, 
and legislative percussions over which producers had little or no control, these changing 
environmental conditions had been growing in complexity and diversity. The operating 
environment discussed by producers and consultants involved issues related to retailers, 
vendors, labor markets, offshore competition, and the availability of computerized 
technology. 
Retailers as elements of environmentai diversity 
The informants thought that because turning inventory rapidly was the basis of retail 
profitability, time had become the most significant element in the retail environment. 
Retailers were perceived to be focusing on increased velocity of sales with less overhead. 
One apparel manager outlined a progression of circumstances that brought the temporal 
component of apparel markets to a priority status: 
Competition is increasing, specifically in the 1990's, a revolution occurred in 
which the number of retailers decreased. And as a result, the number of 
manufacturers in turn decreased as competition increased. Because of that, it 
became important to compete on a different scale. Traditional scales include 
equality in styling and price. All of a sudden, time became the largest issue of 
competition. 108 
Consolidation in the retail sector with the emergence of larger and more influential 
retailers was evident throughout the data. Producers made references to their relationships 
with large customers such as Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and J.C. Penny. The kinds of relationships 
were different than they were in the past. The new relationships were based on electronic 
communications, production planning, and quality control. The larger producers were 
involved in replenishment programs with retailers on some categories of products, thus 
requiring EDI and regular interactions with retail representatives on production scheduling 
and quality. 
A quality control consultant for one of the large retailers reported that apparel producers 
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continued to ship poor quality goods to the retailer. The retailer implemented a quality 
control program that offered assistance to producers within their production plants. The 
program fostered producer partnerships with the goals of improving production quality and 
subsequently reducing the retailer's returns. It involved extensive factory inspections of in-
process variation data with random product sampling and testing. Quality control consultants 
regularly visited plants and worked with production personnel to reduce process and product 
variation. Goods were also inspected after delivery to distribution centers and retail stores. 
This consultant described what she told producers when they had consistent production 
quality failures: 
But when I walk out this door (of the apparel plant), if you ship the goods out 
there tomorrow, or you don't do something to change it, I'm not saying you 
aren't hurting us, because our customers are affected by what you are sending 
us, but the thing is that you are hurting your own company. It may be OK 
today, but it's not going to be OK tomorrow, and as long as there is a 
documentation trail... So, the thing is, if you want to be successful for today, 
practice that kind of business. But if you want to be successful for tomorrow, 
join our team, have an avenue into the amount of sales we have nationwide. 
Then, let's work together on that partnership. And there will be bumpy roads 
along the way, but I will help you. 200 
Producers perceived that retailers were impatient, and had become intolerant of delivery 
delays, poor quality, and high production costs. Retailers expected them to have better 
production quality, lower price points, faster tumarounds, lower minimums, higher held 
inventories, and on-time deliveries. Also, producers reported that retailers had expanded 
their expectations for service from producers to include time-related components such as 
electronic communications (EDI) and the extra preparation of floor-ready merchandise. 
Some producers had systems that electronically tracked orders and sent out advance ship 
notices to retailers, as can be seen in the following statements: 
Well, there are shorter lead times that are demanded by the retailers. And they 
also want to be able to change and to buy closer to the season to improve their 
throughputs. And this is seen as an advantage when they can buy closer to the 
season. 206 
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They want turns really quick. (Large retailer), they have an EDI, an EDI 
system with us, so we get orders in ones, twos, threes, and fours. 204 
The retailer is directed by the consumer to have the right product at the right 
time. And in many ways, the consumer is pushing the retailer who is pushing 
the producer/manufacturer. 107 
I think they are trying to cut their inventories, have us hold their inventories 
for them. 204 
They are demanding the EDI systems to be in a, just a continuous link-up with 
what is going in our ordering systems, out shipping and all that... They want 
to know exactly what we know. 208 
I know that we do have to bar code and we do have to put their hang tags on 
certain things, so we have to be more aware of that. 205 
Because the retail environment was becoming intolerant of poor quality and iong apparel 
production time cycles, producers were having to pass on these time and quality imperatives 
to their suppliers. Suppliers of materials and trims were also elements of environmental 
diversity. 
"Vendors as elements of environmental diversity 
The inflexibility of vendors emerged as a source of conflict for producers. Numerous 
difficulties with vendors were cited, the most common being lack of trust, problems with 
deliveries and quality, as well as uncertain availability of fabrics. One consultant revealed 
the seriousness of the situation with textile vendors: 
I think the biggest pressure has been that in, a lot of people now are trying to 
service replenishment programs, and have had to do with shortening their 
manufacturing cycles. Unfortunately, the biggest problem they have is with 
their suppliers. The textile people have not traditionally done the job 
improving their ability to service and provide flexibility to the apparel 
manufacturer. Consequendy, what you've got is a lot of pressure coming from 
both sides. You've got the retailer wanting you to service these orders every 
week and replenish, at the same time you've been able to take your cycle times 
down to a fairly competitive level, but your textile supplier is still requiring x 
number of weeks to color piece goods. Or provide piece goods. 223 
Despite a general awareness of JIT as an inventory control technique, overall, the 
informants' experience with varying degrees of it were negative. At an apparel production 
seminar, a consultant told the audience jokingly that "...JIT stands for jammed in trailers." A 
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persistent message in the data is that neither the retailers, prcxiucers, nor vendors want to hold 
inventory: 
In my opinion, it goes back to the inventoiy again. No one really wants to 
hold inventory, but when they place an order, they would like to have that 
order filled immediately. 219 
The reality of JIT in one firm was explained by a quality production manager: 
Yes, what the vendors do is they pretend like its a just-in-time system, but 
what they do is they make all the fabric and leathers and so forth in advance 
and then they just store it at their end. It's supposed to be just-in-time, but 
what it is, is they're just storing it out of our sight, and then they feed it to us 
as we need it. And the way we know that they produce a lot of product in 
advance, before we've even placed orders, is that when it comes in and then 
QA rejects it, that raw material, then you'll often hear, you know, well that it's 
not just this shipment that came in, "We have a warehouse full of it". "You've 
got a warehouse full of it? Who told you to make a warehouse full of this 
stuff?!" That's how you find out that they did that. But I think that's another 
reality of just-in-time, you know, I think that just-in-time is somewhat difficult 
to handle for anybody. 202 
Due to lower volumes of material inventories, this manager explained the importance of 
dealing quickly with vendor problems: 
If we have a vendor problem, as far as this material, we only have so much in 
the warehouse we can just pull out. Our people expect us to get on our 
vendors like that, and have the problem solved tomorrow. 216 
Labor as an element of environmental diversity 
Another area of environmental diversity involved labor: issues related to supply, skill, 
wages, and legislation. Apparel producers who were operating in tight labor markets 
reported that they were unable to compete with other industries that paid more to their 
production workers. Some midwestem producers complained of the dual problem of labor 
shortage and having to assume the total cost of training. Producers had faced many other 
labor costs in terms of compliance with legislation related to safety, benefits, and 
compensation. These midwestem producers revealed how tight the labor markets in their 
areas were: 
Right now, we don't have any problems with compensation issues, we have 
102 
problems with getting somebody to walk in the door so that we can hire them. 
We don't lose people very often because of compensation. Then, once we get 
someone in here, the atmosphere is so much different than a piece rate factory, 
there's not the pressure, there's more of an everybody on one team kind of 
concept, we are all trying to get one job done. 203 
We definitely have a labor shortage. In the four counties that our plants are in, 
as far as in (this state), we're all in the top ten (unemployment figures), and 
two are in the top five, so basically there are no employees out there-we'rc 
strapped. 216 
In terms of economic development funds and tax incentives for manufacturing 
establishments, some midwestem states are reportedly not supportive of local growth in the 
apparel industry. One midwestem apparel manager stated that production jobs in "high-tech" 
industries that offer better wages are preferred over apparel jobs. In contrast, an Eastern 
producer had skilled labor readily available because of other apparel plants in the region 
closing. 
Offshore competition as an element of environmental diversity 
Reductions in trade restrictions through GATT, as well as the impending changes of 
NAFTA, were of concern to producers. Although many mentioned global trade and global 
competition as significant conditions, none of the informants offered specific details or 
predictions of the direct implications of these types of legislation on their firms or on their 
industry. The informants who were involved in 807 operations, however, were 
knowledgeable about the logistics and what they perceived to be advantages. One manager 
predicted that faster throughput in the Caribbean would be a serious threat to American 
producers: 
I think what the real key here, also, that you have not mentioned in any of 
these questions, is the concept of flexible manufacturing applied to the 
overseas market If you can get two and three day turns, let's say on 
merchandise out of the Caribbean Basin at ten cents on the dollar, I think that 
will be an unbelievable growth area and eventually catch up to the United 
States and just bury us. 108 
The following comments, ranging from the general to the specific, reflected concerns ftom 
managers and consultants about offshore competition. One comment demonstrated how 
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retailers have bypassed American apparel manufacturers and producers by sourcing direcdy 
fiiom foreign producers. Another manager referred to the issues of time and money involved 
in moving overseas goods to the American market: 
The market is more difficult today than it was four years ago, five years ago. I 
think it's more difficult now because of GATT, NAITA, and so forth. 220 
Well, domestic suppliers really have to become more flexible in order to be 
able to compete an>'more, because on any kind of basic styles, retailers 
themselves, much less other manufacturers can go offshore and program that 
kind of business out a year in advance. ...so they can go to the Far East and 
plan that a year in advance. 224 
A lot of money is tied up in inventory, and especially with the overseas 
market, if we tend, if we don't expect apparel manufacturers can get the 
overseas goods to market, then we can get that share of the money coming 
back. 103 
Well, your commodity production, mass production, a lot of it has been 
moving to lower cost, lower labor cost countries, and consequently, the only 
thing left here, or a lot of what's left here cannot be, where the labor cost issue, 
cannot be offset by technology. What you are left with are product segments 
that require, that have a lot of styling, and require a high level of diversity and 
flexibility in manufacturing. So, what it amounts to, is you either be fast and 
flexible, or you be outside of this country producing at a lower cost. 223 
Technologv as an element of environmental diversity 
Besides the fact that major retailers were requiring producers to install EDI systems, the 
availability, within the past decade, of new computerized technology for apparel production 
was a significant environmental change. Because new technology for production as well as 
for all other aspects of business operation was there, and competitive conditions were 
mandating it, producers who sought flexibility stepped into a cycle of substituting capital for 
labor through technology adoption. One producer's comments about technology adoption 
and competitive advantage reflect the elements of capital expense and risk: 
The whole reason my division got started is because we are the only ones in 
the country that have an operation like this. There is one other company that 
does something similar to this, but they go after the low end market, so they 
don't really attempt to do the quality that we do. But it took a lot of guts for 
the owner of die company to see the possibility that this (type of) machinery 
that makes the (product) without die seams, to go after that. It's been a huge. 
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huge capital investment before we even saw our first sale. And he's like that. 
He's your true entrepreneur. 224 
In addition to production technologies, recent advances in integrated data management 
systems were also having an impact on the internal data processing functions of apparel 
producers. These managers offered the following range of insights about technology 
availability and adoption: 
I think the apparel industry have always been the last ones to move on 
technology. Up until eight, nine years ago, you could still walk into a factory 
and never see technology, old sewing machines... Academia is now pushing 
technology. I think (the other manager) and I being at the level we are at, are 
saying the only way we are going to compete with the future is being at the 
edge of the future, which is bringing in technology. Academics, the (trade 
organization, apparel research center), getting involved and knowing 
technology... Look at the apparel industry ten years ago and look at the 
apparel industry today. We are just barely coming out of our shell. It's the 
ability to invest, and that's what we say. The technology is out there, the 
problem is that the old mentality of "I'm just going to build it, my machines 
are my machines, a single needle is a single needle, if I need a trimmer, I can 
have a human body do it." Nowadays, we can just walk away from that. Why 
have somebody trim it when we can have a machine do it?... It's people 
drawing from historic learning. This is why the US Army is using lasers to 
guide missiles. Why can't we use a laser to center a cutting device? So, six 
years ago, we decided to use it like that. Why not?... To t^e us through the 
year 2,000, that's what we have to do, and it (light sensors to track and count 
goods) costs us money. But five years down the road, who doesn't do it says, 
"We can get away with just a human being." Well, if that human being 
miscounts five or six times, you get charge backs of $500 every time you ship 
an item, then what is it wonh? Is it worth that initial $2,000 investment? 
Absolutely. 220 
And obviously, technology helps. The computer is invaluable. What can help 
is a CAD system, and obviously a marker system, laser cutting, any of that 
stuff that cuts the cost of your labor is invaluable for domestic suppliers. 224 
As far as cutting, we are trying to use every automated knife, cutter, anything 
that we can do to try to speed up the process... 216 
Technology, you know, most people's perceived idea is that technology is hard 
to use in a flexible work system. And I think that is one of the greater 
challenges before industry is to figure out how to marry the soft and the hard 
technologies. 206 
We have had bar codes for years. EDI has been around, but we really haven't 
known for the past several years how to integrate it into our business systems, 
aiid for the past several years, that is where the focus has been. 105 
105 
(We) have new embroidery technology that has tackle twill and it is all 
computerized and it is something that no one else does. 218 
We've got 53 retail stores and we have gone through a major transition in our 
data processing department going off maybe a 20 year old system or a 10 year 
old system and upgrading to an AS400 with EDI capabilities. 217 
The environment that producers were operating in was perceived to be more competitive 
and more costly in terms of growing or maintaining market positions. Producers had to 
respond to the demands of retailers and corporate customers who in turn were responding to 
the demands of persuasive consumer markets. 
Within the broad theme of environmental diversity was the concept of market demand. 
For producers, contending with retailers and corporate or government customers was an 
environmental challenge that became more specifically related to demand. The following 
section takes environmental diversity a step further into the details of demand. 
External Context: Demand Variation 
Informants expressed a relatively narrow range of opinions about what they thought was 
causing producers to become more flexible. Tnemes relating to retailers and consumers were 
represented by one broad area of coherence: demand variation. According to the informants, 
demand for apparel products had varied from the norm in the parameters of volume, order 
assortment, range, and lead time over a period of approximately 10-20 years. Informants 
were aware that retail demand continued to vary, absent the predictability of the past. Retail 
demand in the data was not limited to traditional stores, but included catalogs as well. 
Sources of demand 
The direct sources of demand on producers represented in this data included retailers, as 
well as institutions that purchased apparel for their members, such as schools, teams, 
corporations, and the military. Products represented in the data encompass both basic goods 
and fashion goods for a whole market range, including tops, bottoms, dresses, underwear. 
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children's, and outerwear. Other products were customized uniforms and jackets for sports 
teams and all types of professionals, a variety of sewn goods for the military, and unique 
corporate uniforms for such entities as hotels and restaurants. 
Consumers were perceived to be the source of variation within the retail demand. 
Reflected in the statement of one observant consultant was that the wants of consumers in the 
past two decades had changed. Consumer demands had shifted to wider varieties of apparel. 
The demand for faster merchandise turnover accommodated personal changes in consumer 
tastes and clothing needs, as well as consumers' desire for more immediate gratification. 
Producers were cautioned by this consultant to be aware of the changes in demand: 
Think about yourself as a consumer 20 years ago, going into the stores. I 
remember when I was a kid, even. We would go to the store to go back to 
school, and that was the time when everything that was new for that period of 
the year was in the store, and if you didn't get it during those first couple of 
weeks, you might not get it, and you would wait until the Spring stuff came 
about. So, you had limited choices and a limited time frame in which to get 
first choice of those choices. And what has happened, several things, but the 
consumer has changed and technology has allowed it to happen. But now you 
go into a store and you have hundreds of different things to choose from and 
then it is just, you can't even count how many different things there are, and as 
consumers, we want them today... The other thing we want to be able to do is 
to go back into the store a month from now and have a lot of choices, but they 
would be different choices, so we are developing the mindset that I want to be 
able to change, I want to change much quicker. So we are driving that in a 
sense, whether that was created by the retail environment or technology or a 
combination, I am not real sure. But the key is that the consumers are the 
ones that are going to drive it and those that are realigning manufacturing to 
adjust to that are the ones that are going to be around. Those that recognize it 
and change will be around. Those that don't will not be around, because their 
processing times in many cases are still 6 to 8 weeks. So, how do you go into 
the store a month from now and have a completely different set of choices in 
what you have today? Can't do it. 104 
Characteristics of demand variation 
Variation in product range In an increasingly complex marketplace, the range of 
products that "customers" were demanding of apparel producers had increased in terms of 
sizes, colors, materials, price points, quality, and style variations. This demand variation 
across customers was reflected in the following statements by these producers: 
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...more products, more styles, more colors, more products, more SKU's, more 
SKU's, more SKU's. We struggle from fabric to fabric, style to style. 216 
The retailer wants design, design, design... 202 
There's more interest in unique corporate identity now, and that demand is 
growing exponentially. People are no longer satisfied with a uniform that 
looks just lice company B or company C. They want a unique corporate 
image. 217 
Ah, quality, (large retailer) is one of our customers and they are very strict 
with quality. 210 
People in the 90's are looking for values. It is nothing unusual to see a 
Mercedes parked at a Wal Mart. So, cost is another thing, and they want it 
quicker. They want what they want, when they want it, and they want a lot of 
different styles, so it is tough. 210 
Now, we are going into more of a fashion type of an atmosphere, and we are 
going with fashion colors... 207 
Variation in order volume and range The volumes of products that customers ordered 
from producers was moving from a dominance of large orders in single styles, to smaller 
orders of more styles. This manager's statement reflected such a change: 
In the past, they were ordering in big quantities and big shipments; now it's 
short and sweet. 204 
...any given order is likely to be different from another-no two individuals are 
the same. So the degree of customization, or the amount of work that must go 
into an individual's order varies day to day, and in such a way that you can't 
really predict anything. 222 
Producers were seeing a change within orders toward more variation per order with 
perhaps the same overall volume. This phenomena was evident in the following manager's 
statement: 
The customer is driving it. They want more choices, they want to buy fewer 
of those choices. Instead of buying 10,000, they want to buy 20 different 
products, and maybe buy 100 of each one of those. 216 
Variation in lead time Part of the predictability for apparel producers in the past was 
the relatively long lead times that customers provided them when ordering goods. A 
common theme throughout the data is that lead times were getting shorter because retailers 
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needed to buy closer to the season, and that there were more retail seasons. Also, retailers 
wanted continuous replenishment on basic goods, as well as reorders within season on best 
selling items. This producer was asked whether point-of sale (POS) data from her retailers 
reflected what other garments were selling in that same environment by her competitors: 
No. Not by other vendors. No. What you are looking at, is you have a model 
stock that is set up in the store's computers. And you look at your rate of 
sales, based on what your stock level was. And I have salespeople that handle 
certain accounts, and that is their main job, is to make certain that the model 
stock reflects how the merchandise is actually selling. So if the percentage of 
white is 40%, the model stock should be 40%, and they do it twice a season, 
which means four times a year they review the store's model stock to make 
certain that....Now the difficult thing, and the only way you know what is 
going on with other vendors is you ask, and the retailer tells you, "Well, you 
should really be making a high cut string because (competitor) has it, that's 
doing really well." And that's what happened to us, so we put a high cut string 
in the line. There we go. And what will always happen to you is, styles, you 
put them in, and they will fall out because there are some that just don't sell as 
well as others, or colors that won't sell as well as others. Obviously the 
challenge, from a manufacturing point of view even on a basic business like 
this, is to come up with "What's new?" "New" this year was taupe! I know 
that sounds really boring, but we were doing white, ivory, pink, and black, and 
we did taupe last summer, and now taupe is like a big color. 224 
Informants thought that retailers wanted to avoid ordering apparel merchandise that would 
not sell at first price and require markdowns to move. By ordering as close to the season as 
possible, they may have been able to better forecast what would sell, as well as predict their 
cash needs and inventory tolerances. A production manager revealed the new reality of short 
lead times: 
Used to be that the major retailers would place their orders much earlier in the 
year. In our product, 60% of it is sold at Christmas, 60% of annual sales 
occurs, you Imow, somewhere around Thanksgiving, up to Christmas. And 
previously, your major retailers would place their Christmas orders in June or 
July, and they may take delivery shortly thereafter on it, and store it 
themselves, or just tell us well in advance that, "OK for this Christmas season, 
these are the things that I want." But in the last few years, these retailers are 
now placing orders at the last minute. Its early November, and in will come 
these very large orders for us, and so we needed to set up a system that could 
change over much faster. 202 
Within the shortened retail lead times, informants thought they had found a competitive 
advantage over offshore producers. Producers and consultants believed that reducing the 
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cycle time from fabric to finished product in order to meet the retailers' timing needs, was the 
most critical factor in their competitive advantage. The following statements reflect the 
impact of timing that retailer demands were having on producers: 
Well, of course, we have a seven day delivery service, which no one else 
seems to have, and that is a big plus. They are after us all the time about it 
anyway. 218 
The biggest thing we look at is the number of products being imported. We 
can't always be ±e most price competitive. So, if we can satisfy other needs 
of our customers, we can build on our business. Timeliness, quality, 
minimums is the big thing in our business. 203 
They want it faster, they want it high quality and they want it at a really good 
price. 200 
Well, there are shorter lead times that are demanded by the retailers and also 
they want to be able to change and to buy closer to the season to improve their 
throughputs. And this is seen as an advantage when they can buy closer to the 
season. 206 
The search for and the adoption of different technologies, processes, and organizational 
structures was an adaptive response to this variation in demand. The data show that in 
response to changing demand and environmental diversity, producers had altered their 
operations within five spheres of action: planning, sourcing, processes, products, and 
structure. These internal changes had occurred over time, and varied in depth and range 
within and across firms represented in the data. 
Internal Context: Production Planning Variation 
By transposing flexibility with predictability, flexible producers, as revealed within the 
data, had changed the way they plan their production. With former progressive bundle 
systems making large volume orders under long lead times, producers were able to plan 
production months or seasons in advance. These flexible producers, however, now had more 
variables and less time through which to plan. Planning production involved predicting the 
needs for certain types and quantities of capacity, equipment, and labor skills. Variation in 
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production planning was one of several adaptive responses to demand variation. This retail 
consultant complained about the planning time element in merchandising: 
Constantly, every single day, one of the biggest problems that I run into from 
a planning standpoint is that people don't plan the production and lead time 
into merchandising. And even though we are in fashion industry and fashion 
tums quickly, the plans, designs, and table, the lead times are incredibly long. 
We've already put to bed Fall of 95, its already done and planned and the 
orders, materials, etc. As an example, I just looked at a dress just on Friday 
(mid-August), a maternity 2-piece outfit and the production sample was tested 
in our test lab in March. 200 
When the same consultant was asked if she thought there was much flexibility in apparel 
production, this was her reply: 
No, because the lead times were not put into it. If you could put in lead time 
so we could react to problem, we take away all of our reaction time. We 
absolutely take it away because we don't have people planning properly, 
planning those steps into it. And they think, "Oh gosh its going to take me, its 
just going to take longer". I've had whole seasons fail because of problems we 
found. And the time ftames built into it. Because if we did find a problem or 
if we had a material problem, well then you know you hear, "Well my fabric 
supplier can't get the grey goods firom the mill. The mill is having a problem 
with the yam and then they can't do it because the yam was twist^ incorrectly 
and we are now having a pilling problem with the fabric and no one thought 
about how maybe we should have tested the yam out before we wove it. Or 
maybe we should have tested the crocking or the print before we made ten 
thousands pieces." And the thing is, it's not hard, you have to have certain 
check points and you have to implement your checkpoints throughout your 
system. They don't. They just figure, "Well I haven't had to do it up to this 
point." And nobody's making them accountable for it, although they are 
totally responsible for the goods. 200 
Lead time consolidation 
Informants who were flexible producers had learned to plan production within shorter lead 
times. One consultant explained how producers who used a progressive bundle system had 
difficulty planning production because they were unable to predict when specific orders 
would be finished. He went on to explain that a flexible production system had much less 
work in process inventory and allowed the producer to predict more accurately order 
completion and schedule production : 
The other way is in scheduling, some of the front end aspects of your 
business, the back end aspects of it is the planning. When you have 8 weeks 
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worth of work in process and a tremendous amount of cuts to manage and so 
forth, you can't, most manufacturers with that much in process, and that many 
variables are going to have, and quality was one of things (the other 
informant) was talking about. They can't tell you to within 15 minutes of 
when a cut is going to finish. TTiey are lucky if they can tell you within a 
couple of days when that particular work is going to finish. You take all of 
that out, streamline it, reduce all the work in process and production planning 
and scheduling and so forth, can literally know within a matter of 15 minutes 
when a particular product is going to be finished. You can run that much 
closer to the manufacturing process so it makes those jobs, it allows you to do 
a much more accurate, I am not going to say it is easier, because it changes the 
way that you schedule and that might be what makes you that much more 
accurate in your abilities to determine that. 105 
Informants reported that changing styles in a flexible system required a different type of 
planning. Several producers using modular systems had operator teams involved in the 
production planning process. One large producer who had many plants operating with a 
variety of flexible process combinations devised a spreadsheet system to plan equipment 
needs within plants according to style changes. A consultant noted that planning from a 
systems perspective was necessary to support a flexible production process because style 
changes require more variations: 
Well, first and foremost, is the systems part of it. And that again goes back to 
production planning and forecasting. But also, how work is scheduled from 
orders, or whether it is a QR mode kind of situation. The first component 
supporting this has to be the system side, and...typically we try to improve the 
manufacturing processes without getting ample systems support to make it 
more flexible, to support it. That has been one of the missing links. 223 
Flexibility means that basically, you cannot micromanage, getting down to the 
old scheduling and production control techniques that were used in apparel 
manufacturing. When you are introducing wide variety of styles and product 
into, we used we be looking at, the only real style change in a factory twenty 
five years ago was a thread change, (now) it's thread, fabric, style, as well as 
product. 223 
Another consultant revealed some examples of how production of different styles can be 
planned in a modular plant: 
I think it (the number of styles that can be managed) can be greater in flexible 
systems. If you think of a plant in a progressive bundle, you try to set that 
plant up with, you are going to handle 50 different styles, you are trying to 
mix all of your equipment so that you have all of your pockets setting here and 
all of your darts here and whatever the jobs are and you want them to be able 
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to handle the variations of all the different products as they all come through 
that line, whereas on a team system or a flexible system, you look at small 
groups of people that make the whole product. You can either duplicate that 
group so that every team makes the same product or, every team could be 
making a different product and have that, that group configured for that 
particular product which I think offers some great opportunities for style 
variation. They handle a lot of different styles by doing that. (Large 
producer) has done a great job with that in one of their plants where they have 
a lot of different teams and each team, they may have two teams on this 
product, one team on this product, three on another product, one on another 
product. Changes the whole day's schedule. 104 
One of the flexible producers offered evidence of effective planning within a UPS 
production process for a women's fashion garment: 
Recently, we had a 2,000 unit order for a wet print stirrup pant that we were 
able to turn around in less than three weeks, from design, to fabric allocation, 
to manufacturing, to shipping. By coupling our highly skilled technicians 
with current technology, we were able to cut, sew, finish, and pack the entire 
order in two days. 220 
Some of the producers represented in the data did not have all of the production capacity 
that their customers demanded. For example, one producer would accept larger orders than 
he could handle in his facility because he had planned a network of other producers to 
contract with. This aspect of planning for flexible production involved not only the sourcing 
of production capacity, but also sourcing of other things that improved production capacity. 
Interna! Context: Sourcing Variation 
Flexible apparel producers represented in the data expanded their capacities by seeking 
options. Sourcing is a term that refers to the acquisition of whatever was necessary to satisfy 
demand. The informants thought that having options and being able to source were elements 
of flexibility. The five areas of sourcing identified in the data were those related to skills, 
knowledge, materials, products, and capacity. 
Skill and knowledge sourcing 
The process of becoming more responsive to the variation in market demands for 
producers involved substantial education of production personnel. Guidance to enhance 
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skills was sought from different sources: consultants, technical support programs of 
equipment vendors, apparel research centers, seminars, and trade shows. Some firms hired 
people with expertise from other producer firms. Computer simulation programs, such as 
those that demonstrate and model flow balancing for modular production, were another 
source of skill development for production personnel. 
Raw materials sourting 
The rising impact of 807 production through the Caribbean initiative had offered 
producers the opportunity to cut U.S. made fabric, ship the cut parts to assembly facilities in 
the Caribbean, and sell the finished garments in the U.S. market with duties applied to the 
value of labor added in the assembly pnxess. Many producers represented in this data had 
taken this approach, and they did not rely heavily on imported fabrics. 
Informants reported problems related to raw materials sourcing that involved lead times, 
availability of piece goods, minimum order volumes, selections of colors and fabrics, and 
availability of trims and supplies: 
A lot of it obviously is gonna rely on what kind of product you are making 
and how quickly you can get the raw materials. That's a big, big part of it, 
because you can have a plant that can tum things around, but if you can't get 
the parts, you might as well forget it. 224 
When a consultant was asked if the textile producers were becoming more responsive to the 
timing needs of the apparel industry, he replied: 
They are aware of it. They are developing technologies that are allowing them 
to be more flexible. There are still some major hurdles that they have to 
overcome to be good suppliers and so forth. They are not there yet, to be able 
to support what we are envisioning as agile manufacturing. 105 
Another consultant experienced frustration in working with offshore 807 facilities because of 
the lack of support from the U.S. parent firms in sourcing materials, equipment, and supplies: 
This is going to be the one that I have to blame the people in the US the most 
for. Most of the people cutting and shipping up in the States have been 
cutting and shipping for the American factory and then for the factory down 
here...They often forget that it takes a couple of weeks to get something down 
here, the time and the shipping schedule...Or the container's leaving and they 
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screwed up and they didn't get all the cut pieces or they didn't get some 
machine parts or something...now the container comes and maybe all the 
folders (specifications) to make the garments didn't show up...Then, they end 
up air freighting the folders, or, like the other day, air freighting probably $10 
worth of pins... 211 
One producer noted that as an extension of sourcing, buying supplier companies assured 
his firm availability, pricing, and ultimately control over critical supplies. Acquiring supplier 
companies as a form of vertical integration, was also a sourcing strategy of this producer 
I think we have not necessarily outsourced, but have outgrown, to acquisition 
of other companies that used to supply us with our leather tops and our liners. 
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Another producer sought flexibility through the establishment of a diversified supplier base, 
although, he noted that the limitation of this technique was the variation among suppliers. 
Product sourcing offshore 
All but two producer informants reported that their companies were sourcing apparel 
products offshore, mosriy in Asia, Mexico, and the Caribbean: 
We are sourcing more and more offshore, in China. Really trading all over, 
trying to get more of a better base in sourcing, so we can adjust to the market 
conditions. I think more offshore sourcing has helped us by probably 50%. 
Being able to adjust to the market conditions and getting the right product that 
you need. That is where offshore has really helped us. 209 
The few producers that did not source offshore were specialty and high fashion apparel 
producers who maintained a firm commitment to domestic production. Another producer 
who had not done any offshore sourcing was seeking information on it. Sourcing 
arrangements include wholly-owned production facilities and joint-ventureships in the 
Caribbean, as well as contracting with other producers throughout the world. Some firms 
had expanded their sources of finished goods, but not without quality concems: 
We are doing extensive off shore purchasing of finished goods, that is all over 
the world, we can't give you the name of the countries, it is extensive. So that, 
that gives the flexibility in regards to supply of a particular item, we had it 
made by a couple of different suppliers which is great, but it creates another 
problem. It's not all right if there is variability in their products, but the 
flexibility from that aspect, yeah, it helps very much. We are very diversified 
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in our supplier base as well. Different suppliers find the same component, but 
again you do have small degrees of variation which is not always controllable. 
208 
Offshore sourcing involved coordination among many people. These statements by a U.S. 
manager and an offshore production consultant revealed some of the difficulties with 
communications: 
I think right now, in this day and age...a lot of companies are having to, in 
order to compete, they are having to go off shore and...there is a lot of 
coordinating that is involved and coordination of the organization that is 
involved in this. Because it is not going to be, like you have your plant that 
you can jump in a car and go visit any more. It is dealing with faxes and long 
distance phone calls. And, you know, whenever you call a division, you can't 
threaten. That, I think the industry is having to turn towards that a lot more to 
be competitive 207 
The cost of shipping samples, and getting things, and doing the 
communications from down here to up there, that's very difficult. I think that 
it comes more from (the need for) sending people designing, or whoever is in 
charge of obtaining the cut parts, and putting them down here for about four or 
five weeks and m^ng them work through it, and understand what kind of 
problem it is, so that maybe they've got a little bit more sensitivity of how to 
coordinate this thing. 211 
As an example of a sourcing dilemma, an 807 production consultant complained about 
designers and apparel firms in the U.S. who had come to Honduras with inappropriately 
constructed garment samples that represented products they had already sold to major 
retailers. Lacking the knowledge about types of equipment needed to produce the garments, 
as well as lacking the specifications for the garments, these designers confronted situations 
where they could not find contractors to produce the garments they had sold within their time 
and price constraints. 
Domestic production capacity sourcing 
Several producer informants reported that sourcing more pre-production or production 
capacity offered them increased flexibility. This manager related the ability of sourcing 
production capacity to the meaning of flexibility: 
I mean, one of the things that leads to flexibility is not only using your own 
plant, but having access to using other people's plants, if you ne^ it for a 
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special item. And having those kinds of relationships. A lot of people do use 
contractors. In fact a lot of people in the dress business don't even own their 
own plants, they just use a series of contractors. And if x number of dress is 
hot and its got a certain type of stitching, they put it in this plant, and vice 
versa, and so the amount of flexibility they have really depends on the 
relationships that they have developed with these different plants, and 
obviously with their raw materials suppliers, you know their fabrics, mostly 
their fabric people. 224 
Informants whose firms were striving for more flexibility were not operating in isolation 
fix)m other firms, but were looking for ways to use the capacities of others. Changing 
attitudes toward capacity sourcing were revealed in these comments: 
The one thing I think, in addition, means that flexibility in regard to partnering 
that is in place. And partnerships that have to be in place to receive the 
appropriate information as to what needs to be produced. And two, you have 
to call on people that you don't generally have those capabilities. You have to 
go out of house for someone that does, and having that network set up such 
that you can, responds to the needs, whether or not you can produce it in 
house or not. Traditionally, we thought of, "Well if I can't do it, within our 
four walls, I can't make money at it" and, "I can't do it, it's too hard to control" 
and this and that. That's is not necessarily true. 105 
We are outsourcing some of our leather tops due to our lack of production 
availability up to one of our plants. 201 
A production manager reported how his firm was able to alter the volumes on orders by 
sourcing excess production capacity: 
The volume for a particular style can be as low as 300 garments and up to 
20,000 or 30,000 garments. Some of the large orders are at times allocated to 
outside contractors which can provide us with additional production capacity. 
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Sourcing capacity was essential to his firm's philosophy that flexibility was the ability to 
respond to the market and the customer: 
Change. Never say "No", and "When can I deliver it to you?" Those are the 
three things that I always say. 220 
Even though sourcing variation was understood to be an important set of elements that 
improved the flexibility of apparel producers, sourcing alone was an insufficient means to 
flexibility. Sourcing was supported by and supportive of changes in the production process. 
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Internal Context: Process Variation 
The informants believed that changing the production process from the progressive bundle 
system to another type of system was the principal source of flexibility. Those whose firms 
were responding to demand variation by changing the production process offered anecdotes 
of both success and failure. Informants justified the changes in the ways they produced 
goods according to different tendencies in their thinking: recognition of the lir-oi^iions of the 
progressive bundle system, advantages in blending processes, and issues related to the 
development of production personnel. 
Limitations and advantages of the progressive bundle system 
Informants provided numerous descriptions relating to the limitations of the progressive 
bundle system and offered evidence for the need to vary the production process: 
Well, progressive bundle systems have so much work in process that you can't 
do a quick turn and you can't change quickly. 210 
If you are using progressive bundle, or planning to use progressive bundle, I 
think what you need to do is just close your shop. At least in this country. 
Close your shop and hang it up... You are talking about a dinosaur. You can't 
track, you can't look at quality, you can't look at work in process, WIP, you 
can't judge how you are going to produce an item. If you have a thousand 
items laying on the floor subdivided into 8-12 to a bundle, if there's a problem 
in one bundle, then that technician can cause that problem throughout the 
whole production line and it takes 10 days of seeing that problem. That 
technician has caused that problem throughout thousands of units. If you 
invest in a bundle system, and you are in Bangladesh, and you are maldng T-
shirts and you know you will be making T-shirts for 30 years, fine. Labor is 
low, you're making T-shirts. But in the US, you're working progressive 
bundle, you are doomed. Absolutely doomed. 220 
Progressive bundle systems require a fair amount of time to go from one end 
of the factory to the other. There is a tremendous amount of work in process 
time. 108 
Another concept that is often overlooked, is that the progressive bundle 
system encourages an operator, coupled with piecework, encourages an 
operator to stay on the operation which he or she knows best. 106 
But I don't think it (UPS) is any more flexible than progressive bundle, it just 
requires a lot less inventory, and of coarse, that's dollars on the floor. 217 
For some types of products and markets, the viability of the progressive bundle system was 
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supported by comments such as this one: 
Where you have large runs, or where you are able to do large runs of 
consistent production, I think the progressive bundle system is much more 
efficient. 108 
One firm produced and sourced garments from plants that used bundle systems, but garments 
were then individually customized in a highly flexible distribution center. A consultant noted 
that there was still a need for commodity production, and in some cases, that type of 
production had achieved time efficiency as well as cost efficiency: 
Now there are some situations where we have plants, where half of them are 
modular and half of them are progressive bundle units. And in those cases, 
modular units are set up for quick service, replenishment type business. They 
change frequently, they are paid on a different situation than the traditional 
progressive bundle system. But the progressive bundle systems are sitting 
there cranking out the mass commodity type production. Their cycle times 
have still been greatly reduced. We're talking of, in some pants plants I know 
of, where they have taken the cycle times down to about 7 or 8 days in a mass, 
a progressive bundle system. Then they've got their teams producing in a day 
and a half. But it's just two different systems, two different cost systems, two 
different objectives. And the cost per SAH, or the cost per product, they're 
trying to optimize that on both sides, for what they're trying to do with the 
system. 223 
In whatever manner, modular, UPS, and combination systems were perceived as being the 
primary strategy for accommodating demand variation. Not all informants were convinced 
that process variations were the solution to the problem of high cost production, however. 
References were made to the three largest apparel manufacturers in the U.S. and how their 
strategies had revolved around basic goods: 
There is a tremendous move amongst many of the larger manufacturers and 
here I am talking about (two of the largest apparel firms, in sales) those guys. 
It is very simple. They don't want any variability. They don't really need 
flexible manufacturing. They want one product over and over again. They 
are interested in doing the basics, not the fashions. They want basically 
consistency, consistency, consistency. And that is really their game. 108 
Even though informants offered equally valid opinions on process variations, issues 
related to preferences of one production system over another were controversial. Ranging 
from persuasive arguments to unsolicited personal opinions about the value of a particular 
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production process, most of the informants had decided on what were the best or worst 
characteristics of various production systems. These comments reflect experiences with and 
attitudes toward unit production systems: 
(We) had one, in all the complexity of a unit production system, that was 
counterproductive to flexibility. If you look at the history of UPS, rarely have 
I seen successful, long-lasting installations. They've been good in a couple of 
things. They've reduced, they help control and reduce work in process, by 
definition help reduce cycle time, but nearly everybody that uses them in a 
factory, doesn't, they don't use them in an entire factory, they use them in a 
portion of the factory, so they still stage work prior to putting onto the UPS 
and stage work after it comes off. And they say "I've reduced the cycle time", 
but the only place they've really reduced it is when it's on the UPS... 221 
UPS systems enable decreased work in process and increased throughput. 
Flexible group systems, more commonly known, I believe, as modular 
manufacturing units, at least that's the term out in the field, also enable you to 
do very, very specific production on short basis for specific orders. Flexibility 
is less because efficiencies often drop in UPS or flexible group systems. By 
that I mean, increased overhead that occurs. 108 
I actually believe that unit production system is nothing more than a 
mechanization of the modular of concept and in fact, enhances flexibility even 
over and above the typical modular concept because a UPS will handle more 
than on style at a time. And because of the pacing that the system itself 
generates within each operation, it therefore, gives a little higher level of 
productivity because it doesn't allow the operator to delay in the movement of 
product between workstations. It does that just as fast regardless of the 
styling. 106 
I think the jury is still out. I think there are pros and cons to the concept 
(UPS). Is it faster? Sure, it's faster. We're getting garments off in two hours 
where it's normally taking 8-10 days. Quality level is about the same. And I 
think it's a new type of approach to manufacturing, and I think that's 
something that's been sorely missed in our industry, I think with the workplace 
being more competitive, attracting skilled and unskilled labor to our industry, 
we've got to offer different things to make it more interesting, make it exciting 
for these people who want to make a career in sewing and manufacturing. 
And we have got a welcomed response from our employees who have offered 
to work on it. The individuals that we have are very, very pleased. There are 
a lot of individuals who would like to go on it and we have not had but one 
person volunteer to come off of it. They just were more comfortable with the 
progressive bundle environment. From the standpoint of morale, it's been a 
big boost. And the standpoint of throughput, and reduced work in process, it's 
been a big plus. 217 
These comments reflect knowledge and attitudes toward modular production systems. 
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They also reveal some the considerations that producers went through to assess or evaluate 
variations in production processes: 
We have considered modular manufacturing, but that's been the extent of it, 
it's just considering. I have never seen a m^ular manufacturing environment 
that I was pleased with or happy with. 217 
Despite what everyone says out in the field, our systems for modular 
manufacturing often do not show the same economies scale as the throughput 
that is allowed by having piece rate systems and continuous production. By 
this, I mean the specific styles for known quantities can pass through a system, 
although the time is increased, the efficiency is tremendously increased 
because of the consistency of work. 108 
I am interested to see what route it (modular) is going to take. You know, I 
have seen it put in and I have seen it taken out. I know of companies who 
have spent a half of a million dollars in some plants to convert in one way and 
then turn around and convert it back, so I am interested to see if all the 
factories will do that or not, but I am definitely in favor for the standup. It is 
in having the one unit being passed that seems most effective. I really think it 
is going to progress even better than the traditional sit down modular type. 
212 
With a modular group, you can be making one style this morning, feed 
another style right behind it and have product coming out within an hours time 
of a different style. 210 
Producer informants did not always offer a reason for the process changes they selected. 
A consultant expressed concern regarding producers' lack of "vision" about what they were 
trying to achieve by varying their production process: 
The third, is not really have an understanding of what they are trying to 
achieve, redesigning process there's unlimited types of combinations that you 
can put together between modular, quick line, UPS, and other linked 
processes, and the objective are trying to, there's not really a clear vision of 
what they are trying to achieve, do we need two days throughput time at this 
much cost per SAH, do we need this, do we need that. It's really... a lot of 
people have gotten into it just thinking it's one way to achieve some 
downsizing, a way to achieve some reengineering, and maybe a way to cut 
costs. But they really don't have a real vision of what they are trying to 
achieve. 223 
This producer, however, was certain about his reasons for adopting a modular system. 
Improving productivity or producing at a lower cost were not primary goals, but rather the 
development of the human resources: 
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We are supplying things to a DC which supplies things to a hundred and four 
rental service centers, so we're really verticily integrated, and so it's an inter­
company supply issue. Therefore you've got a extremely stable production 
environment, in a factory in our company, and there you've got real question 
about that modular installation being more productive. Even in a totd sense, I 
don't think we've proved it yet The main drive, the main reason we did it, is 
we wanted to change people's basic relationship to the workplace and to each 
other, not because we felt there would be huge cost savings. The manager that 
originally initiated it thought there would be. My attitude was, even if there 
weren't huge cost savings, if it were equal, I still wanted to do it, because I 
wanted to break the traditional piece-work, "I'm in this business for myself 
mentality. I wanted to destroy that to see if there were merits in that. That's 
the reason I did it. You know, we've been doing it for almost two years... 221 
A confluence of production systems 
Many producers who are experienced with flexible production have found advantages in 
using a combination of production processes both within plants and across plants. Unit 
production lines may have been supponed by mini-bundle lines of sub-assembly work: 
Well, the first thing you do, the main items we're doing on unit production are 
the assembly of our trouser. The small parts, the flies are still assembled off­
line, still on a progressive bundle environment, our waistbands are pre-made, 
our pockets are pre-made, our hip pockets are pre-made, flies, and accessories 
that go onto the finished garment And then from there, we will start out with 
right after serging the panels, because we have automated sergers... so its not 
practical for us to do this serging off the progressive bundle environment, but 
from there we will go into the darts, and back pockets, but right after that we'll 
go into finished back pockets, and attach flies, and so on so forth, all the way 
through the production line. 217 
Modular plants trained operators on a bundle system or did partial modular production side-
by-side with progressive bundle systems. Entire plants remained on progressive bundle 
systems for basic goods, while other plants within the same firm produced different garments 
using modular production or UPS. Modules may have been buffered by small bundles of 
work between sitting operators who moved among two or three machines. Stand-up modules 
may have had no buffers within operations because operators passed off each garment, 
moving among machines to reduce the handling time. UPS systems were being used within a 
team concept. Clearly, the data indicated a blend of technologies and process variations that 
were selected for conditions appropriate for the producer's needs. 
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You have to wonder are you achieving optimum cost? For the lead time 
requirement, or the production time requirements that give optimum service to 
your customers. I deal with that quite a lot in some of our consulting 
engagements, is trying to wresde with question of: Does the quickest 
throughput time, shortest throughput rime match the lowest cost? And if I am 
putting the stuff in the warehouse and letting it sit there for 6 months, I'd have 
to question sometimes, what am I really trying to do. 223 
Their game is much more consistency than it is, in my opinion, than it is going 
out and being flexible. Oh, you know, the CEO, (name) gets some in-vogue 
thing like doing flexible, you know, modular manufacturing. Yes, the people 
are out there trying to convert all of the systems, but the fact of the matter is, if 
they have one style that they have to produce 10,000 dozen a week, the 
flexibility is secondary to throughput and really they are able to do it with 
consistency. You would not believe how easy it is to do modular 
manufacturing with consistent 10,000 dozen of the same style per week. It is 
simple. The problem is when you have everything changing... 108 
We are in the process right now of implementing a UPS. We have been, 
probably about 25% of our trouser manufacturing is done on a UPS which is a 
Gerber mover. In our (state) location, we are presently manufacturing about 
1500 units a day, of which we have about 45-46 operators, with some varied 
results. It's been a real learning curve for us to adjust to the unit production 
environment, compared to progressive bundle. 217 
A few informants mentioned the installation of flexible processes in their 807 operations: 
Domestically, we don't do a whole lot of production anymore. I know that we 
are manufacturing plants down in Puerto Rico, actually making plants, 
building a couple of plants down in Puerto Rico, and there are plans to do 
some modular systems in those. They are trying to develop the team 
atmosphere, and the management down there is going through a bunch of 
seminars, and they will try to get them up to speed on, on these philosophies 
and all that. 207 
Issues related to the development of production personnel 
The data reveal evidence of extensive efforts to train apparel operators beyond former 
limits imposed by the task specialization of the progressive bundle system. Operators who 
learn to produce goods in a modular system are systematically cultivated through many 
training sessions and experimental trials: 
I'd say when we first begin a team, we try to set parameters for them. As that 
team matures, though, they are given more flexibility within a specific, you 
know, we have tolerances set up, we make these decisions, you make these 
within this box. They have their box. Sometimes they want to step out of that 
box into our box, and we have to draw the line and say "No, that's not an issue 
or a question that you can solve or that you can decide." 216 
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These groups are highly supervised. They must complete different levels of 
training before given higher levels of decision making responsibility. 210 
I did want to emphasize in that especially starting out, I mean starting out for 
several years, that developing the team process, it is slow, decisions, things 
take longer to develop consensus, especially when some of the team members 
may or may not have the skills, the Imowledge base to be able to make that 
decision that you want incorporated in there. And from experience of 
facilitating that process, you are sitting there and you know a way based on 
your experience that will work, it is very easy, the tendency is to want to just 
go on and say that should be, but in growing a team, you have to allow for fear 
of failure and you have to, it can't be fear of failure, you have to allow for 
them to do samples tests, not that you want to see them fail, but they have to 
have the opportunity to work on things and problems themselves. Obviously 
there are some parameters there. 105 
As operators learned about throughput, cycle times, cross-training, and effective teamwork, 
they developed a confidence in reasoning. Because modular teams were usually held 
accountable for the assembly of an entire garment, members learned to evaluate the 
consequences of each others' actions. If paid on a group incentive, team members were 
essentially rewarded to develop the skills and productivity within the group: 
Now we are saying, "You're a team, work together. Your pay depends on 
each other". 210 
Ultimately, benefits of the modular team that emerged in the data were that teams 
provided themselves with two critical elements: discipline and direction. These two elements 
were those that supervisors and rules formerly provided in the progressive bundle system. In 
the words of one engineer who did extensive training for modular teams: 
When we take the six dollar earners, the low earners just making pay, those 
teams do a lot better, because TSS is disciplined. There is no time to get up 
and go to the bathroom. There is no time to talk to your neighbor. You gotta 
pass that piece to the next girl, she's waiting. There's nowhere to hide, so it 
disciplines those operators who don't do well on bundle systems. 216 
Teams of operators received guidance from engineers, managers, and other production 
personnel. This statement reveals how teams pursued their own direction while seeking 
assistance from supportive specialists: 
It is imperative that the team is in a physical environment where they can see 
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everything else happening and they have full control over the performance of 
the task. And the way I define empowerment, is having the authority to make 
all the decisions in regard to the performance of the task. So when I do this, I 
give the garment to the team and I say, "Here's the product we have to make. 
Here is the machine configuration and labor content that the engineering staff 
has come up with. Now you take this and improve upon it and call upon 
engineering, management, supervision, maintenance, whoever you need to 
help you get what you want. But you are the boss, you make the decisions on 
the performance of this task." Now, I believe the team should have the full 
authority to make those decisions. 106 
Within the perspective of operator training, few firms managed the transition from a 
progressive bundle system to a modular system well. Support for change was not developed 
through existing social networks of operators: 
That is really hard, but it is not as hard on them as it is on management, 
because management, we are saying, "Hand off your power and authority." 
Actually, they are gaining by giving up but it is harder to see that. So I Aink 
the change is what is so hard. Also, from going from individual incentive to a 
group incentive or an hourly pay with bonuses, people think that they are 
really getting cheated because they will remember that big paycheck. "I was 
on that job one week out of the year and I run the top percentage and I got in 
44 hours." They don't look at the end of the year total and compare that to the 
way they are paid now. So they get in their minds, this isn't fair because I can 
make, you know, they think of that biggest paycheck, but they don't think of 
how much of the time that they were at home for lack of work and those other 
things, so I think, I think that is part of it. 210 
Operators who did not understand the financial and environmental demands on their firms 
may not have been given enough information by managers to appreciate the need for flexible 
production: 
You know, we need to keep talking about teamwork and empowerment of 
people, but they don't really want to empower them or include them in 
managerial relations, you know, or let them know why we have to import. 
Our people right now are so afraid of the imports, does this mean, "Am I 
gonna lose my job?" "They're just doing it to make money." Nobody is sitting 
down with them and saying "This is why we import". I'm being told by top 
management., because I'm often asked these questions from the people, 
"Well, just tell them it's temporary, just tell them its temporary." They don't 
want to give them the whole story, and, I'm the first to say that there are some 
people out there, you know, I don't want to tell everything to either, because 
they misinterpret, they're gossipers, they run, they make trouble for you. But I 
think if we could just include Lhe people more, and right now they are 
desperate for top management to tell them, to explain to them why do we have 
to go to cellular manufacturing, why are we importing, why is quality my job 
now when it used to be the Quality Assurance Department's job, and those 
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answers are not really coming from them, you know, it's all, it's smoothed 
over, and I think they could handle it more, and then they'd understand why 
they need to be more flexible. I spoke with an operator yesterday who seems 
to have really gotten the message, and she was complaining about the others 
and saying these other people have got to wake up, the realities of the 
marketplace dictate that we make these changes, but she was saying so many 
people around me think that this is just shon term, if we complain about it will 
go away. They (the company) gotta be making money, why are they doing 
this? And not understan^ng this from more of a business standpoint, and why 
we need to change and our manufacturing to change. 202 
Outcomes of training programs were not necessarily predictable. References were made to 
the maturation process that teams go through. Due to a lack of experience, teams that were 
not "mature" may not have been able to make decisions with confidence. In such a struggle, 
one consultant thought that immature teams needed to have managerial support, and at times, 
needed to be able to fall back onto a manager's decision skills: 
Go back to the staircase. If you don't, if your teams are not mature, oftentimes 
decisions can be made better if you go back to the old system and let the boss 
or the manager make the decision because the teams might not have all of the 
training that they need in order to make the decision, so they are going to 
struggle with it for a longer period of time. 104 
In such situations, managers had a tendency to expedite the situation, make the decision, and 
deny the team the opportunity to reach consensus. Consultants cautioned that the teams who 
were given opportunities to decide on taking a particular course of action have a commitment 
to that action. And despite the manager's preference for a different solution from a cost or 
labor standpoint, better results were often realized: 
You don't let them struggle forever. That's a tough trade off and that takes 
time. Until they develop those skills but generally what you find out is you 
might have had a way that you wanted, a course of action that you would like 
to have taken and if you had done it, they would have done it. The results 
could have been okay. Even though their way may not be the best time wise 
or cost wise, if it is theirs, they are going to work a lot harder against it, plain 
and simple...They own it and that is the key to the process. A lot of times, you 
get better results even though it may not be the best way and had it been the 
worst way. 105 
Beyond compensation and personal conflicts among team members, other problems that 
operators had in modular production were ill-defined. It was one consultant's opinion that 
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operators who were in pilot modules that were being studied for amounts of productivity 
improvement exhibited the "Hawthorne" effect whereby they would excel during the study, 
but eventually slow down to a more steady pace. He thought that over time, modular teams 
got "worn out" from persistent initiatives to increase productivity. 
Flexible production and operator compensation Nearly every firm that made a 
transition to modular production had difficulty with operator compensation. One producer 
who had made a complete transition to modular production throughout a new plant facility 
reported that monthly operator meetings with the CEO had operators pleading to return to 
their former piece-rate system. The group incentive compensation system continued to be 
perceived by the skilled operators as unfair. This consultant recognized the prevalence of the 
problem throughout the industry: 
20% of all people, in going to a team environment, may be faced with some 
kind of wage r^uctions. This has been a major problem throughout the 
industry. Companies have not dealt with this very well. Big companies, little 
companies, its whether they go through some sort of grandfathering clause, or 
red circling, or whether they just try to buy back the old pay rate, there's been 
all kinds of things tried. Unfortunately, you wind up with 20% of the people 
realizing some wage reduction, and this has caused some significant problems. 
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One manager noted that her best operators left the company over the issue of compensation. 
Another manager in a large production plant had these comments about compensation that 
were representative of other informants' experiences with a transition from piece-rate pay to 
group incentive pay: 
Every issue that we come down to is pay. Every single time. We have 
training as management supervisors, "Oh, pay is not an issue with the 
employees, it's number eight, you know..." It's number one. It's sad to say, but 
it does matter... Part of the problem we had, the very first clusters we took 
very high earners, we wanted to make sure this was gonna work. We got good 
operators, therefore, their average, you know, averaging nine, ten, eleven 
dollars an hour. It's hard to get that with a team. 216 
We did provide the people historically with quite a large monetary incentive 
to be a good piece worker versus the guaranteed rate when you just walk in 
the office. You could go up significantly if you got good at this, and our 
people did become nuite good at their individual operations, and they were 
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making some pretty good money out of it. Some of the supervisors would 
complain because the checks they were handing out to the employees were 
larger than their own, that sort of thing. Well along comes flexible cellular 
manufacturing and now we have groups of people and the individual. Your 
reward as an individual contributing to the organization is no longer 
recognized, it was this group contribution to the organization, and if people 
were in the same group, some were high performers and some were low 
performers. And the high performer suffered in pay while the low performer 
was pulled up in pay, so in essence, you punished your productive people and 
rewarded your non-productive people. 202 
When one consultant was asked about problems with modules, her reply alluded to operator 
anger toward the team member who was the low earner. The "slowest member of the team" 
issue was reported by several producers. None reported a technique for balancing teams by 
skill. Operators who worked in a bundle system on a piece-rate never had to be concerned 
with the output or skills of other operators. In the modules, operators had their pay affected 
by the skills and productivity of all team members: 
Some of the problems with, I mean again as far as communications are 
concerned, I have seen where you get, say five operators that are working as a 
team. You know, they end up, four of them ganging up on the smallest or the 
least effective operator. The one that is not quite as efficient. Again, that is 
just, I think it is just human nature, you know, if you are all being paid the 
same wage, and someone is not, you don't think they are carrying ±eir load, 
they tend to gang up on them. So as far as communications, I definitely see 
that whereas, in the progressive bundle system, you know, "So what? She 
doesn't do 100%, then I don't care, she has got her own paycheck, I have got 
mine". When you are having to share your paychecks, ihen you tend to get 
angry at the low earner. 212 
Most producers who developed modular plants began with volunteers for pilot teams. After a 
period of time, more teams were formed, and conflicts regarding team members, problem 
solving, and other issues became commonplace. This producer experienced similar problems 
with modular team members asking for managerial assistance in settling earning conflicts 
within the team: 
We've had some problems with everyone wanting to get rid of the slower 
people, but our comeback is "OK, we'll get rid of her, so now, you're the 
slowest one, so now they're gonna get rid of you." So you see, its a vicious 
cycle, if you have four people, there's always gonna be one who's the slowest. 
TTie slow one may be exceptional, from the group that she's in, they all four 
may be great, but there's always gonna be one, two, three, and four. So, we 
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basically, unless it gets to the point where it's getting very unproductive, just 
make them stay and work together. 216 
Consultants have focused on solutions to resolve the compensation conflicts. Several 
group-based incentive plans have been developed, but managers complained that in order for 
the plans to be fair, they must become complicated. When neither the operators nor the 
managers could understand the compensation system, it failed to be an incentive. 
We're not gonna use his (consultant's) pay system. It's too complicated for the 
operators to understand. Up to a certain break even level, you make your 
hourly rates, then so much goes in the pot and you share... 204 
The underlying assumption with productivity-based compensation was that operators had 
to be paid a financial incentive to work hard. Working hard continued to be perceived as 
sewing fast, moving fast, and constantly pushing the team for higher production numbers: 
TSS, basically group piece-work. They are paid a per piece price. What they 
put out is what they get paid. So its basically piece-rate, however, they are all 
paid the same. 216 
Compensation was also an issue with unit production systems. Even though many 
producers maintained a piece-rate incentive on UPS processes, this producer was 
reconsidering its value from a flexibility perspective: 
We are evaluating right now whether individual incentives are the best way to go with 
unit production. We are looking at a group incentive, possibly, tied into production, 
as well as tied into possibly giving split people that do more than one job a bonus, in 
addition to the production quota for the day. Also, we're entertaining tying that into 
some kind of a quality count, zero defects might be a 10% bonus, and every one 
defect might be a minus a certain percentage below that. So, those are areas that 
we've never had to entertain before with progressive bundle, and now we are having 
to basically go through a learning curve just like the operators. Learning how to 
manage, as well as learning how to best pay these people on a unit production system. 
217 
A small producer offered his example of the compensation system they had devised that they 
believed actually supported the company's goal of completing finished garments. Many 
producers, especially those with union shops, classified operators according to seniority. 
This firm took a different approach: 
A technician is classified by the quantity of equipment he or she can operate 
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and the number of operations he or she can perform. This fixed hourly range 
of pay averages between $6.25 and $9.00. Beyond the fixed rate, a technician 
can earn up to a 4% bonus per quarter based on production goals which are set 
at the introduction of each new style run. This bonus can be matched up to 
100% based on the overall performance of the company. Additionally, 1% is 
given based on attendance and attitude. This bonus system also has been 
^apted to apply to every company employee. 220 
Labor unions Many of the informants were affiliated with firms that had union 
representation of operators. The informants believed that the national union officials were 
supportive of flexibility, but that some of the local officials were guarded or simply 
misinformed about it This manager noted the stages of transition that the union had to go 
through as her company developed flexible production processes and compensation systems 
to support that flexibility: 
Union rules, yes, we have problems with, if you are familiar with the stages of 
team development the union will go through stages too. Sometimes, there is 
a stage where they are still protecting their turf and they have to evolve and 
learn their new role too. 210 
Positive statements about cooperative efforts between unions and production managers were 
made. A negative comment about union rules preventing labor-management teamwork was 
mentioned by a manager with production plants in many states. Apparel managers wished 
for some guidance from the unions in dealing with the compensation conflict. 
Professionalization of labor The process of developing operators to make the transition 
to a flexible production system was difficult because of the core values that the operators 
inherited from the bundle system. Many informants referred to the need for readjustment in 
attitudes, because the former ways of producing garments and organizing the labor depended 
on different ways of thinking. Obedience to the "...sit down, shut up and sew concept" (223) 
had given way to operators who had a base of decision making knowledge and some power 
to voice and demonstrate their proficiencies. 
One producer was hiring former progressive bundle system operators from plants that had 
recentiy closed and was cross-training them for a unit production system with rapid style 
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changes. In addition to being trained for at least three sewing operations, operators at this 
plant were al^-o expected to understand how to read cutting and specification sheets, unload 
items from a UPS carrier, press, fold, and bag garments. The essence of their flexibility was 
that they were able to recognize when and how tasks had to be done, and had the confidence 
and functional power to get up and do those tasks. The philosophy of this producer was that 
all production personnel did whatever was necessary to ship finished products. If that meant 
that operators came in on Saturdays to learn new skills, or managers worked on Sundays to 
plan weekly production, that is what was done. 
Flexibility and professional development of operators was not only initiated from 
managers and consultants and introduced to operators. Informants voiced an awareness of 
operators wanting more responsibility and bigger jobs: 
I think the worker today is looking for more of a challenge, more 
responsibility, more authority, and the flexibility factor, it all kind of fits 
together. It's being able to change and do more jobs, do more operations, 
have more skills, t^e more responsibility, it all kind of goes together. 223 
As operators developed their task and knowledge ranges, they could accommodate changes 
in products more readily. 
Internal Context: Product Variation 
Informants thought that flexible producers should be receptive to changes in their product 
lines. Some producers had abandoned the notion that they were in business to manufacture a 
certain category of apparel. Variations in products offered multiple domains of value to the 
flexible producers. Wider varieties of styles, sizes, and materials within categories, as well as 
newer product categories like cruise and exercise wear were reported. This producer 
demonstrated open-mindedness in the process of considering new orders and products: 
Saturday, I was on the phone with someone talking about producing an item 
for their line, like (designer name) does some bags and we've done some of 
their dresses and tops and they called us and said, "Can you do some bags for 
me?" And I know what (the other manager) would say, "We really don't want 
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to be in the bag manufacturing business." And they faxed us, and I sat down 
with (the other manager) the other day and I said, "(other manager), why not? 
It's only a couple thousand, you know we've got 5 or 6 people sitting around in 
subassembly, why not?" It's that type of mentality that keeps us alive. 
Whereas most manufacturers will say things like "All we do is pants. We don't 
want anything but pants." Or "Tops, all we do is tops". We're like, " Baby 
clothes for (another designer name)? What do you think?" "Let's give it a 
shot!" 220 
A consultant explained that as products had changed, the attitudes toward product types were 
also changing. Several producers thought that fashion goods were a successful market niche 
for them. Consequently, continuously changing products was the core of their businesses. A 
uniform producer noted the changes in product types and fabrics in his industry as being 
more significant than style changes. The following statements reflect these issues: 
Well I think the thing that we tend to deal with today is in the old days, people 
did not make, if you were a knit product plant, you didn't make wovens. If 
you were wovens, you didn't make knits. We are seeing a lot of those 
boundaries falling away. For instance, on rugby shirts, you've got woven 
collars on a knit shirt. 223 
Where Americans and domestic suppliers can still do a decent business, is by 
doing the high fashion stuff that they can, if something's hot today, they still, 
because everything's close by can make garments quickly. 224 
Our unique approach is to remain a versatile style shop. We specialize in 
knits and we can do any type of garment, from pants, to constructed tops, to t-
shirts, to dresses. 220 
I see changes in the area of fabrics, more so than designs, also in the type of 
products that we're offering. We're getting into a GoreTex clothing, we're 
getting into a line of flame retardent products for fire departments, as well as 
our traditional uniform clothing for police, fire and postal. 217 
Throughout the data, product variation was a consequence of demand variation. Flexible 
producers that were accepting more variation in their orders had found it necessary to make 
internal changes that supported variation. 
Internal Context: Structural and Functional Variation 
In their attempts to become more flexible, most firms represented by informants had 
changed the way they functioned. Some firms had changed the way they were structured. 
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Variations in internal functions and structure went beyond production process variations, in 
that the changes supponed flexible processes and influenced the abilities of personnel to 
increase throughput and manage product variation. The data offered many more examples of 
functional variation than of structural variation. Examples of functional variations included 
changes in policies, changes in job descriptions, and changes in departmental specialization. 
These changes required a concomitant change in thinking: 
Everything has to change. Everything means from our raw materials, supply 
deliveries, integral parts, you cannot plan a little JIT without having supplier 
involvement and discipline and commitment. So raw materials was the first 
thing they began to change. And we couldn't understand what our customers, 
everything revolves around the customers, of course, by what their demands 
were, so we had to get them on board. Our manufacturing means in regards to 
the work centers again, okay, having small companies within the big 
company, to, run specific styles that can be worked with that type of 
equipment. That obviously reflected a management change of thinking, and 
employee change of thinking. 208 
In some cases, the structural forms that flexible producers were assuming were both adaptive 
to demand variation and supportive of increased flexibility. They were adaptive and 
supportive because they promoted and sustained functional changes. Rexible producers were 
modeling the forms of their organizations toward a single goal of increasingly faster 
throughput This producer had undergone both structural and functional changes with the 
consolidation of divisions and development of electronic communications among production 
plants: 
We have gotten everything closer together. Instead of having different 
divisions, we are all under one division now. We are more flexible than we 
used to be. One factory can, you know, they can adjust to what the other 
factory has made. We have our uppers being made in one place and (other) 
stuff in another place. With better communications, we can adjust quicker and 
be more flexible... We have given people more empowerment, group quality 
teams. We are dealing with statistical process control... We have a computer 
now that we can show our problems on and it goes right to the other factory's 
computer... Well, before, there was no communication between factories. 
They just would either write them a letter or call them, tell them what you 
needed. But now there is much more better communication between factories 
as far as group meetings and the computers, much more closer relations now. 
Ah, you toow the hard-line is that you don't need this, they will do their own 
thing. But now it is more of a team effort with everybody to open it. 209 
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Some structural forms were localized changes. For example, this producer attempted to 
build brand loyalty with younger consumers by developing products through a team-based 
design structure that allowed newly hired young designers to function freely: 
And I think that's where our designs have changed the most. We still have the 
traditional, but now we are trying to appeal more to younger people. We did 
that by, our design center somewhat works like a cell, or a team-type 
environment. And what we did there was to hire young, a couple of young 
gals right out of designing college, and then, just let 'em loose... 202 
In some firms, teams were used not only for modular production, but also in managerial 
structures and functions: 
As far as flexibility, our company has gone to teams, teamwork. Everything is 
teams and teamwork. Managers are teams and teamwork attacking problems, 
in a team approach rather than an individual, which makes it, gives us 
different angles to each problem, solves problems quicker. 216 
One consultant noted that the most successful apparel producers had the functional ability 
to leam from within the organization what the problems were: 
The more successful companies I've seen seem to truly solicit from below 
what problems exist in the company. And truly listen to it. Have a system 
that where the people can say right to the guy at the top, "What the — are you 
all doing? Can't you see that this — isn't working?" And it's heard. 211 
These consultants noted the importance of company-wide structural and functional changes 
that were needed to support flexibility: 
I think every single thing. There is no exception. Everybody, every function 
in the plant must change in order to accommodate the new objective... I do 
think that first line supervision is a necessary function, but not the job 
description that we currently exist under. And that job description is, with the 
way we operate in progressive bundle, is an almost impossible job... It is much 
more of a coach and a cheerleader and it is responsive to the needs of the team 
rather than dictating orders to the team. 106 
It is also important to include some of the peripheral people, not just engineers 
and supervisors and plant managers and operators, but some of your support 
people too because they are just as imponant in this environment as well. The 
accounting folks have to understand the process much better than they did in 
the past, maybe not better than in the past, but they have to be educated and 
trained about this entire process as well as the people who are doing the 
sourcing and whatnot It is important to include them as well and a lot of 
times, they get excluded until it is directly affecting their ability to support it 
105 
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The role of managerial and functional changes that supported flexibility within a large 
corporation were revealed by this producer's comments: 
Certainly, management has had to change from the standpoint of training and 
the role they play is a whole different type of role. In a flexible process, a 
modular type of process, teamwork process, many policies have had to 
change, be completely rewritten. Take whole boxes, in terms of looking at 
things, old paradigms, and completely throw them away. And getting 
managers to see that, but at the same time, still do it within the context of a 
corporate policy type system. It's been a real challenge. 221 
For some producers, vertical integration was an important aspect of the flexibility in their 
organizational structures. Despite the fact that this producer used a progressive bundle 
system, she believed that the verticality of her operation was the firm's source of flexibility: 
One of the things that, and the advantage my whole business, is that 
everything is done under one roof and we are completely vertical. That is one 
of the reasons my business, granted it's a panty business, but we take yam in 
one door, we knit the panties uncolored, we sew on the leg elastic, close the 
gusset seams, then it goes in and the garments are dyed in a dye machine, 
dried, and then they have the bows put on, and they are put on hangers and 
they go into the warehouse. So, we do it all under one roof, and obviously, 
that gives us a lot of flexibility. Everything is bar-coded, so we know where 
every bundle is at all times, so that we can monitor how much is in knitting, 
how much is in sewing, how much is in dyeing, finishing and so on. We 
found for us, what works the best, is a bigger bundle that we're working from, 
because it's white panties, or whatever, you get it dyed. 224 
Across the data, small producers had less difficulty making structural and functional 
changes that supported flexibility. One consultant noted the importance of the "small 
company mentality" that large companies needed to adopt This large producer explained 
how dramatic the structural and functional changes in his firm had been: 
But again, it's something we can see. It's something we've had to address. All 
of the processes have changed. Every single process within the entire DC has 
had to be completely re-engineered, process mapped, in some cases, just 
thrown away and start over again completely... I mean, we are re-engineered 
to the point of tearing things apart and building them all over again. Not just 
the concept and processes, but equipment lay-out, utilization, how things are 
used, real complete re-engineering, not a partial type of a thing. Materials 
have changed. Locations of materials, types of threads, types of needles, how 
a machine works, supplier involvement, basic types of things, but operator 
driven, which is really different from the standpoint "This thread works well, 
this one doesn't." Those types of things have changed. Where the supplies are 
located at, how the supplies get to the people, so that you have better 
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utilization. There are those kinds of things that do change relative to... And of 
course, the biggest change is labor. There's no doubt about that. Just from the 
training standpoint, trying to get people to throw away old baggage and 
attitudes, trying to re-socialize them into a different way of doing work, and 
just getting people to accept that this is not the way you typically had to do 
business before, and you are truly being given knowledge and skills and being 
expected to use them. Very, very high expectations, which is sometimes a 
challenge, so I would say all of these have changed...Because our disciplines, 
manufacturing and distribution are relatively new in the way they fit into the 
company, I think we're less encumbered by our successes, so we don't keep 
visiting those, because we've changed it so radically. We don't have a past 
reference point anymore. I would say, that, we in the manufacturing and 
distribution phase of the business are much more open minded. Customer 
driven is an essential driving force throughout the whole company. And 
certainly was a large element in our changing. 221 
Barriers to Flexibility 
All informants alluded to circumstances, both internal and external, that hampered the 
implementation of flexibility. Three major internal barriers to flexibility were identified in 
the data: structural, functional, and cognitive. External barriers were the costs of flexibility, 
the inflexibilities of specialized technology that was available for the industry, and the 
barriers involved in sourcing, vendor relationships, and labor unions. 
Internal barriers 
Structural barriers One of the most serious frustrations that producers discovered 
during their transitions to more flexible capabilities was the rigidity of their organizational 
structures. Most of the firms represented had not yet overcome all of the structural barriers 
that continued to impede flexibility. Some comments reflected the general problems of 
bureaucratic structures, as they related to decision making, power, and the important element 
of time: 
Management hasn't changed that much. We still have the same type, we have 
the same structure, you know, organizational chart, that really has not changed 
a great deal... That will have to change. We'll have to be what you call flat 
organization to make other parts of the company more flexible. 202 
Bureaucratic inflexibility is the major failure of offshore operations. And I'm 
sure it does play a role in the States also. Most of the excess costs goes to 
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bureaucratic inflexibility. You make the plant as flexible as you can... I hear 
that "empower the people", but empowerment only works if the people really 
have the power to make the decision and cany it completely through. If the 
people want, they can prove to their own group and show proof than an 
investment in a machine or a change in the manufacturing method or 
something is going to solve it, they ought to be able to carry it out, as long as 
it can be justified. Anything be justifi^. 211 
And the bureaucracy, the management style that we had, the autocratic style, 
where people had to wait for the decision to be made at the top level, today 
just can't exist. It can't work. It's not working. 223 
So that there are companies, that I'm afraid are in deep trouble today as they 
have seen their explosion in styles, explosion in SKU's and they have not 
changed their manufacturing processes, they are in real trouble. They are 
incurring high costs, what we call high direct labor variance, underabsorbed 
overhead, wide discretion in earnings, a big difference between earnings one 
week and the next week, and consequently it causes a very unhappy 
workforce, low morale, high turnover, high absenteeism, all great things that 
go with that. And they trying to use 1950 processes and systems to deal with 
the new millennium's production requirements. 223 
Informants recognized the limitations of local flexibilities and the need for changes in the 
structures and functions of their firms beyond the production process. For example, some 
producers had changed their production processes to effectively implement short cycle 
manufacturing, but then were hindered in their abilities to acquire raw materials on time. 
These comments relate to problems associated with local flexibilities and the maintenance of 
centralized corporate control: 
We are not all the way to flexibility. We have got modular teams, but we are 
not completely in alignment with all of our vendors, all the way to our 
customer. So, we are like a pocket of flexibility, and in order to be completely 
flexible all the way through, it would all have to change. It would have to be a 
more just-in-time system, probably lower batch sizes from the suppliers... 
Our purchasing department, which is at corporate, deal with the vendors more 
at this point. We (the production plants) are not into that. Like I said, we are 
still a pocket, which I know, that is probably our next step. 210 
Right now, we're still, well, when you talk about flexibility, you are talking 
about manufacturing, you're not talking about me the designer, or me an R&D 
person, or me in maintenance, or sales, salesmen. We don't touch the 
salesfoice, they get to continue, yet they could benefit by being more 
flexible... And I think that if that salesman, or salesperson would have some of 
that information, that would be more flexible and essentially be handling the 
problem right on the spot. 202 
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With mcxiular change, the workforce becomes more empowered. And in 
order to empower people, then you have to change the way you are doing 
things. In other words, you can't have a dictatorship. You have to change the 
policies, where people are free to think and make decisions. There have to be 
hand-off plans for decision making in place... 210 
In some of the larger companies, I know, that encounter problems, I hear 
everybody rumbling about what they should do, "Why don't they do this or 
why don't they do that? The top people of the corporation aren't listening to 
that. They are not hearing it... And the people who need to hear it don't (get) 
down to the factories, where it's happening. They only take tours once a 
year... and they wonder why a lot of (things) get messed up. 211 
Functional barriers Both formal and informal policies that had served as the main 
source of control in the informants' firms became important barriers during the transition to 
flexibility. Informants were aware of the functional shortcomings of their firms: 
We have got to break down some functional silos and get better at focusing on 
the customer. 210 
We personally tried the modular system and it didn't work for us. Maybe it's 
partly the way we put it together, and maybe we needed more management 
involved in it, but we found that we had people do work in a group and get 
paid. And what happened was the good people worked hard, and were paid 
the same amount as the people in the group who didn't work hard. The good 
people got upset about this, and quit, and left us with the bad people. So, we 
have now gone back to paying people based on what each individual person 
does. Management and policies. 224 
That's one of the prerequisites, and that's gotta come from senior management, 
the president all the way down. You gotta go from being a dictator to being a 
coach. The supervisor's gotta go from being a "Go do this, go do that." to 
"What can I do for you now?" Some do well, some don't do so well. 216 
In general, most of the problems we ran into when implementing the UPS 
were not technical in nature, but had to do with our policies and our business. 
210 
Cognitive barriers Although no informants used the term "cognitive," many of them 
made references to the ways that operators, supervisors, and managers thought about issues 
related to the barriers to flexibility. 
But flexibility is still in the minds of those operators. You can have the right 
machines, the perfect system, but if you don't have flexibility in the minds of 
those operators, you're still inflexible. 216 
Well, the most common is communication, the language and cultural barriers. 
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because you build up a culture in a company and when you change to another 
way of working and thinking and doing things, they have to change, and the 
communication up and down and across has to be able to acknowledge this. 
Compensation is also important because there's a fear, and part of that stems 
firom lack of communication, and most of that fear is in two areas, and that is 
"Is it going to affect my money?" and "Am I going to lose my job?" 219 
A senior manager of a large producer offered these insights into the danger of past success 
while trying to cope with a new envinDnment: 
We've tended to be, I think, tended to be somewhat cynical. But we've spent a 
lot of time visiting our past successes, and a lot of time praising ourselves at 
how well we've done in the pasL I think it's a danger signal. I think it's 
something that senior management has to overcome. 221 
These consultants offered some details on the fears and ignorances of managers regarding 
investment and personnel development in flexible systems, as well as the pos.<5ible negative 
consequences they could suffer: 
And the reason I think that's true is that plant managers and companies in this 
business are not very progressive. They are rooted in ten or twenty year old 
thinking and they're afraid. There is real short term thinking as far as money, 
or investment goes. And if you go to a flexible manufacturing, it's like when 
you clean your closets out you've got to make a mess to get it all back in there, 
and so, you are going to lose a little bit of ground, and a lot of companies 
work very close to their invoicing, and their customers, and they are afraid 
they are not going to be able to ship, or they are going to lose a customer, or 
an order, and also they are afraid they are going to lose their operators. 219 
One of the causes is management's in a lot of places, inability to support, truly 
support the needs of the team The team has a tremendous amount of needs in 
this great process and not understanding what those needs are is uncharted 
territory. The team doesn't know well enough yet what they need from 
management that or how to voice it. Management doesn't always know 
exacdy what the teams are going to need and that can be a, that can cause 
some conflict. 105 
Resistance to change Resistance to change emerged in the data as one of the most 
significant and frequent cognitive barriers to flexibility. Informants identified causes of 
change resistance as having many emotional and cognitive elements, including those of fear 
over less pay and job loss, as well as insecurities in performance capabilities. 
Several informants complained about managers having traditionally kept information and 
strategy from lower level employees. When producers moved into flexible production 
139 
systems with operators who were empowered to make decisions, the importance of 
information being withheld and its impact on resistance to change became apparent: 
I think they are scared, of what's going to happen. There are a lot of people 
who are afraid they are going to lose their jobs, and again, a lot of that falls 
with management not being up front and telling them what is going on rather 
than just springing everything on them... (Operators need) as much 
information as possible, really. I think if they have information and they are 
clear about what is going to happen and that is going to help tremendously. 
205 
These informants acknowledged the importance of managerial attitudes and the salience of 
functional resistance to change. Resisting change occurred at all levels in apparel 
organizations: 
Again, attitudes of upper management. There are very, very big stumbling 
blocks to that It is not a matter of being able to do something, it is a matter of 
convincing somebody that just because we have done something one way for 
twenty-five years, does not mean that it is the best way...Nobody wants to 
change. You can't come in and move anything, change any process, give them 
a computer printed form rather than hand printed form without three managers 
from three different departments coming in and asking you why. 205 
It used to work, they made all the decisions, supervisors were only glorified 
bundle handlers, people were not allowed to voice any opinions on the floor at 
all, the operators, and consequently, it has evolved to this point. I think you'll 
see, and we have been seeing companies, plants fail because of top 
management inability to deal with this. And it's not a lack of education, a lot 
of these people are very well educated, very bright, but they just do not know 
another way of dealing with this, and are insecure. Insecurity really shows up 
in this environment. 223 
External barriers 
Costs of flexibility Although two producers offered evidence on the actual costs of 
developing a modular production plant, others noted that there was significant expense 
involved in operator and managerial training. Costs associated with lost work and more 
equipment in modular plants were considered to be high. Informants provided statements 
such as these that referred to the need for larger quantities of production equipment: 
If you have a traditional bundle system, you will have less machines per 
operator. When you start a modular group, you may have 10 people that are 
solely responsible for making the product, so if there is 30 operations you may 
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have 2 1/2 to 3 machines per operator, so you have a lot more machines per 
operator. 210 
Obviously, you have a big financial, capital investment at the start. Clusters 
that we're looking at, you're probably looking cap-wise at $120,000 per 
cluster. Machinery, table-tops, etc. But that's just capital expenditure you're 
gonna pay off. 216 
Financial, yes, there is a cost to converting to teams because when you 
convert, you go into this training mode. You start training people. It costs a 
lot of money. There is not units coming out the other end, so it is a big cost. 
You hear people say, "Well, you know, they don't understand that it costs", 
but it does cost...All teams were in place by (date). During the following year, 
the initial training and make-up cost was between $250,000 and $300,000. 
210 
When this producer was asked what prevented his firm from becoming more flexible, he 
referred to the different types of costs as well as other potential problems that were involved: 
Money. If you do it right, it's expensive, whether you go UPS or not, you still 
have to have extra machinery sitting out doing nothing, extra mechanics 
repairing machines, you're more susceptible to someb^y not showing up with 
the goods, your zippers or whatever, if you're just in time, that route... 
Flexibility is not cheap. You need to put in a real time. 204 
Inflexibility of technology Infomiants reported other functional barriers such as the 
incompliance of specialized production processes and equipment. One manager noted that 
the capital goods sector was not providing equipment to support flexibility. These comments 
reflect such issues; 
You have less specialty equipment because you want equipment that you can 
use, you can flex with. You don't want as much high volume specialty 
equipment with teams. 210 
You know those machines we bought, (name) machines, for jeans, it's not 
good for under size 24, so its not for lx)ys line. We go back to the old way. 
The jean bounding machine (name), can't do shorts. This technology is more 
specialized than it is general... No one is going to buy something they can't use 
everyday to produce. You can't buy a $37,000 piece of equipment, and say 
"Now we're going to change the product". 204 
Designers need to know enough to realize that there is more than one way to 
make something. You can do small changes sometimes in the construction, 
and preserve the look, fit, and quality, and ma.ke it easier on the plant. 219 
One consultant believed that the way flexible producers should now understand production 
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technology was different than their former focus on the achievement of efficiencies in 
equipment utilization: 
It doesn't necessary have to change, but the way you look at technology 
changes. We used to look at it as something that had to be maximized, that 
you had technology efficiencies in the same way you looked at operator 
efficiencies. So you wanted 100% machine utilization in order to be at 110% 
machine capacity. And the flexible manufacturing, the goal is to provide what 
the customer wants in a very short period of time. That doesn't necessarily 
mean that you will be running equipment 100% of the time. You only run 
equipment when you need it rather than run it for the sake of running it, so in 
the past, much of our inventory problem came from the fact that we were 
trying to keep machines running 100% of the time even when we didn't have 
orders for their production. We would gamble on it, oh, well the orders will 
becoming. 105 
Sourcing and vendor relationship barriers The data contained many examples of 
barriers related to sourcing and offshore operations. Sourcing of finished products, 
equipment, and raw materials involved the common problems of unavailability, late 
deliveries and poor quality. There were reports of excessive corporate control that interfered 
with the ability of offshore operations to function independently or flexibly. This consultant 
commented on the frustrations that managers in 807 operations experienced when trying to 
obtain necessary equipment: 
If they have to get approval and it will take 6 weeks for some committee or 
something, and they've got to sit down and decide when they are gonna do it. 
By that time, the situation has probably changed. Or they lose interest, they 
say, "Why should we try to do this? Everyrime we get down to deciding what 
we want to do, by the time they tell us we can do it, it's too late." So, 
bureaucratic inflexibility is the major failure... But they bought all the 
computers and stuff in the States, which is or is not a good idea. But the way 
they gotta prove their expense account and this sort of thing, it's a real hassle 
for them to go out here (Honduras) and buy the keyboards and everything that 
they need locally, without approving it. They buy printers through (name), or 
a purchasing manager in the States. Instead of just going down here and 
buying the damn thing. Maybe it costs $50 more, but they didn't wait three 
weeks to get it either. 211 
Barriers also involved those related to vendor relationships. Producers expressed an 
awareness of the industry's initiative toward cooperative partnerships. Some producers 
complained of a failure to implement cooperation with suppliers and cited a lack of trust and 
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the continuing presence of adversarial relationships with vendors: 
Partnerships, I'll tell ya, that's one we're trying, and we're not very good at it 
There's not a good attitude of trust, trusting relationships are very difficult to 
build in a very, highly competitive environment. We're in the business where 
the basic selling price of our product on the street to the ultimate consumer 
has not increased since 1984. So, that means the inputs, the raw materials and 
so forth of our suppliers, if they keep raising the prices, we have to get real 
nasty with them. And it sets up an adversarial relationship, I don't think it sets 
up a real partnership. So this is a challenge for us. We pay lip service to it, 
about is all the time, but we don't really do it. 221 
Suppliers, lead time, design considerations, also very, very important. Up and 
down the supplier chain, the flexible manufacturing is not working all that 
great... for the most part, most suppliers and most manufacturers continue to 
work in the traditional system where they have inventory. And inventories 
continue to increase. 108 
Another consultant also spoke of the imponance of developing partnerships. Paradigm shifts 
in the ways that firms had to communicate with one another in order to achieve flexibility 
focused on the retailer-manufacturer relationship, which was also a vendor-supplier 
relationship: 
We have had bar codes for years. Electronic data interchange has been 
around, but we really haven't known for the past several years how to integrate 
it into our business systems and for the past several years, as we mentioned, 
that is where the focus has been. It has been on the technology side, not on 
the partnering, in the use of those tools, we have thought Q.R. was those 
technologies, and indeed it is not. The top part is the partnering that has to 
transpire again. The reason that it has taken so long is that paradigm shifts 
change in the way that we do business together. It used to be if you had, when 
the retailer and the manufacturer had some communication, was either when 
the retailer didn't pay the manufacturer on time, the manufacturer picked up 
the phone, or if, the reason the manufacturer will call and the retailer promises 
the manufacturer something, the manufacturer didn't deliver on time. The rest 
is done through the U. S. mail, paper purchase orders the whole works. I 
mean literally, that is somewhat exaggerated but that is the extent of it. That 
is what is starting to change, even to the point where some of the retailers are 
starting to recognize there has to be win/win situations, it can't be an 800 
pound gorilla, beating the manufactures over the head although there has to be 
some push to start change. What really is going to make it work is the 
partnering that has to be in place and they are staning to recognize that, I think 
even more than they did even a year and a half, two years ago. 105 
Poor quality was perceived as a major barrier to successful sourcing. Quality control 
managers reported that they had the responsibility to monitor the finished products and raw 
143 
materials that vendors supplied. In some cases, vendors did not suffer any consequences for 
failures in their production quality. This manager explained how his company established a 
strict procedure for dealing with suppliers who shipped them poor quality goods: 
We used to receive, import finished goods. They used to just go in the field 
with no quality audit. Well, now, we not only do a quality audit, but we have 
got a, a procedure put together that all of our world suppliers are fully 
informed on, narrowed the procedure down to step 1 and step 2 that if you fail, 
you know, we will advise you and provide you with samples and audit the 
results and so forth. And we will charge you back. And we will sort at your 
expense. And we will be compensated portion of the trade duty, everything... 
Y^, and if you don't fulfill it, you are going to pay the price, not us. So we 
have reached a new degree of quality. 208 
Labor union barriers Labor unions that represented apparel workers were believed, by 
some of the informants, to be barriers to flexibility. A manager in the eastern part of the U.S. 
thought that the frequent apparel plant closings in his area were directly related to the 
inflexibility of the unions: 
Most people in the (area) are, the shops that are piece rate are union, and right 
now the union is just killing the facilities. Just in the past 3 months we've had 
four major people go out of business. One with about 500 people. Another 
one with 200, another with 100, another with 150. So, piece rate people that 
are looking for jobs in this area, are looking for hourly, plus bonuses, plus 
benefits. And they also, most of the people that are out there are looking 
forward to becoming a cross-trained person. We tell them, "For this amount 
of money, this is what you are going to learn." "You can come in here and 
earn $7-$8, but to earn that $7-8, guaranteed, you have got to become cross-
trained"... We still advertise for people because we want to bump up our 
manpower, but what happens is the union convinces them to stay out of the 
industry. It is the union. It really is. We get a lot of people that really feel the 
union has given them a hard shake and they stay with us, and we've had 
people for nine years. 220 
Unlike many other areas of the country, this firm was not facing an acute labor shortage, nor 
a shortage of trained sewers. However, trained sewers in this local labor force were task-
specific operators whose single specializations had lost value in their marketplace. In order 
to regain their marketability, the operators had to learn more skills. 
Union rules that had been established prior to flexible processes interfered with producers' 
ability to make deep changes in the organization of production. Some producers had to 
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rewrite the language in union contracts as well as educate the union officials about the 
flexible production processes: 
The biggest one (problem with union rules) is seniority. Plant seniority, line 
seniority. And when you reform teams for flexibility, and you have different 
levels of seniority mixed together, typically the line seniority issue disappears. 
In other words, if you had seniority as a side seamer, in a team environment, 
you don't really have side seamers, so the line seniority disappears, and that 
can cause some problems. 223 
Informants found that the challenges of becoming flexible could be found in the ways that 
they learned to overcome barriers. Producers were unable to keep everyone in their 
companies and production plants committed to flexibility and pleased with the changes. 
Meanings: Perspectives 
When specifically asked, each informant offered an explanation of what flexibility in 
apparel production meant. Abstract meanings of flexibility also emerged across many other 
responses in the data. As informants discussed what was happening in their markets and 
industry that was encouraging producers to become more flexible, their words imparted 
meanings of flexibility through experiential needs. Likewise, when describing the 
characteristics of successful apparel producers, flexibility was represented through behaviors 
as an essential definition of success. 
Flexibility was illustrated in the data through five perspectives: as a set of abilities, as a 
means to profitability, as a quandary of productivity, as a solution to quality failures, and as a 
renovated conception of the value of time. 
Flexibility as a set of abiiities 
The technique of asking questions from different perspectives around the issue of 
flexibility generated a series of responses that ranged from the rare to the redundant. The 
most common response was that flexibility was an ability. That ability involved having 
knowledge and skills to do or be something, as these quotes regarding the meaning of 
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flexibility reveal: 
... the ability to react quickly to changing demands. 221 
... being able to pace what you're doing. 224 
... being able to deal with a wide variety of styles. 223 
... the ability to respond to the market, the customer, and delivery dates. 220 
... being able to adjust to the new styles. 209 
... being able to stop what you are doing and deal with a different situation. 102 
... being able to satisfy a variety of different needs of our customers. 203 
... the ability to become moldable to whatever the company needs to get 
the garment out the door. 220 
Dozens of statements like these throughout the data indicate an acute awareness of the 
need to be flexible within the dynamic apparel production environment. The informants 
believed that apparel producers needed to have an internal capacity for changing quickly in 
response to demand. The informants who were consultants had experience and knowledge 
about many firms that had developed flexibility, and offered these summaries: 
Being flexible to me means having the ability to deal with a wide variety of 
styles, as well as some cases, being able to deal with a wide variety of 
products... No, I guess, I should put on there with some degree of efficiency. 
Unfortunately, there's a lot of people out there, I'm afraid, they start thinking 
about flexibility, the level, degree of styling varies a lot from plant to plant. 
And, we seem to find a lot people having trouble putting a red definition in 
terms of what is styling and what is flexibility to handle that. 223 
We used to think flexibility was in place if you could change a plant over in 
six months, then you were pretty flexible. And then that went to six to eight 
weeks and now it is down to a couple of weeks that you need to be able to 
respond, you need to be able to change. You see that really beginning to 
happen on a daily basis, product by product where the next one you make 
might be slightly different and as long as you have the information about it 
and the tools that you need, then you will respond to it, the ultimate in 
flexibility. 104 
Flexibility in apparel production, to me really means that you ought to be able 
to make about anything, and changeover to do it quickly. It means to me that 
you don't have a knit factory, you don't have a woven factory, you don't have a 
tops factory, you don't have a bottoms factory, you have a factory that can do 
just about anything. 211 
Perceptions of flexibility as thev related to profit 
Informants had a range of opinions on the profitability of flexible production systems. 
Most comments reflected conditional statements, such as the relationship of profitability with 
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types of products or with environmental circumstances. Some informants were uncertain or 
did not think they had enough experience to judge the profitability of flexible production. 
Others were convinced that their systems were profitable because they had data to verify it. 
These are some of the responses that producers gave when they were asked if they thought 
that flexible production systems were more profitable: 
In a variable, highly variable, small lot environment, no question. In a mass 
manufacturing, high volume, stable environment, the jury is still out. 221 
The greater the need for flexibility, the greater the potential for more 
productivity and more profitability. 222 
Well, I'd guess I'd have to say that the jury is still out on that. 202 
Absolutely. 208 
Yes, because your turnaround is going to be a lot faster. The work in process 
is going to be slower and you are going to be able to get those fashion 
garments out. So, yes from that standpoint, definitely. In the bundle system, 
tfie work in process is a little bit longer. 207 
Yeah, in the long run. Obviously, you have a big financial, capital investment 
at the start. Clusters that we're looking at, you're probably looking cap-wise at 
$120,000 per cluster. Machinery, table tops, etc. But that's just capitd 
expenditure that you're gonna pay off. 216 
Yes, yes they are. Project much better, and the facts and figures show they are 
much more profitable. 209 
Heidi, I think it depends on the environment, it depends on the manufacturer... 
If you have a number of different products that you are wanting to run at the 
same time... 217 
If you need to react quicker to your retailer's needs, yes, definitely. 205 
Absolutely. It takes a fair amount of time to see that profit come back in your 
hand. It will become profitable in a shorter time. It's all proportional. The 
more you can shove through the system, the quicker you get your return on 
investment Definitely. 220 
Perceptions of flexihilitv as thev related to nroducfivitv 
Responding to the question of productivity within flexible production systems posed a 
dilemma for some of the informants. Virtually all of the informants were experienced in the 
traditional systems and conceptual frameworks of apparel production, with productivity 
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having been the key performance measure. This consultant explained the fundamental 
differences between the progressive bundle system and flexible systems as they related to 
productivity: 
Well, I think the inherent problem with the progressive bundle system has 
always been the individual incentive system. And the individual incentive 
system promotes individual efficiencies which promotes staying on the same 
thing and being, getting to high efficiency levels out of individual operations. 
And that has not always, and will not continue to be the thing that suppons a 
flexible manufacturing systems. Unit production systems can or cannot, or 
may or may not change this if it's still an individual piece rate system. In a 
UPS, you haven't really done a whole lot to support flexibility. Modular and 
teams, and quick lines, all the variations that exist in these other processes, 
have expanded flexibility, primarily because they have moved away from 
individual performance on individual operations. And the team performance, 
and cross training, and multi-skilled sets are what's supported that, or what is 
supporting that. 223 
Some comments reflected the predicament of productivity as a performance measure within 
flexible production. The following came in response to the question about whether flexible 
systems were more productive than bundle systems: 
No. 217 
OK, they're not as productive... If we achieve the optimum in a flexible 
system, it will more profitable. But while we are still in the learning part of 
this, while we still keep tweaking the system to try to make flexibility occur, 
that is certainly not more profitable than just the old system of "Let's pound 
the stuff out", you know, for the max profitability. 202 
Despite what everyone says, out in the field, our systems for modular 
manufacturing often do not show the same economies of scale and throughput 
that is allowed by having piece-rate systems and continuous production. By 
this I mean, the specific styles for known quantities can pass through a system, 
although the time is increased because of the consistency of work. Where you 
have large runs, or where are able to do large runs of consistent production, I 
think the progressive bundle system is more efficient. 108 
The jury is out. 221 
Other statements are positive and reflect more confidence with a different understanding of 
productivity: 
What you can produce in a week, I can produce in two days. There's no doubt 
about it, the numbers show it, pure... 220 
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Yes. Like I said, the bundle systems were hard to track, and it could sit there 
for days before it gets to the next department. Or, it might go through three 
departments in one day, based on how they happen to be pushing or pulling it 
through the floor. 205 
Labor has to change, in flexibility, I think we are going to have to have a 
tradeoff. We should teach Susie, or, I think John, let's not have machismo 
here, we can teach John to hem pockets and hem a thousand pockets a day. 
He can hem pockets for his whole job everyday. But, we can teach John to 
hem pockets, and sew on labels, maybe he's going to do 800 pockets a day and 
sew on 5,000 labels. We have this tradeoff. We are not going to be making 
the same thing all the time, so therefore we're going to have to teach the 
people to be flexible, the operators have to have flexibility. That's the hard 
thing to do and we are going to lose some production for particular operations, 
but the thing we are going to gain is that they will be able to change around a 
lot quicker. That's t^es selling of the people. It may be a little more of the 
production, but on the other hand we may have more sales, because of our 
flexibility and being able to take the lead. And we don't have as m.uch 
required, for a particular client or product that we are selling, so then you can 
usually get a little more money out of them. 211 
Basically, in my case it (modular) is more productive in terms of cost per 
minute, and that is pretty straightforward. 222 
Yes, definitely, because I think they are disciplined. They, from peer pressure 
are ^sciplined. A lot of operators, a lot of low earners are not bad sewers, and 
most of the jobs we have, and you know, menial time is not the majority of a 
rate, bundle handling, it's just discipline, it gives them a lot more productivity. 
216 
I think we could prove it and quantify it, that it's more productive. And I think 
you could say, and even measure it in traditional ways. Efficiency, output per 
person, I think, once those units have matured, I think your output per person 
will be definitely superior to the traditional way that you are tr;^ng to do it. 
Unquestionably, in a variable environment that he's in, with tremendous 
changes, small lot sizes, and so forth, to me, there is absolutely no question. 
221 
Flexihilitv as a solution to quality failure 
Production quality was perceived as important benefit of flexible systems because lower 
work-in-process allowed quality failures to be readily apparent. All of the informants 
thought that quality had improved as a result of flexible systems: 
But then there is a quality issue. Even if you do not build the mindset about 
quality into the people, just a flexible system in itself will cause quality 
problems to surface. Tliey are not going to get buried under mounds and 
mounds of inventory, which is what happens in a progressive bundle system. 
You have all this work in process, and you don't know whether it is bad or 
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good, oftentimes until weeks later and by then, it is too late to respond to it. 
Whereas in a flexible system, you usually are talking about much shorter 
throughput times and even if you don't detect it until it gets all the way 
through the process, that is in most cases, the same day in which it was 
produced, or the same day in which the defect was created to begin with. 104 
Typically, the benefits have been achieved in some sort of flexible 
environment, empowered environment, where with teams, it's been, I can't 
think of one where there hasn't been significant improvement in overall 
quality performance. Whether or not TQM has been a part of it, of the overall 
approach, the results have still been significant. So that one is one that we can 
typically, I normally quote anywhere from, outgoing quality levels typically at 
least 50% of what they were in the old PBU environment. 223 
These managers explained how they controlled quality within the flexible production process 
through operator training: 
As far as our people, that's something that's just drilled in their heads. 
Quality, quality, quality. That's really not a problem we ever have, just fix)m 
day one their aJmost too good. In a lot of cases they are too good, our quality, 
they're too picky, too finicky. We don't have a quality auditing system, yet, 
we're working on getting one... In a cluster, the last girl is part of the 
inspection, so we are leaving it up to them. Like I said, they've been drilled 
and schooled. 216 
Everybody is trained to be an inspector. Inspecting the processes. We do 
have end-of-line feedback, it's much easier to provide feedback to a few 
workers than it is to hundreds of workers. Therefore, it's easier to manage and 
control quality with a flexible system, a modular system, than it is with an 
individual task type system. 222 
Quality problems remained an issue with modular manufacturing. This manager revealed 
how quality assurance had changed from inspection to a system where operators accepted 
responsibility for improving the process. It did not always work: 
With the cellular system, you know, you are trying to empower the people to 
be their own quality assurance. And so instead of the QA technicians being 
inspectors, they now have to be teacher and coach and quality facilitator. So, 
they essentially teach the cell people what is the quality requirement, they will 
then also teach them how they can solve their own problems. All right, now 
again the reality of that is that sometimes they want to solve their own 
problems and sometimes they don't. So, we can talk all about, you know, we 
let our people solve their own problems all you want, but if they're busy, if 
they need to get something out, if they're having a bad day, they say "No, I 
don't want to solve that problem." And then they'll turn it over to the QA so 
they can dump it into a different area. So you know, its that human factor 
again, you can empower people, but people are still people, and I have a bad 
day at work, too. 202 
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F1e\ihilitv as a renovated conceDfion of the value of time 
Some of the producers had shifted their priorities from keeping their equipment and plants 
running at full capacity to continuously shipping products to customers on time. For them, 
changing some or all of their production processes from the bundle system to short cycle 
manufacturing processes reduced materials inventory cost and improved cash flow. Even 
though time remained a critical element of the production process, flexibility required that 
time be conceptualized from an overall system view, rather than from a local maximized 
capacity view. This renovated concept of time was apparent in the words of the following 
informants: 
With the bundle system, the focus was on individual productivity of the 
operators... Now, we look at how many pieces are shipped out the door, 
b^ause that is what we need in order to remain competitive. Focusing on 
individual productivity in the chain can bring the whole chain down... Hence, 
(our) goal is to have employees work together to continuously ship our 
customers their products on time, at all times, instead of keeping the plant 
running at full capacity at all times. 220 
It's more critical to get it shipped out. 204 
Well, take the last one, technology. The big factor there is changeover time, 
and how flexible technology is, typically is a product of the length of 
changeover. 223 
So they still stage work prior to putting onto the UPS and stage work after it 
comes off. And they say "I've r^uced the cycle time", but the only place 
they've really reduc^ it is when its on the UPS...But from dock to dock, there 
hasn't been a real, significant reduction. 221 
Processing times. If your throughput time or manufacturing time is reduced 
from 6 to 8 weeks, down to 6 to 8 minutes or 6 to 8 hours, then the ability to 
adjust to what consumers want is improved dramatically. 104 
If a plant uses such a criteria of average efficiency, then flexibility is deemed 
to be a detriment and would decrease flexibility and plant managers think that 
is costing them money. Of course, I don't agree with that and the plants that 
we have worked with, flexible manufacturing, we have given them new 
methods of measurement and in many cases, they are based on throughput and 
operating expense concept of the theory of constraints. But flexibility in fact, 
increases throughput because you are able to meet the demands of the 
customer and therefore, it doesn't cost money. 106 
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Summary of perspectives of flexibility 
In summary, there was no single definition of flexibility that was best. The range of 
definitions provided by informants was more useful, because each definition liberated the 
concept of flexibility from the boundaries and shortcomings of the other definitions. As a 
group of definitions, flexibility emerged through the data in multidimensional form as actions 
supported by a different background logic in cultural, social, and technical domains. 
Although informants described production flexibility as a set of abilities applied to a 
shorter production time frame, another view of flexibility emerged in the data that mirrored 
the capacity of an apparel producer to transform itself into an organization that was then 
able to sustain production flexibility. This transitional capacity of referent firms was 
characterized by a process of specific responses to challenges in demand variation. 
Mechanisms: A Theory of the Transitional Capacity of Apparel Producers 
Within the collected data, transitional capacity was the apparel organization's intemal 
aptitude for integrating the technical and human spheres of change with the structural and 
functional spheres of the business system. This capacity accommodated both idealistic and 
realistic expectations, in that managers provided guidance from a theoretical foundation of 
condensed cycle time, while functional personnel used local decisions that were rooted in 
circumstantial compromises. Transitional capacity was the apparel producer's power to 
change itself into an entity that could then make ceaseless changes. 
For apparel producers who had transitional capacity, the process of change became one of 
redefining their organizations. By effecting the passage from traditional structures and 
practices consistent with industry norms of cost efficiency, to distinct cultures that supported 
the design of apparel production around knowledge and information, production firms 
interpreted themselves as flexible entities. 
People within these organizations had to redefine their priorities as they wimessed the 
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erosion of their commitments to their former organizational stmctures and progressive bundle 
systems. For some of the apparel managers, leading the transition to flexible production had 
become the greatest challenge in their careers. Managers and operators had to abandon the 
security of a known system for blind faith in a system that was difficult to preconceive and 
that could develop only over an unknown period of time. For those who were earning wages 
that were barely able to cover their financial needs, the threat of changing compensation 
systems or the viability of their jobs involved serious risks. One consultant divulged what he 
believed to be the three major problems for producers who had made the transition: 
I tend to think there are three major problems when people change from one to 
the other. Number one, they grossly underestimate the time required to evolve 
fipom one process to the other. The training that's required for people to 
assume a greater level of responsibility, and so consequently what happens is 
a lot of people just miss estimate I guess, or grossly underestimate the time 
required for this to happen. We're talking years, not months. And, that's one 
problem. Second problem is the level of sponsorship that comes down 
through the organization. And if you have someone who believes that this is 
the right thing to do, either from a business strategy or from a human strategy 
sort of thing, are they prepared to sponsor this through the long process that I 
just talked about, in terms of getting it implemented. They sometimes lose 
their enthusiasm and move on to another flavor of the month. That I guess is 
kind of the second major problem that I run into. The third, is not really have 
an understanding of what they are trying to achieve. 223 
Language contained within the transcripts and documents reflected a limited range of 
knowledge sources about flexibility. Informants were asked about their knowledge sources, 
or where they had learned about flexibility. The data contained production language that had 
evolved from common influences. These influences could be recognized as the trade and 
business press, ideas shared from company to company, industry trade shows, and seminars. 
The language that producers and consultants used to describe elements of flexibility such as: 
" you gotta walk the walk and talk the talk," "empowerment," "JIT," and "quick turns" was 
part of the transitional process. Having a language of flexibility may have added legitimacy 
to the changes in the firms because the language represented true change in the ways of 
thinking and the ways of behaving. 
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The nrocess of earning transitional capacity in annarel production 
The data offer direct evidence for the reasons that apparel producers pursued flexible 
strategies. How the transitions were made was not as evident, but the data reveal a pattern in 
the process of earning transitional capacity that was characterized by specific behavioral and 
ideological turning points. It should be emphasized that the process of earning transitional 
capacity among producers had a beginning, but did not have an end and did not follow a 
linear sequence. The process was continuous and iterative as the firms developed themselves 
ideologically and behaviorally in different ways at different times. For example, the data 
show evidence of process variation failures and abandonment of those variations. Later 
attempts to vary the production process within the same firms had been quite successful. 
The first turning point was the recognition of demand variation. Deciding what demand 
variation meant to their firms led to the identification of adaptive variants in sourcing, 
products, process, planning, and organizational structure/function. Concomitandy, other 
turning points included the assessment of value and risk in adaptive variants, the 
development of measuring techniques that supported flexibility, and the process of intensive 
knowledge and information acquisition. 
Recognition of demand variation Informants had a strong awareness of changes in 
demand. How they perceived the impact of those changes on their organizations ranged from 
a fear for their survival to opportunities for profit and growth. Some producers reported 
being "forced" into flexibility by customers or other competitive pressures. Others were not 
immediately threatened, but sought the variation in demand as a type of market niche. They 
perceived variation in demand as something that could provide them with unlimited 
opportunities to demonstrate to customers their competencies in product and volume 
variations within concise delivery occasions. Once producers had recognized demand 
variation and decided to do something in response to it, they began the learning and changing 
process with search behavior. 
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Identification of adaptive variants Search behavior on the part of producers was the 
first turning point in the process of becoming flexible. Virtually every producer had 
undertaken some form of learning about flexibility, usually in the forms of benchmarking and 
of visits to other producers who had adopted specific technology or the production system of 
interest. Some informants were aware of successful modular or UPS installations in a variety 
of firms and they emulated benchmarking techniques. Many informants did extensive travel. 
They attended seminars and trade shows as well as read books and trade press articles about 
flexibility. Producers making the transition sought the support of others who had also done 
it. Some producers hired consultants to help them identify adaptive variants, design 
strategies, and provide managerial support and education. 
Development of mechanisms to assess risk and determine the value of variants As 
producers experimented with sourcing options and process variations, they learned to assess 
risk and determine the value of a variety of flexible forms. Decisions about purchasing 
G\D/CAM or computerized cutting equipment to improve throughput was a prime example 
of a cost/benefit determination that most producers reported. In order to assess whether or 
not they could "justify" it, some reported that they predicted the payback period of the 
equipment through a set of sales forecasts. Vendors of equipment were expected to provide 
producers with data so the producers could evaluate the value of the equipment. Anecdotes 
of trial and error in production processes showed that operators were also able to assess risk 
and determine the value of behavioral variants. 
Cultivation of measuring techniques that support adaptive variants Performance 
measures such as piece-rate incentives, productivity per Standard Allowable Hour, and 
traditional product cost did not allow producers to account for the value of improved 
throughput and customer satisfaction. As a result, some producers began to search for 
methods of measuring what was newly important, instead of continuing to make decisions on 
measurements of what used to be important. One large producer who had about eight years 
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of experience with flexible production reported that his firm was trying to develop new 
measuring systems even though they had continued to use old measurements such as direct 
labor cost. Producers who had cultivated transitional capacity and had learned how to 
measure its value discovered that they could seek out and serve customers who needed lower 
volumes, wider product ranges, and reduced cycle times. 
Earning transitional capacity through intensive knowledge acquisition Informants in 
this study were in various stages of learning about flexibility. Knowledge was acquired 
through processes of exploration and experimentation. The method of acquiring transitional 
capacity depended on a concentrated learning effort for the individuals within the 
organization. Informants had to reason their way to levels of understanding about flexibility. 
Operators created knowledge by acquiring a wider range of task activities. Some producers 
hired consultants to manage the transition to a different production process, while others 
hired consultants to do specific kinds of personnel training. Producers who had adopted 
forms of flexibility without the concomitant structural and functional changes in their firms, 
learned first hand about the barriers to flexibility. 
The process of individual and organizational learning was implicit in the data, in the form 
of changing behaviors, beliefs, and organizational structures. Behind all of the behaviors and 
beliefs was knowledge based on a different set of assumptions. It was in the structures of the 
organizations that the ideology of flexibility was honored. Producers could change what they 
did (fonns) to act flexibly, but only those who changed their operating structures, changed 
who they were (ideology). 
Summary of theorv of transitional capacity of apparel producers 
The five behavioral constructs of this theory are as follows: 1) recognition of demand 
variation; 2) identification of adaptive variants; 3) development of mechanisms to assess 
risks and determine the value of variants; 4) cultivation of measurement techniques that 
support adaptive variants; and 5) earning transitional capacity through intensive knowledge 
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acquisition. Adaptive variants are concepts that were developed throughout the findings and 
include variations in apparel producers' production processes, products, planning activities, 
sourcing, and structures/functions. Producers were found to move through a series of these 
behaviors as they developed transitional capacity. 
Contribution to the Literature 
The results of this study contribute to the literature according to the three constructs that 
supported the study's design: ideology of flexibility, forms of flexibility, and barriers to 
flexibility. The meanings of flexibility that emerged in the data reflected the broad scope of 
flexibility identified in the literature and embraced the cultural components of flexibility: 
ideology and forms. Furthermore, the results helped to document a paradigm shift that is 
occuring within the apparel production sector. 
The deOroote framework 
The results of this study were supported by a useful framework of three theoretical 
concepts developed by deGroote (1994). These concepts were derived from the generic 
properties shared by the models of flexibility proposed in the literature: flexibility as a 
property of technologies, diversity as a property of the environment, and performance 
criteria. As a hedge against uncertainty, flexibility is considered in the framework as a 
property of technologies. Technology is defined as "... any aspect of a firm's production 
resources, control procedures, and overall strategy" (deGroote, 1994, pp. 934). This study 
found that flexibility was indeed a set of technologies and behaviors that provided apparel 
producers with options for coping with demand variation (uncertainty). 
The second concept of the framework is diversity. Diversity is a property of environments 
in which technologies are operated. Because diversity refers to general notions of variety, 
complexity, or variability, flexibility and diversity are two complementary properties. 
Therefore, the more diverse the environment, the more flexibility is required to cope with that 
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diversity. These findings point to the environmental diversity as well as the profound 
changes in market demand that apparel producers were perceiving. The more demand 
variation the producers oelieved was present, the greater their perceived need for the adoption 
of flexible behaviors. 
The third concept is a performance criterion for evaluation of differing technologies in 
different environments. A given technology would be considered more flexible than another 
if an increase in the environmental diversity produced a more desirable change in 
performance, ftoducers who had earned transitional capacity were in the process of learning 
how to predict the future consequences of adopting behavioral variations. Profit, quality, and 
productivity were the desirable outcomes that producers had measured. 
Tdeology 
Among the respondents, flexibility was recognized as a significant competitive strategy. 
Consistent with Gerwin's (1993) model and analysis, informants were responsive to 
environmental diversity and reported advantages in the use of strategic flexible options both 
defensively and offensively. Informants were not familiar with academic literature or studies 
on general manufacturing flexibility and did not make references to terms such as mix 
flexibility or rerouting flexibility. Nevertheless, implicit to their responses were dimensions 
of flexibility that appeared in the frameworks of authors listed in Table 1. For example, 
reports of the relative inflexibility of specialized apparel production equipment referred to the 
machine flexibility dimension of Swamidass (1988), Sethi and Sethi (1990), and Gupta and 
Somers (1992). Mix flexibility alludes to product variation, which was a major theme in this 
study. The concepts of static and dynamic flexibilities of Cohen and Zysman (1987) offer an 
analogical interpretation of transitional capacity in apparel production. 
Other ideological aspects of flexibility appeared in the findings of this study. For 
instance, the data showed evidence of producers trying to overcome mechanistic management 
systems that were viable when apparel production conditions were more stable. The 
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components of mechanistic systems described by Bums and Stalker (1961) were 
demonstrated clearly as elements of behavior producers were trying to vary from. Organic 
management systems were evolving within flexible apparel firms. From the perspectives of 
communications, sourcing, empowerment of operators, and networking, flexible producers 
were adopting organic forms of management systems as a redefinition of the firms' value 
sources. 
Within apparel producers' responsive product, planning, sourcing, and process variation 
activities, craft forms of production administration were evident. Local decisions and cross-
functional teamwork for problem solving characterized a movement away from bureaucratic 
administration and toward craft administration. Cultural interpretation of the data through 
Baligh's (1994) theory found support for the importance of "fit" between the structural 
components of the production firms and the teamwork cultures that flexible producers were 
trying to establish. 
Central to Frederick Taylor's (1992) theory of management was the encouragement of 
workers to build on their knowledge bases and contribute to innovation in production 
processes through the development of new techniques. The results supported this principle 
because operators who were in functioning in modular teams were expected to experiment 
with process innovations and advance themselves in efficiency and skill. 
Behavioral and technological forms of flexibility 
Behavioral and technological forms of flexibility cited in the literature were consistent 
with what producers were adopting. The literature focused on flexible production processes 
as isolated systems. Studies such as those by Bailey (1993) and Schoer and Ziemke (1994) 
on modular and UPS failed to emphasize a blend of systems that the informants in ihis study 
reported. 
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Barriers to flexibility 
Producers experienced a variety of barriers to flexibility. Firms that demonstrated the 
ability to transcend barriers had an internal capacity for change that Willmott (1993) alluded 
to in his discussion of strong corporate cultures. As in Hill's (1992a) study, operator 
compensation conflicts emerged as a major barrier in modular production processes. 
Resistance to change was reported by informants, but was not as well developed in depth as 
the literature. These findings show both the cognitive and affective components of change 
resistance. Endsley's (1994) model for reducing the resistance to technological change in 
manufacturing organizations may offer apparel producers guidance in the management of 
flexible innovations. 
Paradigm shift in apparel production 
This study documented differences in the organization of apparel production as the 
industry was moving away from a model of power-based relationships toward a network 
model that emphasized sourcing and cooperative relationships. Consistent with the 
discussion (Rubenstein, et al., 1984) of paradigm shifts, the adequacy or truth of assumptions 
underlying the former apparel production paradigm have been questioned. Members of the 
apparel manufacturing community represented in this study had shifted their world view by 
questioning the assumptions of former production canons as they related to changes in 
market demand. 
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SUMMARY 
Conclusion 
Naturalistic researchers are cautioned against presenting grand conclusions that push the 
work beyond the boundaries of the results. The account of a qualitative study should stand 
on its own. Wolcott (1990) claims that bridging the gap between describing the results and 
prescribing solutions to problems based on those results requires the imposition of judgment. 
That judgment may be from the perspective of the researcher, the informants, or an expert. 
Nevertheless, a researcher who has the privilege of examining phenomena from an insider's 
perspective is certainly affected by the experience and can share personal reflections. 
Therefore, as the results of the content analysis are valid in themselves, the conclusion to this 
study is no more than personal opinion and professional judgment on the part of this 
researcher. In conclusion: 
Flexibility is essentially a state of mind, be that the mind of an individual or the mind of 
an organization. Even though apparel producers have to invest in technologies that support 
flexibility, flexibility cannot simply be bought-it must be earned. It is not a static state of 
achievement, but a dynamic process that never ends. Flexibility as transitional capacity is 
developed by apparel firms who are capable of self-critique. 
Some activities that apparel producers undertake are those that insure the producers' 
current survival. Other activities help producers to progress and grow. Flexibility supports 
both survival and advancement As a virtual fountain of youth, flexibility allows producers 
to look at the market through an unimpaired vision, then respond with the maturity of 
production experience. 
The philosophy of flexibility lies in demand. Market demand is a stream of information 
and a body of knowledge that solves the big question for apparel producers: What ought we 
do? The market speaks, and to those producers who are capable of listening to the market 
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and capable of accommodating it, financial rewards are assured. Historically, listening to the 
market is not something that the United States apparel industry has done well. Now that the 
mass market concept has been outgrown, niche markets pose unique demands in terms of fit, 
aesthetics, quality, materials, and price points. For example, ready to wear clothing 
manufactured in the U.S. does not fit many individuals within this increasingly diverse and 
aging population. Our growing African, Asian, and Hispanic populations possess clothing 
needs and wants that extend beyond the past awarenesses of the large corporate producers 
and retailers. 
By collecting data, retailers have assumed the role of staying in touch with consumer 
needs and preferences. Like retailers, producers should be restmcturing their production 
plants and organizations around knowledge and information about their markets instead of 
around cost efficiencies. With wide ranges of options for sourcing, processes, planning, and 
product lines, flexibility should encourage producers to abandon the belief that each 
production plant must act as a "stand alone profit center." 
The dynamic nature of markets makes them penetrable by those producers who have 
cultivated a capacity to change continuously. Producers that recognize market need and have 
innovated intemally are capable of integrating product development with production. 
Flexibility requires apparel producers to develop cognitive complexity-many ways of 
gathering information, creating knowledge, and processing both through organizational 
structures that have easy communication between specialists. Traditions in apparel 
production are maintained by its members within a framework of assumptions, language, and 
values that define them as a system. The ideology of flexibility is honored within the 
structure and functional policies of the apparel firm. 
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Limitations 
The major limitation of this study lies in the possibility that the informants were not a 
representative sample of the population of apparel managers and consultants in the United 
States who had knowledge and experience with flexibility. Even though informants had 
varying levels of expertise about flexibility, depth interviews of a defined number of 
informants was more than adequate to analyze the questions and fulfill the objectives of the 
study. However, the sample size relative to the size of the potential population was very 
small. Some of the informants were limited in the amount of time they had available for 
interviews. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Because this was a descriptive study of a relatively new phenomenon, the results exposed 
several issues worthy of further inquiry. They include the educational development of 
managers and production personnel, the compensation of operators within flexible production 
processes, the alterations in the administration of apparel production, and the development of 
appropriate performance criteria that capture value in the ability to change. 
The study was not designed to gather data from the perspective of sewing operators and 
supervisors. Although four of the informants were operators who functioned at a research 
center and had advising roles in the industry, they were not as representative of operators in 
private firms who learn flexible production techniques without expert guidance. According 
to the informants, training and experimentation were found to be critical to the organizational 
learning process. Research that focused on the types of learning styles and effective training 
content for managers and production personnel who are developing flexible production 
techniques would be of value to producers. For example, an appropriate research question 
might be: Under what conditions are managers, operators, and supervisors best cultivated to 
become critical thinkers and decision makers as their firms develop transitional capacity? 
Such research could be conducted through a collaboration of academic institutions and the 
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apparel industry, with its outcomes forming a basis for technical education programs. 
Operator compensation was another serious issue for producers who adopted variations in 
their production processes. An analysis of the various types of pay systems and the 
assumptions that underlie the systems that flexible producers are adopting would be useful 
for other members of the industry. Such research could be a combination of a quantitative 
and a qualitative study. The economics of apparel production wages with a documentation of 
pay systems could be combined with a qualitative study from the perspectives of managers 
and operators on the motivational issues related to pay systems. 
Because the bureaucratic structures and functions of apparel firms were the most 
significant barriers to flexibility that were identified, research that focused on methods to 
prudently disintegrate such barriers within the context of viable business activities would be 
useful to many producers. For example, from the results of such a study, some producers 
who need to maintain bureaucratic structures for the purposes of financial control required by 
outside stakeholders, could leam to operate flexibly within their boundaries. 
As the industry moves away firom using anthropometric data for sizing standards and 
develops the capacity to manufacture clothing for individuals based on their digitally 
recorded body measurements, producers will require process innovations that can 
accommodate much more demand variation. Most producers use traditional measures, such 
as cost accounting and financial statements to evaluate their performance, but this study 
demonstrated that there is value in the ability to change. Therefore, research that seeks to 
discover what types of performance measures are appropriate for producers to use in decision 
making related to flexibility might be of considerable merit. 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to inductively describe dimensions of flexibility in apparel 
manufacturing. Using qualitative methods, 38 interviews of apparel production consultants 
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and managers were conducted in a variety of settings throughout the United States and in 
Honduras. Eighteen apparel production plants were toured. Attendance at two apparel 
research centers, three apparel production seminars, an apparel research conference, and a 
major apparel production trade show contributed to the study in the form of knowledge, 
documents, introductions to informants, and observations of apparel production equipment 
and techniques. Sales of the referent apparel firms ranged from $2.5 million to over $500 
million. All of the informants had experiences with flexibility and had high levels of 
knowledge about apparel and soft goods production. Through content analysis of data across 
conceptual categories, a grounded theory of flexibility within apparel firms emerged. 
Flexibility in apparel production was defined as transitional capacity: the ability to 
accommodate the variation in quantitative and qualitative demand for apparel products. 
Apparel producers go through a process of earning transitional capacity that begins with the 
recognition of demand variation and the need for change. Concomitantly, the identification 
of adaptive variants, the development of mechanisms to assess risk and determine the value 
of adaptive variants, and the cultivation of performance measures that support process 
variation are undertaken. 
The major barriers to the development of production flexibility were found to be 
structural, functional, and cognitive. Examples of barriers include bureaucratic inflexibility, 
incompliance of specialized production processes and equipment, and the mechanistic view 
of apparel production that has supported the productivity paradigm of the progressive bundle 
system and its piece-rate incentive assumptions. 
As producers face profound environmental diversity and demand variation, they have 
increased their range of products and reduced their cycle times by adaptively using a variety 
of behavioral techniques: computerized technologies, variation in production processes, 
professional development of labor, sourcing of materials and products, changing 
organizational structures, and development of vendor-retailer networks. Producers 
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essentially earn transitional capacity through an intensive process of knowledge acquisition 
and dramatic changes in the structures, functions, and ways of thinking within their firms. 
166 
REFERENCES 
Abend, J. (1994, March). Unionized makers win right to go offshore. Bobbin, pp. 70-72. 
Agins, T. (1994, January 13). Apparel makers are refashioning their operations. The Wall 
Street Journal, pp. B4. 
Alcorta, L. (1994). The impact of new technologies on scale in manufacturing industries: 
Issues and evidence. World Development, 22 (5), 755-769. 
Alic, J. A. (1993). Computer-assisted everything? Tools and techniques for design and 
production. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 44 (4), 359-31 A. 
Aly, A. A., & Subramaniam, M. (1993). Design of an FMS decision support system. 
InternationalJournal of Production Research, 31 (10), 2257-2273. 
Angle, H. L., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1989). Suggestions for managing the innovation 
journey. In A. H. Van de Ven, H. L. Angle, and M. S. Poole (Eds.), Research on the 
management of innovation: The Minnesota Studies (pp. 663-697). New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Applebaum, R. P., & Gereffi, G. (1994). Power and profits in the apparel commodity chain. 
In E. Bonacich, L. Cheng, N. Chinchilla, N. Hamilton, and P. Ong (Ms.), Global 
production: The apparel industry in the Pacific Rim (pp. 42-62). Philadelphia, PA: 
Temple University Press. 
Auerbach, P. (1988). Competition: The economics of industrial change. New York: 
Basil Blackwell, Inc. 
Aurrecoechea, A., Busby, J. S., Nimmons, T., & Williams, G. M. (1994). The evaluation 
of manufacturing cell designs. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 14 {\), 60-74. 
Awasthi, V. N. (1994). The ABC's of activity-based costing. Industrial Management, 
56(4), 8-11. 
Bailey, T. (1993). Organizational innovation in the apparel industry. Industrial Relations, 
32 (1), 30-48. 
Baligh, H. H. (1994). Components of culture: Nature, interconnections, and relevance to the 
decisions on the organization structure. Management Science, 40 (1), 14-27. 
Balkwell, C., & Dickerson, K. G. (1994). Apparel production in the Caribbean: A classic 
case of the new international division of labor. Clothing and Textiles Research Journal, 
12 (3), 6-15. 
Bartel, A. P. (1994). Productivity gains from the implementation of employee trainmg 
programs. Industrial Relations, 33 (4), 411-425. 
167 
Belussi, F. (1987). Benetton: Information technology in production and distribution: A 
case study of the innovative potential of traditional sectors. University of Sussex: 
Science Policy Research Unit. 
Berkstresser, G., & Takeuchi, K. (1986). The present state of automated sewing system 
development in Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. In G. Berkstresser and D. 
Buchanan (Eds.), Automation and robotics in the textile and apparel industries, 
(pp. 265-274). Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes Publications. 
Bernard, H. (1987, Januaiy). Vertical ventures. Bobbin, pp. 56-58. 
Bessant, J. (1991). Managing advanced manufacturing technology. Manchester, UK: NCC 
Blaclwell. 
Bidanda, B., Cleland, D. I., & Dharwadkar, S. R. (1993). Shared manufacturing: A global 
perspective. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
Black, S. S. (1994). Big guns get serious about QR. Bobbin, pp. 20-22. 
Black, S. S., & Cedrone, L. (1994, May). Apparel coming of age in the Americas. Bobbin, 
pp. 54-58. 
Blackburn, J. D. (1991). The Quick-Response movement in the apparel industry: A case 
study in time-compressing supply chains. In J. D. Blackburn (Ed.), Time-based 
competition: The next battleground in American manufacturing (pp. 246-269). 
Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin. 
Bobrowski, P. M., & Park, P. S. (199?). An evaluation of labor assignment rules when 
w o r k e r s  a r e  n o t  p e r f e c t l y  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e .  J o u r n a l  o f  O p e r a t i o n s  M a n a g e m e n t ,  I I ,  
257-268. 
Bobrowski, P., & Bretschneider, S. (1994). Internal and external interorganizational 
relationships and their impact on the adoption of new technology: An exploratory study. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 46 (3), 197-211. 
Bockerstette, J. A., & Shell, R. L. (1993). Time-based manufacturing. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
Bonacich, E., Cheng, L., Chinchilla, N., Hamilton, N., & Ong, P. (1994). The garment 
industry in the restructuring global economy. In E. Bonacich, L. Cheng, N. Chinchilla, N. 
Hamilton, and P. Ong (Eds.), Global production: The apparel industry in the Pacific Rim 
(pp. 3-18). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Bonacich, E., & Waller, D. V. (1994). The role of U.S. apparel manufacturers in the 
globalization of the industry in the Pacific Rim. In E. Bonacich, L. Cheng, N. Chinchilla, 
N. Hamilton, and P. Ong (Ms.), Global production: The apparel industry in the Pacific 
Rim (pp. 80-102). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University ftess. 
Braverman, K. (1974). Labor and monopoly capital: The degradation of work in the 
twentieth century. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
168 
Brimson, J. A. (1991). Activity accounting: An activity -based costing approach. New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Brown, A. D. (1993). Understanding technological change: The case of MRPII. 
InternationalJournal of Operations & Production Management, 13 (12), 25-35. 
Buchko, A. A. (1994). Barriers to strategic transformation: Interorganizational networks 
and institutional forces. In P. Shrivastava, A. Huff, & J. Dutton (Eds.), Advances in 
strategic management, Vol. JOB (pp. 81-106). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc. 
Burgess, A. G., Morgan, I., & Vollmann, T. E. (1993). Cellular manufacturing: Its impact 
on the total factory. International Journal of Production Research, 31 (9), 2059-2077. 
Bums, T., & Stalker, G. M. (1961). The management of innovation. London: Tavistock 
Publications. 
Bursic, K. M. (1992). Strategies and benefits of the successful use of teams in 
manufacturing organizations. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 39 (3), 
277-289. 
Busby, J. S., & Williams, G. M. (1993). The value and limitations of using process models 
to describe the manufacturing organization. International Journal of Production 
Research, 31 (9), 2179-2194. 
Calori, R., Johnson, G., & Samin, P. (1994). CEOs' cognitive maps and the scope of the 
organization. Strategic Management Journal, 75,437-457. 
Carlsson, B. (1989). Flexibility and theory of the firm. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 7, 179-204. 
Carrere, C. G., & Little, T. J. (1989). A case study and definition of modular manufacturing. 
International Journal of Clothing, Science, andTechnology, 11,30-38. 
Cedrone, L. (1993, November). Special report: Sourcing the Caribbean and Latin America. 
10th annual 807/CBI comparative analysis pullout. Bobbin, pp. 62-A. 
Cedrone, L. (1994, March). Miami maintaining its bearing. Bobbin, pp. 60-66. 
Cedrone, L. (1994, June). Finding the bar code fast track. Bobbin, pp. 68-74. 
Chang, T. M., & Yih, Y. (1994). Generic kanban systems for dynamic environments. 
International Journal of Production Research, 32 (4), 889-902. 
Chester, A. N. (1994, January-February). Aligning technology with business strategy. 
Research-Technology Management, pp. 25-32. 
Chinchilla, N., ^ Hamilton, N. (1994). The garment industry and economic restructuring 
in Mexico and Central America. In E. Bonacich, L. Cheng, N. Chinchilla, 
N. Hamilton, and P. Ong (Eds.), Global production: The apparel industry in the Pacific 
Rim (pp. 287-305). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University ftess. 
169 
Coghlan, D. (1993). A person-centered approach to dealing with resistance to change. 
Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 14 (4), 10-14. 
Cohen, S. S., & Zysman, J. (1987). Manufacturing matters: The myth of the post-industrial 
economy. New York: Basic Books. 
Cokins, G. (1994, August). Finding the crossroad to change. Bobbin, pp. 66-73. 
Conant, J. S., Smart, D. T., & Solano-Mendez, R. (1993). Generic retailing types, distinctive 
marketing competencies, and competitive advantages. Journal of Retailing, 69 (3), 
254-279. 
Courcoubetis, C., & Weber, R. (1994). Stability of flexible manufacturing systems. 
Operations Research, 42 (5), 947-957. 
Cowaid, R. (1983). Patriarchal precedents. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Darrah, C. N. (1992). Workplace skills in context. Human Organization, 51 (3), 264-272. 
Das, B., & Mital, A. (1994). Production feedback and standards as moderators of the 
worker satisfaction-productivity relationship. Ergonomics, 37 (7), 1185-1194. 
Davis, E. W. (1992). Global outsourcing: Have US managers thrown the baby out with 
the bathwater? Business Horizons, 35 (4), 58-65. 
Davy, J. A., White, R. E., Merritt, N. J., & Gritzmacher, K. (1992). A derivation of 
the underlying constructs of just-in-time management systems. Academy of Management 
Journal, 35 (3), 653-670. 
Defense Logistics Agency. (1992, October 21). Apparel research planning meeting: 
Program and presented papers. 
de Groote, X. (1994). The flexibility of production processes: A general framework. 
Management Science, 40 (7), 933-945. 
De Mey, M. (1982). The cognitive paradigm. London: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
DeMeza, D., & van der Ploeg, F. (1987). Production flexibility as a motive for 
multinationality. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35 (3), 343-352. 
De Roche, C. P. (1994). On the edge of regionalization: Management style and the 
construction of conflict in organizational change. Human Organization, 53 (3), 209-219. 
Dixon, J. R. (1991). Measuring manufacturing flexibility: An empirical investigation. 
School of Management, Boston, MA: Boson University. 
Dixon, J. R., Arnold, P., Heineke, J., Kim, J. S., & Mulligan, P. (1994). Business process 
reengineering: Improving in new strategic directions. California Management Review, 36 
(4), 93-108. 
170 
Drucker, P. E. (1990). The emerging theory of manufacturing. Harvard Business Review, 
68 (3), 95-102. 
Elger, T. (1982). Braverman, capital accumulation and deskilling. In S. Wood (Ed.), The 
degradation of work? Skill, deskilling and the labour process. 23-53. London: 
Hutchinson & Co. 
Endsley, M. R. (1994). An implementation model for reducing resistance to technological 
change. The International Journal of Human Factors in Manufacturing, 4 (1), 65-80. 
Evans, J. R., & Lindsay, W. M. (1989). The management and control of quality. New York: 
West Publishing Co. 
Ferre, F. (1988). Philosophy of technology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Flynn, B. B, & Jacobs, F. R. (1987). An experimental comparison of cellular (group 
technology) layout with process layout. Decision Sciences, 18 (4), 562-581. 
Fiegenbaum, A., & Kamani, A. (1991). Output flexibility-a competitive advantage for 
small firms. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 101-114. 
Fine, C. H., & Freund, R. M. (1990). Optimal investment in product-flexible manufacturing 
capacity. Management Science, 36 (3), 449-466. 
Fiol, C. M. (1991). Managing culture as a competitive resource: An identity-based view of 
sustainable competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 77(1), 191-211. 
Fisher, M. L., Hammond, J. H., Obermeyer, W. R., & Raman, A. (1994, May-June). 
Making supply meet demand in an uncertain world. Harvard Business Review, 72 (3), 
83-93. 
Forstner, H., & Ballance, R. (1990). Competing in a global economy. An empirical study 
on specialization and trade in manufactures. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Francis, A. (1986). New technology at work. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Friedman, B. L. (1988). Productivity trends in department stores, 1967-86. Monthly Labor 
Review, 2 (3), 17-21. 
Ganz, C. (1981). Linkages between knowledge creation, diffusion, and utilization. In 
R. F. Rich (Ed.), The knowledge cycle (pp. 185-206). Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Gardiner, S. C., Blackstone, J. H., & Gardiner, L. R. (1994, May/June). The evolution 
of the theoiy of constraints. Industrial Management, 36 (3), 13-16. 
Gaskill, L. R. (1992). Toward a model of retail product development: A case study analysis. 
Clothing and Textiles Research Journal, 10 (4), 17-24. 
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
171 
Germeroth-Hodges, E. (1993, September). Discounters rate tops with apparel consumers. 
Bobbin, 118-124. 
Gerwin, D. (1993). Manufacturing flexibility: A strategic perspective. Management 
Science, 39 (4), 395-410. 
Glaser, B. G. (1992). Emergence vs. forcing: Basics of grounded theory analysis. Mill 
Valley, CA: Sociology Press. 
Glasmeier, A., Campbell, J. M., & Henton, J. M. (1993, November-December). Tequila 
sunset? NAITA and the U.S. apparel industry. Challenge, pp. 37-45. 
Goss, B. M., & Knudsen, D. C. (1994). Flexibility in offshore assembly operations: 
Electronics assembly in the commonwealth Caribbean. The Developing Economies, 32 
(2), 210-227. 
Grandori, A. (1987). Perspectives on organization theory. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 
Gregory, K. L. (1983). Native-view paradigms; Multiple cultures and culture conflicts 
in organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28 (3), 359-376. 
Gunasekaran, A., Martikainen, T., & Yli-OIli, P. (1993). Flexible manufacturing systems: 
An investigation for research and applications. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 66,1-26. 
Gustavsson, S. O. (1984). Flexibility and productivity in complex production processes. 
InternationalJournal of Production Research, 22 (5), 801-808. 
Gupta, Y. P., & Goyal, S. (1989). Flexibility of manufacturing systems: Concepts and 
measurements. European Journal of Operations Research, 43, 119-135. 
Gupta, Y. P., & Somers, T. M. (1992). The measurement of manufacturing flexibility. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 60,166-182. 
Hadeler, B. J., & Evans, J. R. (1994, July/August). Supply strategy: Capturing the value. 
Industrial Management, 36 (4), 3-4. 
Hambrick, D. C. (1980). Operationalizing the concept of business-level strategy in 
research. Academy of Management Review, 5 (4), 567-575. 
Han, M. H., & McGinnis, L. F. (1989). Flow control in flexible manufacturing: 
Minimization of stockout cost. International Journal of Production Research, 27 
(4), 701-715. 
Handfield, R. B. (1994). US global sourcing: Pattems of development. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, 14 (6), 40-51. 
Harvey, J., Lefebvre, L. A., & Lefebvre, E. (1992). Exploring the relationship between 
productivity and technology adoption in small manufacturing firms. IEEE Transactions 
on Engineering Management, 39 (4), 352-358. 
172 
Hassan, M. M. (1994). Machine layout problem in modem manufacturing facilities. 
InternationalJournal of Production Research, 32 (11), 2559-2584. 
Hayes, R. H., & Wheelwright, S. C. (1984). Restoring our competitive edge. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons. 
Henderson, H. (1991). Paradigms in progress: Life beyond economics. Indianapolis, IN: 
Knowledge Systems, Inc. 
Herbig, P., Milewicz, J., & Golden, J. E. (1993). The mysteries of forecasting. Journal of 
Business Strategies, 10 (2), 95-111. 
Herbig, P. A., & Palumbo, F. (1994). The effect of culture on the adoption process: 
A comparison of Japanese and American behavior. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 46 (1), 71-101. 
Hill, J. E. (1992a). Rexible manufacturing systems. Unpublished paper. Clemson 
University: Clemson Apparel Research. 
Hill, J. E. (1992b). Unit production systems for flexible manufacturing. Defense Logistics 
Agency Apparel Research Planning Meeting: Program and presented papers. 
Hoffman, K., & Rush, H. (1988). Micro-electronics and clothing: The impact of 
technological change on a global industry. New York: Praeger. 
Hopp, W. J., & Simon, J. T. (1993). Estimating throughput in an unbalanced assembly-like 
flow system. International Journal of Production Research, 31 (4), 851-868. 
Hudson, K. (1978). Food, clothes, and shelter. London: John Baker. 
Hunter, N. A. (1990). Quick Response in apparel manufacturing: A survey of the American 
scene. Manchester, UK: The Textile Institute. 
Hunter, N. A., King, R. E.., Nuttle, H. L., & Wilson, J. R. (1993). North Carolina apparel 
pipeline modeling project. International Journal of Clothing Science and Technology, 5 
(3/4), 19-24. 
International Apparel Research Conference Proceedings. (1994). American Apparel 
Manufacturers Association. Washington, DC. 
Jacobs, M. (1994, May). Buy, sell or perish. pp. 67-69. 
Jackman, J., & Johnson, E. (1993). The role of queuing network models in performance 
evaluation of manufacturing systems. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 44 
(8), 797-807. 
Johnson, H. T., & Kaplan, R. (1987). Relevance lost: The rise and fall of management 
accounting. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Johnston, R., & Lawrence, P. R. (1988, July-August). Beyond vertical integration-The rise 
of the value-adding partnership. Harvard Business Review, 66,94-101. 
173 
Jones, R. A., & Ostroy, J. M. (1984). Flexibility and uncertainty. Review of Economic 
Studies, 51,13-32. 
Jones, S. (1985a). Depth interviewing. Applied qualitative research 
(pp. 45-55). Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Co. 
Jones, S. (1985b). The analysis of depth interviewing. In R. Walker (Ed.), 
qualitative research (pp. 56-70). Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Co. 
Kaciz, R. (1989, August-September). Rags and riches? One industry's strategy for 
improving productivity. Technology Review, 92, pp. 42-53. 
Kaighobadi, M., & Venkatesh, K. (1994). Flexible manufacturing systems: An overview. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 14 (4), 26-49. 
Kanter, R. M. (1994, July-August). Collaborative advantage. Harvard Business Review, 
72 (4), 96-108. 
Kaplinsky, R. (1994). From mass production to flexible specialization: A case study of 
microeconomic change in a semi-industrialized economy. World Development, 22 (3), 
337-353. 
Karlsson, K., & Norr, C. (1994). Total effectiveness in a just-in-time system. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, 14 (3), 46-65. 
Kaufman, P. J., Smith, N. C., & Ortmeyer, G. K. (1994). Deception in retailer high-low 
pricing: A "rule of reason" approach. Journal of Retailing, 70 (2), 115-138. 
Kawano, E. (1993). The Japanese model of production: Cooperation or coercion? In G. 
Epstein, J. Graham, and J. Nembhard (Eds.), Creating a new world economy. Forces of 
change & plans for action (pp. 242-257). Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Kessides, I. N. (1990). Towards a testable model of entry: A study of US manufacturing 
industries. Economica, 57 (226), 219-238. 
Klassen, R. D., & Whybark, D. C. (1994). Barriers to the management of international 
operations. Journal of Operations Management, 11, 385-396. 
Klein, D. (1976). Some notes on the dynamics of resistance to change: The defender role. 
In W. Bennis, K. Benne, R. Chin, and K. Corey (Eds.), The planning of change (pp. 117-
124). 3rd edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Klein, J. H. (1994). Cognitive processes and operational research: A human information 
processing perspective. Journal of Operational Research Society, 45 (8), 855-866. 
Kogut, B., & Kulatilaka, N. (1994). Operating flexibility, global manufacturing, and the 
option value of a multinational network. Management Science, 40 (1), 123-139. 
Koubek, R. J., Clarkston, T. P., & Calvez, V. (1994). The training of knowledge structures 
for manufacturing tasks: An empirical study. Ergonomics, 37 (4), 765-780. 
174 
Kreher, H. (1994). Some recurring themes using soft systems methcxlology. Journal 
of the Operational Research Society, 45 (11), 1293-1303. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Kulisch, T., & Banner, D. K. (1993). Self-managed work teams: An update. Leadership 
and Organization Development Journal, 14 (2), 25-29. 
Kunz, G. I. (In press). Behavioral theory of the apparel firm: A beginning. Clothing and 
Textiles Research Journal. 
Kusterer, K. C. (1978). Know-how on the job: The important working knowledge of 
"unskilled" workers. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc. 
Laengle, K., Griffen, P. M., & Grifien, S. O. (1994). A quantification of the economic 
value of flexible capacity. International Journal of Production Research, 32 (6), 1421-
1430. 
Lambrecht, M., & Segaert, A. (1990). Buffer stock allocation in serial and assembly type of 
production lines. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 10 
(2), 47-61. 
Lederer, P. J., & Singhal, V. R. (1994). The effect of financing decisions on the choice of 
manufacturing technologies. The International Journal of Flexible Manufacturing 
Systems, 6 , 333-360. 
Levin, L., Fielding, E., & Ackhurst, K. (1993). Developing a computer control system for 
a flexible manufacturing cell. The International Journal of Flexible Manufacturing 
Systems, 5,143-159. 
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. (1993). The myopia of learning. Strategic Management 
Journal, Special Issue, 14, 95-112. 
Lewison, D. M. (1994). Retailing. New York: Macmillan. 
Li, S., & Tirupati, D. (1994). Dynamic capacity expansion problem with multiple products: 
Technology selection and timing of capacity additions. Operations Research, 42 (5), 958-
976. 
Lin, S. H., Kincade, D. H., & Warfield, C. (1994). Productivity and production in the 
apparel industry. International Journal of Clothing Science and Technology, 6 (1), 20-27. 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Lindsley, W. B., Blackburn, J. D., & Elrod, T. (1991). Time and product variety 
competition in the book distribution industry. Journal of Operations Management, 10 
(3), 344-362. 
175 
Lorange, P., Roos, J., & Bronn, P. S. (1992). Building successful strategic alliances. 
Long Range Planning, 25 (6), 10-17. 
Mair, A. (1994). Honda's global flexifactory network. International Journal of Operations 
& Production Management, 14 (3), 6-23. 
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science, 2, 71-87. 
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1992). Theories of bureaucracy. In J. Shafiitz and S. Ott 
(Eds.), Classics of organization theory (pp. 124-132). Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole 
Publishing Co. 
McGregor, D. (1960). The human side of enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Meredith, J., & Vineyard, M. (1993). A longitudinal study of the role of manufacturing 
technology in business strategy. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 13 (12), 4-24. 
M^sziros, I. (1989). The power of ideology. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Meyer, C. (1994, May-June). How the right measures help teams excel. Harvard Business 
Review, 72 (3), 95-103. 
Miles, M., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: A sourcebook of new 
methods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Miller, J. G., «& Roth, A. V. (1994). A taxonomy of manufacturing strategies. Management 
Science, 40 (3), 285-303. 
Miller, R., & Blais, R. A. (1993). Modes of innovation in six industrial sectors. IEEE 
Transactions on Engineering Management, 40 (3), 264-273. 
Mills, D. E., & Schumann, L. (1985). Industry structure with fluctuating demand. The 
American Economic Review, 75 (4), 758-767. 
Minor, E. D., Hensley, R. L., & Wood, D. R. (1994). A review of empirical manufacturing 
strategy studies. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 13 (1), 
5-25. 
Mitwashi, M. G., & Askin, R. G. (1994). Production planning for a multi-item, single-stage 
kanban system. International Journal of Production Research, 32 (5), 1173-1195. 
Moncarz, H. T., & Lee, Y. L. (1993). Report on scoping the apparel manufacturing 
enteiprise. International Journal of Clothing Science and Technology, 5 (3/4), 6-18. 
Morgan, G. (1983). The significance of assumptions. InG.MoTgzn^^.), Beyond method: 
Strategies for social research (pp. 377-382). Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Morgan, G. (1986). Images of organization. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
176 
Morgan, G., & Smircich, L. (1983). The case for qualitative research. Academy of 
Management Review, 5 (4), 491-500. 
Morganowsky, M. A. (1993). Changes in US retail market structure. International Journal 
of Advertising, 12 (1), 37-43. 
Mueller, F. (1994). Teams between hierarchy and commitment: Change strategies and the 
'internal environment'. Journal of Management Studies, 21 (3), 383-403. 
Mytelka, L. K. (1991). Technological change and the global relocation of pnxiuction in 
textiles and clothing. Studies in Political Economy, 36 (3), 109-143. 
Nayyar, P. R., & Bantel, K. A. (1994). Competitive agility: A source of competitive 
advantage based on speed and variety. In P. Shrivastava, A. Huff, & J. Dutton (Eds.), 
Advances in strategic management, Vol. lOA. (pp. 193-222). Greenwich, CT: JAIPtess 
Inc. 
Nemetz, P. L., & Fr>', L. W. (1988). Flexible manufacturing organizations: Implications 
for strategy formulation and organization design. Academy of Management Review, 13, 
(4), 627-638. 
Newman, W. R., Hanna, M., & Maffei, M. J. (1993). Dealing with the uncertainties of 
manufacturing: Rexibilities, buffers and integration. International Journal of Operations 
& Production Management, 75 (1), 19-34. 
O'Connor, C. A. (1993). Resistance: The repercussions of change. Leadership & 
Organization Development Journal, 14 (6), 30-36. 
Peeters, M. (1993). Teamwork in clothing factories: Experiences from The Netherlands. 
International Journal of Clothing Science and Technology, 5 (2), 7-13. 
Pettigrew, A., &'Vhipp, R. (1991). Managing change for competitive success. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, Ltd. 
Pleschberger, T. E., & Hitomi, K. (1993). Flexible final-assembly sequencing method for 
a JIT manufacturing environment. International Journal of Production Research, 31 (5), 
1189-1199. 
Powell, W. W. (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organization. 
Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336. 
Pugh, D. S. (1983). Studying organizational structure and process. In G. Morgan (Ed.), 
Beyond method: Strategies for social research (pp. 45-56). Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Ram,M. (1994). Managing to survive. Working lives in small firms. Oxford, UK: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Reeves, T. K. (1970). The control of manufacture in a garment factory. In J. Woodward 
Industrial organization: Behavior and control (pp. 108-129). London: Oxford 
University Press. 
177 
Ritzman, L. P., & King, B. E. (1993). The relative significance of forecast errors in 
multistage manufacturing. Journal of Operations Management, 11, 51-65. 
Rubinstein, R. A., Laughlin, C. D., & McManus, J. (1984). Science as cognitive process. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Ruch, W. A., & Hershauer, J. C. (1974). Factors affecting worker productivity. Tempe, 
AZ: Arizona State University. 
Sanchez, R. (1993). Strategic flexibility, firm organization, and managerial work in dynamic 
markets: A strategic-options perspective. In P. Shrivastava, A. Huff, & J. Button (Ms.). 
Advances in strategic management. Vol. 9 (pp. 251-291). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc. 
Savery, L. K. (1994). Attitudes to work: The influence of perceived styles of leadership 
on a group of workers. Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 15 (4), 12-18. 
Schein, E. H. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
Scheller, H. P. (1993). The meaning of apparel quality through the perceptions of apparel 
production managers and operators. Unpublished master's thesis, Iowa State University, 
Ames, lA. 
Schoer, B. J., Wang, J., & Ziemke, M. C. (1991, July). A look at TSS through simulation. 
Bobbin, pp. 114-119. 
Schoer, B. J., & Ziemke, M. C. (1994). Human resource issues affecting the survival of 
US apparel manufacturing. The International Journal of Human Factors in 
Manufacturing, 4 (1), 55-64. 
Seidmann, A., & Tenebaum, A. (1994). Throughput maximization in flexible manufacturing 
systems. HE Transactions, 26 (1), 90-99. 
Seiler, E. (1984). Piece-rate vs. time rate: The effect of incentives on earnings. The Review 
ofEcorwrnics and Statistics, 66 (3), 363-375. 
Sethi, A. K., & Sethi, S. P. (1990). Flexibility in manufacturing: A survey. International 
Jourruil of Flexible Manufacturing Systems, 2 (4), 289-328. 
Shepard, H. A. (1956). Superiors and subordinates in research. Paper 12 of the Symposium 
on the Direction of Research Establishments. H.M.S.O.: Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research. 
Sieling, M. S., & Curtain, D. (1988). Patterns of productivity change in men's and boys' 
suits and coats. Monthly Labor Review, 3 (11), 25-31. 
Sim, S. K., Yeo, K. T., & Lee, W. H. (1994). An expert neural network system for dynamic 
job shop scheduling. International Journal of Production Research, 32 (8), 1759-1773. 
178 
Skinner, S. J., Gassenheimer, J. B., & Kelley, S. W. (1992). Cooperation in supplier-
dealer relationships. Journal of Retailing, 68 {2), 174-193. 
Slack, N. (1988, February). Manufacturing systems flexibility-An assessment procedure. 
Computer-Integrated Manufacturing Systems, 7(1), 25-31. 
Slaughter, R. A. (1994). Lxx)king for the real "Megatrends". Engineering Management 
Review, 22 (2), 5-18. 
Smircich, L. (1983a). Studying organizations as cultures. In G. Morgan (Ed.), Beyond 
method: Strategies for social research (pp. 160-172). Beverly Hills: Sage Piiblications, 
Inc. 
Smircich, L. (1983b). Concepts of culture and organizational analysis. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 28 (3), 339-358. 
Snell, S. A., & Dean, J. W. (1992). Integrated manufacturing and human resource 
management: A human capital perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 35 (3), 
467-504. 
Snow, C. C., & Thomas, J. B. (1994). Field research methods in strategic management: 
Contributions to theory building and testing. Journal of Management Studies, 31 (4), 457-
480. 
Spender, J. C. (1993). Some frontier activities around strategy theorizing. Journal of 
Management Studies, 50 (1), 11-30. 
Stewart, E.C. (1983). Culture and decision making. In (Eds.) Decision-making. 
pp. 177-211. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1959). Bureaucratic and craft administration of production. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 4,168-187. 
Swamidass, P. M. (1988). Manufacturing flexibility. Operations Management Monograph 
No. 2, Waco, TX: The Schneider Group. 
Swamidass, P. M., & Newell, W. T. (1987). Manufacturing strategy, environmental 
uncertainty and performance: A path analytic model. Management Science, 33 (4), 509-
524. 
Takahashi, K., Hiraki, S., & Soshirodas, M. (1994). Flexibility of production ordering 
systems. International Journal of Production Research, 32 (7), 1739-1752. 
Taplin, I. M. (1994). Recent manufacturing changes in the U.S. apparel industry: The case 
of North Carolina. In E. Bonacich, L. Cheng, N. Chinchilla, N. Hamilton, and P. Ong 
(Eds.), Global production: The apparel industry in the Pacific Rim (pp. 328-344). 
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Taylor, F. W. (1992). The principles of scientific management. In J. Shafritz and S. Ott 
(Eds.), Classics of organization theory (pp. 69-80). Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole 
Publishing Co. 
179 
Taylor, S. J., & Bogdan, R. (1984). Introduction to qualitative research methods: The 
search for meanings (2nd. ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Teng, J. T., Grover, V., & Fiedler, K. D. (1994). Business process reengineering: 
Charting a strategic path for the information age. California Management Review, 36 
(3), 9-31. 
Thomas, J. (1993). Doing critical ethnography. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Thomas, H., & Pruett, M. (1993). Introduction to the special issue: Perspectives on theory 
building in strategic management. Journal of Management Studies, 30(1), 3-30. 
Tucker, J., & Corey, M. (1993). Apparel and fabricated textile products. US. industrial 
outlook 1994. U.S. Department of Commerce & International Trade Association. 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Tucker, J., & D'Andrea, M. (1992). Apparel and fabricated textile products. US. industrial 
outlook 1993. U.S. Department of Commerce & International Trade Association. 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Tunc, E. A., & Gupta, J. N. (1993). Is time a competitive weapon among manufacturing 
firms? International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 13 (3), 4-12. 
U. S. Department of Commerce, (in press). Statistics for industry groups and industries: 
1992 and 1987. Manufacturers-summary series, pp. 6-8. 
Van de Ven, A. H. (1986). Central problems in the management of innovation. 
Management Science, 32 (5), 590-607. 
Van de Ven, A. H., & Poole, M. S. (1989). Methods for studying innovation processes. 
In A. H. Van de Ven, H. L. Angle, and M. S. Poole (Eds.), Research on the management 
of innovation: The Minnesota Studies (pp. 31-54). New York: Harper & Row. 
Vonderembse, M. A., & White, G. P. (1991). Operations management. St. Paul: West 
Publishing Company. 
Webb, J. (1992). The mismanagement of innovation. Sociology-The Journal of the 
British Sociological Association, 26 (3), 471-492. 
Webster, F.E. (1992). The changing role of marketing in the corporation. Journal of 
Marketing, 56, 1-17. 
Westbrook, R. (1994). Priority management: New theory of operations management. 
International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 14 (6), 4-24. 
Wheelwright, S. C, & Clark, K. B. (1992). Competing through development capability 
in a manufacturing-based organization. Business Horizons, 35 (4), 29-43. 
Willmott, H. (1993). Strength is ignorance; slavery is freedom: Managing culture in modem 
organizations. Journal of Management Studies, 30, 515-543. 
180 
Wolcott, H. F. (1990). Writing up qualitative research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Wong, B. K., Chong, J. K., & Park, J. (1994). Utilization and benefits of expert systems in 
manufacturing. International Journal of Operations & Production Management,  14 {\) ,  
38-49. 
Woodward, J. (1965). Industrial organization: Theory and practice. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Woodward, J. (1970). Technology, management control and organizational behavior. In 
J. Woodward (Ed.), Industrial organization: Behavior and control (pp. 234-243). 
London: Oxford University Press. 
Yang, Y. (1994). The impact of MFA phasing out on world clothing and textile markets. 
Journal of Development Studies, 30 (3), 892-915. 
Young, M., & Post, J. E. (1993, Spring). Managing to communicate, communicating to 
manage; How leading companies communicate with employees. Engineering 
Management Review, 22 (1), 24-31. 
ZuHone, L. M., & Morganosky, M. A. (1995). Exchange relationships between apparel 
retailers and manufacturers. Clothing and Textiles Research Journal, 13 (1), 57-64. 
181 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Gratitude is extended to the informants of this study for sharing their knowledge of the 
apparel industry with the academic community. Special thanks to the staff of the apparel 
research centers and the apparel industry hosts in Honduras. 
This work found its confidence in the expertise of my faculty committee: Mary Littrell, 
Grace Kunz, Barbara Flynn, Ann Marie Fiore, and Dave Roberts. I thank the other members 
of the faculty within the Department of Textiles and Clothing for their contributions to my 
graduate degrees. 
The best lesson of my graduate education came from William Logan Bender, whose 
indirect perceptions taught me how to smooth out life's big equation. 
182 
APPENDIX A: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
183 
Questions for development of interview schedule 
What kinds of strategies does your firm have or is your firm planning to have that will 
affect its production flexibility? 
How much flexibility does your production system have? Is it the right amount for the 
present? How about for the near future? 
What could make your system more (or less) flexible? 
What constraints does your company face in becoming more flexible? 
How valuable is it for parts of your production system to be flexible, and other parts to be 
inflexible? 
a), flexibility in obtaining fabrics and trims 
b). flexibility in skills/training of labor 
c). flexibility in process 
d). flexibility of management 
e). flexibility in equipment/technology 
In your opinion, does the cost of becoming more flexible justify the rewards? In other words, 
is flexibility cost-efficient? 
Do you think that an apparel production system can become too flexible, to the point of being 
unstable? 
If you could imagine the ideal production system for the apparel business environment of the 
nineties, what would that system be like? Can you describe it if you didn't have any financial 
or legal constraints ? 
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Interview Guide for Apparel Production Managers 
1. What does "being flexible in apparel production" mean to you? 
2. What has been happening in the market and in the industry that is promoting apparel 
producers to become more flexible? 
3. Where do you get information about flexibility? How did you become more informed 
about it? 
4. Which parts of a production system have to change in order to achieve flexibility? 
Probes: Labor (plant locations, training, attitudes, etc) 
Materids (suppliers, lead times, design considerations, etc) 
Process 
Management/Policies 
Technology 
5. In what ways are unit production systems and modular team systems more flexible than 
progressive bundle systems? In what ways are they less flexible? 
6. Do you think flexible production systems are more productive than bundle systems? 
7. Do you think flexible systems are more profitable than bundle systems? 
8. What are the challenges of managing quality in flexible production systems? How do you 
manage quality in a flexible production system? 
9. What is your company doing to become more flexible? 
Probes: Changing production systems 
Sourcing offshore 
Establishing offshore plants or joint ventures 
Technology (EDI) 
Partnerships with vendors/retailers 
10. Can you share with me some of the problems and issues that occur in production systems 
when they change from a traditional bundle system to a different system? 
Probes: Constraints-labor shortage, union rules, financial, materials, equipment, time 
Compensation issues 
Communications-language & cultural barriers 
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11. What contributes to your company being more flexible? 
12. What prevents your company from becoming more flexible? 
13. Has there been resistance to change in your company? If so, why do you think people 
don't want to change? 
14. What do you think people need to know in order to become more flexible? 
15. Can you describe the most important characteristics of successful apparel producers? 
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Interview Guide for Consultants 
1. There has been an emphasis on flexible production systems in the apparel trade press. 
What does being flexible in apparel production mean to you? 
2. Is it important to be flexible? Why or why not? 
3. What has been happening in the market and in the industry to require apparel producers 
to become more flexible? 
4. In what ways are unit production systems and modular systems more flexible than 
progressive bundle systems? In what ways are they less flexible? 
5. Which parts of a production system have to change in order to achieve flexibility? 
Probes: Labor (plant locations, training, attitudes, etc.) 
Materi^s (suppliers, lead times, design considerations, etc.) 
Process 
Management/Policies 
Technology 
6. How valuable is it for parts of a production systern to be more flexible, while other parts 
are inflexible? 
7. Can you share with me some of the problems and issues that occur in production systems 
when they change from a traditional bundle system to a different system? 
8. What are the most common labor/management conflicts that are occuring within 
individual companies when they change to flexible systems? 
Probes: Constraints-labor shonage, union rules, financial, materials, equipment, time 
Compensation issues 
Communications-language and cultural barriers 
Quality 
9. What kinds of conflicts are occuring in the industry as it shifts to more flexible systems? 
Probes: Retailers 
Suppliers 
Transportation 
Market pressures 
10. Can you describe the most important characteristics of successful apparel producers? 
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Introduction of Research Project for Personal Interviews 
Dear Participant: October, 1994 
I am a graduate student from the Textiles and Clothing Department of Iowa State 
University in Ames, Iowa. This year, I am conducting a research project to learn about 
flexibility in apparel manufacturing from the perspectives of people who work in the apparel 
industry. I have selected you for an interview because of your experience and expertise. 
Therefore, I would like to talk with you in some depth about flexibility in apparel production. 
Your participation will help me to fulfill my research goals, which are: 
1. To explore and describe issues related to flexibility, such as changes in the market 
and industry that may be requiring flexibility, and issues related to labor, 
management, materials, quality, productivity, profit and growth. 
2. To understand how flexibility issues compare within three different production 
systems: progressive bundle, modular (flexible work groups), and unit production 
systems (overhead conveyor systems). 
I have prepared a guide to the topics which I want to discuss with you. When I visit you, I 
may be taking some notes. All records of the information you share with me will be 
identified by number only. No names will appear on any information from you. Any 
publication from this research will be written without identification of names, companies, 
cities, or people. 
Because accuracy is of critical importance, I would like to tape record your interview. 
The information you give me is most valuable in your own words. No one but me and 
perhaps my faculty supervisor will hear this tape. Any references to people or companies 
will be deleted fix)m the transcription of the tape. After my research results are complete, all 
of the tapes will be destroyed. I will be using the information from the interviews to write 
my doctoral dissertation and one or two research articles. 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. 1 would like you to participate, but if you 
cannot, I will understand. You may withdraw at any time. 
If you wish, I would be pleased to send you a copy of the summary and recommendations 
of this research. They will be available by next summer. Thank you! 
Heidi P. Scheller (address and telephone) 
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Theme Development 
Emergent Theme: Environmental Diversity 
Sample data represenring environmental diversity theme: 
The other major component, point here is that prices have not been increasing, so, and we've 
got a very flat market, so we've got a limited number of consumers, prices are not going up, 
global competition, and so how do you compete in that environment? 223 (market 
stagnation; price resistance) 
Well, the market. The market is more difficult today that it was four years ago, five years 
ago. I think its more difficult now because of GATT, NAFTA, and so forth. A^at keeps us 
apart fi-om everybody else is our ability to listen to what consumers want. Not just the people 
who come in through the door, but the actual people who wear the garments. 220 (free 
trade; fashion demands) 
Well, your commodity production, mass production, a lot of it has been moving to lower 
cost, lower labor cost countries, and consequently, the only thing left here, or a lot of what's 
left here cannot be, where the labor cost issue cannot be offset by the technology. What you 
are left with are product segments that require, that have a lot of styling and require a high 
level of diversity, and flexibility in the manufacturing. So what it amounts to, is you either 
be fast and flexible, or you be outside of this country producing at a lower cost. 223 
(segmented markets; fashion demands; time competition; labor costs) 
Basically being flexible in apparel production to me means that you are going to survive in 
this industry. If you are not flexible, ah, the market place, the customer is demanding 
flexibility. He is demanding that he has the right product at the right time and he has his 
socks, his color, his style that he wants. If we are not able to produce the flexible production 
as demanded by the customer, we are not going to be in business. 107 (fashion demands; 
time competition) 
Competition is increasing, ah, ah, specifically in the 1990's, a revolution occurred in which 
the number retailers decreased and as a result, the number of manufacturers in turn decreased 
as competition increased. Because of that, it became important to compete on a different 
scale. "Traditional scales include equality in styling and price. All of a sudden, time became 
the largest issue of competition. 1()8 (time competition; consolidation of retailing; 
consolidation of manufacturing) 
Codes from first and second order analysis: 
Market characteristics Comnetitive forces 
Market stagnation Free trade 
Price resistance Labor costs 
Time competition Consolidation of manufacturing 
Segmented markets Consolidation of retailing 
Fashion demands Time competition 
Offshore sourcing Availability of technology 
Retail power Vertical integration 
Networking 
Government regulation 
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Theme PcYglopmgnt 
Emergent Theme: Demand Variation 
Sample data representing demand variation theme: 
because what we see our customers headed tov/ards is more personalized products, but not at 
the expense of what custom made or tailor made clothing has been as that connotes high and 
very expensive. You are going to pay if you are going to get something tailor made, but yet 
people want things that are customized for their own individual likes and designs and in an 
agile environment, an organization can respond to those requests, those requirements and the 
term that is being used with that is mass customization and that does not connote high price 
in the same way that tailor made does. So, to me being flexible is being able to respond to 
the changing demands of the customer, whatever that is and the time fi^e in which we have 
to do that is becoming shorter and shorter. 104 
They are demanding more accurate forecasts. They are demanding the EDI systems to be in 
a, just a continuous link-up with what is going on in our ordering systems, out shipping and 
ail that, ah, so it is going hard core in the other direction. They want to know exactiy what 
we know. So we have better responses. 208 
Well, there are shorter lead times that is demanded by the retailers and also they want to be 
able to change and to buy closer to the season to improve their throughputs and this is seen as 
an advantage when they can buy closer to the season. 206 
The retailer is directed by the consumer to have the right product at the right time and in 
many ways, the consumer is pushing the retailer who is pushing the producer/manufacturer. 
107 
The biggest problem in the intimate apparel industry right now is that the retailers put us on 
sale way too much, so the customer doesn't know to come in and buy anything at regular 
price, they just wait for the sale. It's kind of like buying sheets. 224 
Retailers are pushing the whole thing and basically, they don't really care about flexible 
systems. All they want is as cheap as can be on time. 108 
The customer is driving it. They want more choices, they want to buy fewer of those choices. 
Instead of buying 10,000, they want to buy 20 different products, and maybe buy 100 of each 
one of those. 216 
Women are going to work in more casual type of clothing. It's not any more the suit. If you 
are a professional woman, it could be relaxed knit bottoms with pockets. The ability to get 
there faster and work with people, like (name), the style is good, but you also have to 
understand this is your market also, part of that cycle. 220 
there's more interest in unique corporate identity now, and that demand is growing 
exponentially. People are no longer satisfied with a uniform that looks just like company B 
or company C, they want a unique corporate image. 217 
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Theme Development 
Emergent Theme: Sourcing Variation 
Sample data representing sourcing variation theme: 
Yeah, we are sourcing more and more offshore, in China. Really trading all over, trying to 
get more of a better base in sourcing, so we can adjust to the market conditions. 209 
In applying this to flexible manufacturing, modular manufacturing, most people initially 
think of supplying people and equipment. You have to have people that are cross train^. 
Therefore, flexible people have to have flexible equipment. The one thing I think, in 
addition, means that flexibility regard to partnering that is in place and partnerships that have 
to be in place to receive the appropriate information as to what needs to be produced and two, 
you have to call on people that you don't generally have those capabilities. You have to go 
out of house for someone that does, and having that network set up such that you can, 
responds to the needs, whether or not you can produce it in house or not. Traditionally, we 
thought of, "Well if I can't do it, within our four walls, I can't make money at it" and I can't 
do it, too hard to control and this and that. That's is not necessarily true. 105 
A lot of it obviously is gonna rely on what kind of product you are making and how quickly 
you can get the raw materials. That's a big, big pan of it, because you can have a plant that 
can turn things around, but if you can't get the parts, you might as well forget it. But you do 
have to have a plant. So, part of it is standardizing what you are doing. What kind of 
equipment you have ahead of time, I mean, one of the things that leads to flexibility is not 
only using your own plant, but having access to using other people's plants, if you need it for 
a special item. And having those kinds of relationships. A lot of people do use contractors. 
In fact a lot of people in the dress business don't even own their own plants, they just use a 
series of contractors. And if x number of dress is hot and its got a certain type of stitching, 
they put it in this plant, and vice versa, and so the amount of flexibility they have really 
depends on the relationships that they have developed with these different plants, and 
obviously with their raw materials suppliers, you know their fabrics, mostly their fabric 
people. 224 
Ah, we are doing extensive off shore purchasing of finished goods, that is all over the world, 
we can't give you the name of the countries, it is extensive. So that, that gives the flexibility 
in regards to supply of a particular item, we had it made by a couple of different suppliers 
which is great, but it creates another problem. It is all right if variability in their products, but 
the flexibility from that aspect, yeah, it helps very much. We are very diversified in our 
supplier base as well. Different suppliers find the same component, but again you do have 
sm^ degrees of variation which is not always controllable. 208 
I think what the real, the real key here, also, that you have not mentioned in any of these 
questions, is the concept of flexible manufacturing as applied to the overseas market. If you 
can get 2 and 3 day turns, let's say on merchandise out of the Caribbean Basin at 10 cents on 
the dollar, I think that will be an unbelievable area for growth and eventually will catch up to 
the United States and just buiy us. 108 
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Theme Development 
Emergent Theme: Planning Variation 
Sample data representing planning variation theme: 
The other way is in scheduling, some of the front end aspects of your business, the back end 
aspects of it is the planning, "^en you have 8 weeks worth of work in process and a 
tremendous amount of cuts to manage and so forth, you can't, most manufacturers with that 
much in process, and that many variables are going to have, and quality was one of things 
was talking about. They can't tell you to within 15 minutes of when a cut is going to 
finish. They are lucky if they can tell you within a couple of days when that particular work 
is going to finish. You take all of that out, streamline it, reduce all the work in process and 
production planning and scheduling and so forth, can literally know within a matter of 15 
minutes when a particular product is going to be finished. You can run that much closer to 
the manufacturing process so it makes those jobs, it allows you to do a much more accurate, I 
am not going to say it is easier, because it changes the way that you scheduie and that might 
be what makes you that much more accurate in your abilities to determine that. 105 
any given order is likely to be different from another-no two individuals are the same. So the 
degree of customization, or the amount of work that must go into an individual's order varies 
day to day, and in such a way that you can't really predict anything. 222 
I guess in a system like that, what you probably have to do is you would have to, of course, 
plan and think of things that would possibly come up with that. Maybe like getting more 
mechanics trained and uh, having them assigned to a specific module and that module only. 
I guess companies would kind of have to think ahead and foreplan, you know, for things like 
that. 207 
Flexibility means that basically, you cannot micromanage, getting down to the old scheduling 
and production control techniques that were used in apparel manufacturing. When you are 
introducing wide variety of styles and product into, we used we be looking at, the only real 
style change in a factory twenty five years ago was a thread change, (now) it's thread, fabric, 
style, as well as product. 223 
We used to think flexibility was in place if you could change a plant over in six months, then 
you were pretty flexible and then that went to six to eight weeks and now it is down to a 
couple of weeks that you need to be able to respond, you need to be able to change. You see 
that really beginning to happen on a daily basis, product by product where the next one you 
malie might be slightly different and as long as you have the information about it and the 
tools that you need, then you will respond to it, the ultimate in flexibility. 104 
Constantly, every single day, one of the biggest that I run into from a planning standpoint is 
that people don't plan the production and lead time into merchandising. And even though we 
are in fashion industry and fashion turns quickly, the plans, designs, and table, the lead times 
are incredibly long. We've already put to bed Fall of 95, its already done and planned and the 
orders, materials, etc. As an example, I just looked at a dress just on Friday, a maternity 2-
piece outfit and the production sample was tested in our test lab in March. 200 
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Theme Development 
Emergent Theme: Process Variation 
Sample data represenring process variation theme: 
As far as flexibility, our company has gone to teams, teamwork, everything is teams and 
teamwork. Managers are teams and teamwork attacking problems, in a team approach rather 
than an individual, which makes it, gives us different angles to each problem, solves 
problems quicker. 216 
We use a system where various operators will do various jobs, and various parts of jobs. We 
don't run a bundle system. An operator may do a whole job, may do part of a job. The 
concept that we use is whatever it takes to get the product out the door, is what we have to 
do. That's part of our being flexible. 203 
Everything has to change. Everything means from our raw materials, supply deliveries, 
inte^^ parts, you cannot plan a little JIT without having supplier involvement and discipline 
and commitment, you know, so raw materials is the first thing they began to change and we 
couldn't understand what our customers, everything revolves around the customers, of 
course, by what their demands are, so we had to get them on board, our manufacturing means 
in regards to the work centers again, okay, having small companies within the big company, 
to, run specific styles, ah, that can be worked with that type of equipment, you know, ah, that 
obviously reflected to a management change and thinking, employee change and thinking. 
208 
If you're doing the same thing over and over again, like (name) blue jean, I can't see that unit 
production is going to be any more profitable, or any more flexible than progressive bundle. 
If you have a number of different products that you are wanting to run at the same time, I can 
envision that you would have four or five different assembly lines set up on a flexible 
manufacturing concept and you would be able to achieve a much quicker throughput than 
running one thing through progressive bundle environment, and then the next thing and the 
next. It's, when you change styles in a progressive bundle environment, it's very disruptive. 
217 
You've got to be flexible enough to change around your operation. Sew that fabric, press that 
fabric and meet that customer's desires. Who knows? Maybe it's not gonna work out long-
term, maybe the cost is not gonna work, and the people are gonna change, and next year, 
we're not gonna be doing wrinkle-free, or two years from now. That's the hot thing right 
now. As you noticed one of the plants their building a big end on, that's for wrinkle-free. It's 
the hot thing right now. 211 
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Theme Development 
Emergent Theme: Product Variation 
Sample data representing product variation theme: 
Saturday, I was on the phone with someone talking about producing an item for their line, 
like (designer name) does some bags and we've done some of their dresses and tops and they 
called us and said, "Can you do some bags for me?" And I know what (name) would say, 
"We really don't want to be in the bag manufacturing business." And they faxed us, and I sat 
down with (name)the other day and I said, "(Name) why not? It's only a couple thousand, 
you know we've got 5 or 6 people sitting around in subassembly, why not?" It's that type of 
mentality that keeps us alive. Whereas most manufacturers will say things like "All we do is 
pants. We don't want anything but pants" Or "Tops, all we do is tops". We're like," Baby 
clothes for (another designer name)? What do you think?" "Let's give it a shot!" 220 
Well I think the thing that we tend to deal with today is in the old days, people did not make, 
if you were a knit product plant, you didn't make wovens. If you were wovens, you didn't 
make knits. We are seeing a lot of those boundaries falling away. For instance, on rugby 
shirts, you've got woven collars on a knit shirt. 223 
Where Americans and domestic suppliers can still do a decent business, is by doing the high 
fashion stuff that they can, if something's hot today, they still, because everything's close by 
can make garments quickly. 224 
I see changes in the area of fabrics, more so than designs, also in the type of products that 
we're offering. We're getting into a GoreTex clothing, we're getting into a line of flame 
retardent products for fire departments, as well as our traditional uniform clothing for police, 
fire and postal. 217 
Well, domestic suppliers really have to become more flexible in order to be able to compete 
anymore, because on any kind of a basic styles, retailers themselves, much less other 
manufacturers can go offshore and program that kind of business out a year in advance. A 
pair of shorts, it's not gonna change firom year to year. The color might change, but you're 
still gonna have cotton twill shorts, and so.... A perfect example is many of the retailers will 
go, and they know that they sold x number of dozens of this short last year and so what they 
might do is they are going to run the same short next year, but they may just make a slight 
change maybe in the color, they might change the belt they put on it, or the button close or 
some thing, but in essence, they may not change the pant at all, they may not even change the 
fabric. So they can go to the Far East and plan that a year in advance, and know it's a pretty 
stable business. 224 
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Theme Developnient 
Emergent Theme: Structural/Functional Variation 
Sample data representing structural/funcrional variation theme: 
But, for dresses and sportswear, people that are trying to turn items quickly, obviously with 
relationships with their own contractors, and supplementing it obviously with a plant they 
own themselves, that may have the equipment that does the special trimming, maybe binding 
is important one season, piping or something, and you have to have special sewing 
equipment to put that on. So, either having that yourself or having relationships with people 
that can do that for you is obviously gonna add to your flexibility. 224 
And that is again that goes back to production planning and forecasting, but also how work is 
scheduled from orders, or whether its on a QR mode, kind of situation. The first component 
supporting this has to be the system side, and we are, our mode of operations, typically we 
try to improve the manufacturing processes without getting ample systems support to make it 
more flexible, to support it. That has been one of the missing links. 223 
There is an adversarial relationship between vendors and manufacturers and that has to stop. 
The walls have to break down between the vendor to the manufacturer to the retailer. 
Absolutely. All the things that go to make a garment, there has to be a team concept across 
different companies being the vendor to the manufacturing. You have got to kind of open up 
yourself to the and, and let them know that you have got to have this and this is the reason 
why because some say that maybe the best situation is that you produce the garment and 
know where it is until it is sold. That is very vertical. 
Today, you are looking at more of a flat line management system, everybody manages from 
one level, although it has to come from top down. All the way down. 220 
Yeah, we have gotten everything closer together. Ah, instead of having different divisions, 
we are all under one division now. We are more flexible than we used to be. One factory 
can, you know, they can adjust to what the other factory has made, like we have our uppers 
being made in one place and other stuff in another place. With better communications, we 
can adjust quicker and be more flexible. 209 
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Theme Development 
Emergent Theme: Flexibility as Transitional Capacity 
Sample data representing flexibility as transitional capacity theme: 
The ability to revisit the way of doing things. In other words, challenging the process that 
they arc currently employing constantly, will be probably the most essential element in their 
future success. Abandoning the old, traditional, tried and true methods is gonna be an 
absolute necessity. Ahh, and there are a few around that do that. 222 
Well, directly related to manufacturing, it would refer to the flexibility of a manufacturing or 
assembly line to adjust firom product line to product line. 217 
Rexible manufacturing, also could deal with the flexibility of working with contractors, 
working with vendors, different sourcing, offshore, to basically streamline and prepare on a 
real-time type of basis or just-in-time type of basis to supply your needs. 217 
Different styles, different, you know, all licensed and different products like that and fast 
deliveries. That's what it means to me. 218 
It's our philosophy, it's just the way we decided to build our company. We decided very 
early on to not have a product line, we only have a capability, so when we have a customer 
that comes to us and they want a widget cover, we can't say "Well, which widget cover do 
you want?" But we can ask them how they want that widget cover built and it's all, 
everything is customized to what they want. We try to address the customer's needs. 203 
Being flexible to me means having the ability to deal with a wide variety of styles, as well as 
some cases, being able to deal with a wide variety of products. 223 
I think that you should be open to new ideas, producing the garment in the best way, the best 
way from a cost standpoint, from a people standpoint, and from a time limit standpoint. 205 
Basically being flexible in apparel production to me means that you are going to survive in 
this industry. 107 
Being flexible in apparel production is the ability for a company or entity to meet the market 
demands. 108 
Most important characteristic. The ability to shift with change of situation. You have to be 
flexible in your approach. Now, I am not talking about flexible in terms of the way you are 
talking about it. I am speaking of it in terms of flexibility to do whatever is necessary, fly in 
goods if necessary, to react to what needs to happen and to have your line managers also be 
able to react to what needs to be, you know, happening. 108 
To us, information. That is the bottom line. We can do whatever we need to do, but we need 
the proper information, the proper information has to be routed forwarded to the next people 
who need that information. We try something new. We want to make sure that we take into 
consideration the ramifications for the next person and maybe even two people down the line, 
but it is all information as far as being flexible. We need the information from sales and 
scheduling early enough to make the right arrangements, training, machinery requirements. 
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getthosethingssetup, soitisinformarion, wouldbe#l. It is important. 201 
Everything has to change proportionally. If anything you do in management has got to fall 
all the way through to production and every other facet. You just cannot change one item. If 
you change a production to be highly mechanized and technically oriented, you've got to 
educate and retrain to better manage the technology and the people. It's a bdance. I guess its 
sort of a weird way to explain it, but when you build a race car, the carburetor has to balance 
out with the motor and the exhaust. Your management team, if you build a technology center 
that can produce an item very quickly and efficiently and you have to train your management 
to train the people how to use the equipment, the technology efficiently. If you don't make 
the training fall all the way through, then, there's a miscommunication all the way through. 
You can't expect production to understand what management wants. 220 
We've got 53 retail stores and we have gone through a major transition in our data processing 
department going off of maybe a 20 year old system or a ten year old system and upgrading 
to an AS400 with EDI capabilities. 217 
Because our disciplines, manufacturing and distribution are relatively new in the way they fit 
into the company, I think we're less encumbered by our successes, so we don't keep visiting 
those, because we've changed it so radically. We don't have a past reference point anymore. 
I would say, that, we in the manufacturing and distribution phase of the business are much 
more open minded. Customer driven is an essential driving force throughout the whole 
company. And certainly was a large element in our changing. 221 
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Theme Development 
Emergent Theme: Barriers to flexibility: Structural, functional, & cognitive 
Structural harriers 
Sample data representing structural barriers theme: 
Management hasn't changed that much. We still have the same type, we have the same 
structure, you know organizational chart, that really has not changed a great deal. 202 
And the bureaucracy, the management style that we had, the autocratic style, where people 
had to wait for the decision to te made at the top level today just can't exist, it can't work, it's 
not working. 223 
That will have to change, we'll have to be what you call flat organization to make other parts 
of the company more flexible. 202 
Functional harriers 
Sample data representing functional barriers theme: 
We personally tried the modular system and it didn't work for us. Maybe it's partly the way 
we put it together, and maybe we needed more management involved in it, but we found that 
we had people do work in a group and paid. And what happened was the good people 
worked hard, and were paid the same amount as the people in the group who didn't work 
hard, the good people got upset about this, and quit, and left us with the bad people. So, we 
have now gone back to paying people based on what each individual person does. 224 
So that there are companies, that I'm afraid are in deep trouble today as they have seen their 
explosion in styles, explosion in SKU's and they have not changed their manufacturing 
processes, they are in real trouble. They are incurring high costs, what we call high direct 
labor variance, underabsorbed overhead, wide discretion in earnings, a big difference 
between earnings one week and the next week, and consequently it causes a very unhappy 
workforce, low morale, high turnover, high absenteeism, all great things that go with that 
And they trying to use 1950 processes and systems to deal with the new millennium's 
production requirements. 223 
Again, when we talk change in our organization, we are generally talking about change for 
the shop people, and it's hands off for everybody else. 202 
Cognitive harriers 
Sample data representing cognitive barriers theme: 
I tend to think there are three major problems when people change from one to the other. 
Number one, they grossly underestimate the time required to evolve from one process to the 
other. The training that's required for people to assume a greater level of responsibility, and 
so consequently what happens is a lot of people just miss estimate I guess, or grossly 
underestimate tfie time required for this to happen. We're talking years, not months. And, 
that's one problem. Second problem is the level of sponsorship that comes down through the 
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organization. And if you have someone who believes that this is the right thing to do, either 
from a business strategy or from a human strategy sort of thing, are they prepared to sponsor 
this through the long process that I just talked about, in terms of getting it implemented. 
They sometimes lose their enthusiasm and move on to another flavor of the month. That I 
guess is kind of the second major problem that I run into. The third, is not really have an 
understanding of what they are trying to achieve, redesigning process there's unlimited types 
of combinations that you can put together between modular, quick line, UPS, and other 
linked processes, and the objective are trying to, there's not really a clear vision of what they 
are trying to achieve. "Do we need two days throughput time at this much cost per SAH, do 
we need this, do we need that?" It's really... a lot of people have gotten into it just thinking 
it's one way to achieve some downsizing, a way to achieve some reengineering, and maybe a 
way to cut costs. But they really don't have a real vision of what they are trying to achieve. 
223 
Look at the apparel industry ten years ago and look at the apparel industry today. We are just 
barely coming out of our shell. It's the ability to invest, and that's what we say. The 
technology is out there, the problem is that the old mentality of "I'm just going to build it, my 
machines are my machines, a single needle is a single needle, if I ne^ a trimmer I can have 
the human body do it. Nowadays, we can just walk away from that. Why have somebody 
trim it when we have a machine that can do it? 220 
We've tended to be, I think, tended to be somewhat cynical, but we've spent a lot of time 
visiting our past successes, and a lot of time praising ourselves at how well we've done in the 
past. I think it's a danger signal. I think it's something that senior management has to 
overcome. 221 
I think very simply that there's a comfort zone that people establish, saying "You know, I 
became famous, and this is a world-class company because I did these things. Now, you 
want me to change those things that made me successful? That'd be crazy!" That's what 
does it. I think, tiie more experienced, the more successful... The thing that really hit me the 
other day, was success is the greatest enemy of long-term profitability. Now, do you 
understand what I'm saying? So, our past success, and we are really one of the most 
successful companies in America could be the foundation of future failure if we don't evolve. 
221 
Well, 20 years ago when you were in manufacturing, you manufactured, and they bought 
what you manufactured. The complete shift is now they tell you what they want and that is 
basically going now in a virtual way, they not only tell you want they want, but they tell you 
when they want it and how much they are going to pay you for it and those things ^1 together 
create major problems and attitude in thinking of the managers that have to deal with this. 
They have, some can never deal with it. And unfortunately, because of their manufacturing 
experience and education, unfortunately, they send many companies down the tubes. It is sad 
to say, but it does happen. 107 
It (technology) doesn't necessary have to change, but the way you look at technology 
changes. We used to look at it as something that had to be maximized, that you had 
technology efficiencies in the same way you looked at operator efficiencies, so you wanted 
100% machine utilization in order to be 110% machine capacity. And the flexible 
manufacturing, Lhe goal is to provide what the customer wants in a very short period of time. 
That doesn't necessarily mean that you will be running equipment 100% of the time. You 
only run equipment when you need it rather than run it for the sake of running it, so in the 
201 
past, much of our inventory problem came from the fact that we were eying to keep 
machines running 100% of the time even when we didn't have orders for their production. 
We would gamble on it, oh, well the orders will be coming. 105 
Right now we're still, well when you talk about flexibility, you are talking about 
manufacturing, you're not talking about me a designer or me an R&D person or me in 
maintenance, or sales... salesmen. We don't touch the sales force, they get to continue, yet 
they could benefit by being more flexible. 202 
Flexibility in terms of thought processes, would get so locked in to the way things have been 
tliat there is just a very strong resistance to change and flexibility connotes change, it means 
change and so if you are going to be successful, you have to be able to accept whatever it is 
that is coming along, whether it is new equipment or new systems or new ways of tackling 
the old problems. 104 
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2. I agree to provide the proper sutveiUaace of this project to insure that the rights and welfare of the human subjects are 
protected. I will repon any adverse reaoions to tiieconunitiee. Additions to or dianges in research procedures after the 
projeahasbeenapprovedv^besubmiaedtothecommitteeforreview. lagreetorequestrenewaiofapprovalforanyprojeci 
continuirjg more than one year. / . 
Heidi P. Scheller 5/1/94 -
Typed Nms of Pnnciptl Invc&ifiiar 0*>e Sifs^unc^o^PnDcijial Invcsufuor 
294-2628 
Textiles & Clothing 1052 LeBaron Hall 
Depsimou Ciinpnt Addnu Cunput Teicphone 
3. Signatures of other investigators Date Relaticxiship to I^incipal Investigator 
4. PiincipalInvestigator(s) (check all that apply) 
• F^ty • Staff ^ Graduate Student • Undergraduate Student 
5. Projea (check all that apply) 
• Research ^ nie^ordissenaiion • Class project • Independent Study (490,590. Honors project) 
6. Number of subjects (complete all that apply) 
50 # Adults, non-smdents __ # ISU student 
Approximation 
.#minarsunder 14 
. * minors 14 • 17 
___ other (explain) 
7. Brief description of proposed research involving human subjects: (See instructions. Item 7. Usean additional page if 
needed.) Managers, sewing operators, and consultants in the apparel industry will be 
interviewed about issues related to flexibility in producing apparel. Two apparel 
research facilities will be toured, along with a variety of apparel production plants 
within the United States. Interviews will be tape recorded and content analyzed 
for themes relating to the objectives of the study. 
(Please do not send resesrcb, thesis, or dissertation proposals.) 
8. Informed Consent: • Signed informed consent will be obtained. (Attach a copy of your form.) 
S Modified informed consent will be obtained. (See instnictions, item 8.) 
• Not applicable to this project. 
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9. Confidentiality of Data: Describe below the nsethocis to be used to ensure the confidentiality of daia obtained. (See 
instructions, item 9.) 
Interviews will be held in private areas, where others cannot hear responses. 
Transcribed tapes will delete all names of people and firms that are referred to. 
No names of respondents will appear on transcriptions. Transcriptions will be 
identified by a coded number that only the researcher can identify. 
No information will be provided to respondents about how others in the study 
responded at the time of data collection. Respondents who so wish may receive 
a summary of the study's results. 
10. What risks or discomfort will be part of the smdy? Will subjects in the research be placed ar risk or incur discomfort? 
Describe any risks to the subjects and precautions that will be taken to minimize them. (The concept of risk goes beyond 
physical risk and includes risks to subjects' dignity and self-re^)ect as well as psychological or emodonal risk. See 
insBuctions, item 10.) 
None. 
11. CHECK ALL of the following that apply to your reseaRh: 
• A. Medical clearance necessary before subjects can participate 
• B. Samples (Blood, tissue, etc.) from subjeas 
n C. Administration of substances (foods, drugs, etc.) to siAjects 
• D. Physical exodse orcondidoning for subjects 
• £. Decqmon of subjects 
• F. Subjects under 14 yean of age and/br • Subjects 14-17 years of age 
• G. Subjects in institationa (noising homes, prisons, etc.) 
• H. Research must be approved by another instttudon or agency (Attach letters of approval) 
I t  yon checked any of the items in 11, please conplcte the foUowiof in the space below (include any attachments): 
Items A - D Describe the procedures and note the safety precaatioas being 
Item E Describe how subjects will be deceived; justify the deception; indicate the debriefing procedure, including 
the timing and infbnnation to be pienintcd to subjects. 
Item F For subjects under the age of 14. indicate how infonned consent from parents or legally authorized repre­
sentatives as well as from subjects will be obtained. 
Items G & H Specify the agency or instiuition that must approve the project If subjects in any outside agency or 
institution are involved, approval must be obtained prior to teginning the research, andtheletterof approval 
should be filed. 
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Last Name of Principal Investigator_^_f__^ 
Checklist for Attachments and Time Schedule 
The following are attached (please check): 
12.S Letter or written statement to subjects indicating clearly: 
a) purpose of the rcseaich 
b) the use of any identifier codes (names. #'s), how they will be used, and when they will be 
removed (see Item 17) 
c) an cstirratE of time needed forpanidpadon in the research and the place 
d) if applicable, location of the research acrivity 
e) how you will ensure confidentiality 
f) in a longitudinal study, note when and how you will contact subjects later 
g) panicipaiion is voluntary, nonpanicipanon will not affect evaluadons of the subject 
13. D Consent fonn (if applicable) ^ 
14. • Letter of approval for research from cooperaring organizations or instituaons (L^ applicable) 
15.0 Data-gathering instruments In development-wil l  submit later.  
16. Antidpated dates for contact with subjects: 
First Contact Last Contact 
June 13, 1994 August 15, 1994 
Momh/Diy/Year Month/Diy/Year 
17. If applicable: anridpated rintfi that identifiers will be removed from completed survey instmmenis and^or audio or visual 
tapes will be erased: 
May 1, 1995 
Month I Day / Yeir 
18. Signamre of Departmental Executive Of5cer Date Department or Administtarive Unit 
^ O^OttTtJLU d. 
19. Decision of the University Human Subjects Review Commioee: 
Project Approved Project Not Approved No Action Required 
X Project approved with the understanding the interview schedule will be submitted 
when it is completed. 
Patricia M. Keith ,/?An 
Name of Committee Chairperson Datk Signature 6f Commitiee Chauperson 
GC:l/90 
